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INTRODUCTION
The country in southeastern Europe known as "little
Greece" to its inhabitants of the nineteenth century

1

a population of one million just before the Crimean War
and its territory amounted to 47,000 square kilometers.

had
2
3

The newly formed nation became a kingdom in 1832 when Great
Britain, France and Russia, the three Protecting Powers of
Greece, appointed a Bavarian Prince, Otho I, to reign over
the country.

4

Otho came to Athens early in 1833 but the

king did not assume his responsibility as a ruler until he
was twenty years of age in 1835.

The man who dominated the

1 The Greeks of the nineteenth century had the Byzantine Empire in mind when they characterized the nation as
"little Greece."
2 E.About, E Hellada tou Othonos (E Synchrone Hellada,
1854), translated by A. Spelios, La Grece Contemporaine
(Athens), 52, who was writing before 1854 recorded that the
population of Greece was 950,000. A.R. Rangabes, Greece: Her
Present Progress and Position (New York, 1867), 22, maintains
that the population-of Greece in 1853 was 1,042,529. E. Nomikos, "The International Position of Greece During the Crimean
War'' {Ph.D.Dissertation, Stanford University Press, 1962),
290, has it at 1,000,000 for 1854 and it is safe to say that
this is the correct figure.

Il
i
!

3 Nomikos, "International Position of Greece," 290.
4 For the text of the Treaty of May 7, see British
and Foreign State Papers, XIX, 33-41. Also see G.F. Martens,
et ~., eds., Recueil ~ Traites d'alliance, de paix, de
treve et plusieurs autres actes servant '~ la connaissance
des relations etrangeres des puissances et etats de !'Europe
depuis 1761 jusqu'a present, X, 550-64. Gottinque, 1819-1944
{title Changes to Nouveau recueil general des traites • • • ·
from IX on).
1

2
scene and exerted much influence in the government was Count
Joseph von Armansperg.

5

After February 1837 Otho became the

absolute ruler of Greece as he dismissed Armansperg from his
position as Arch-Chancellor.

The king ruled without a con-

stitution for about seven years after the Armansperg dismissal, but not without opposition.

During that time he managed

to accomplish nothing more than hatred from his subjects, rivalry from the Greek political parties and the three Protecting
Powers, all elements which contributed to the weakness of the
young nation.

As Professor Tsivanopoulos points out:

Instead of exerting himself to consolidate the freedom
which the Greeks had conquered, the efforts of King Otho
were all directed toward the complete extinction of that
freedom.
The Bavarian ruler, forgetful that he was an
elected Monarch, and that his subjects had won their independence by their own swords, thought that he was
called to govern after the fashion of his ancestors.
• • • The people who had preserved their institutions
entirely under the weight of Ottoman dominance, now saw
their cguntry transformed into the likeness of a German
duchy.
Othonian absolutism was too unpopular among the freedomloving Greeks who in 1834 revolted and demanded that a con-

5 Armansperg was appointed president during the first
Regency in Greece by a decree of 5 October 1832 of Ludwig,
King of Bavaria. Armansperg was known for his liberal tendencies and this is the reason he was favored for the Regency
in Greece which he shared with the first regency headed by
Professor Ludwig von Naurer and Major-General Karl Wilhelm
von Herdeck.
See J.A. Petropoulos, Politics and Statecraft
in~ Kingdom of Greece, 1833-1843 (Princeton;-1968), 155,
for the period of the first Regency see 153-217.
6 S.I. Tzivanopoulos, Katastasis ~ Hellados ~
Othonos kai Prosdokiai Aftis Ypo ~ Aftou Megalioteta ~
giou A Basilea Hellinon (The Condition of Greece under Otho
and Her Expectations under His Majesty George I, King of the
Greeks) (Athens, 1864), 4-5.

3

stitution be drawn up so that the people would have some
form of representation in their government.
The principal leaders of the September revolution

7

were military officers who had much of the public support
in the ·capital.

The 1843 revolution was bloodless and more

important it was successful in driving the Bavarian bureaucracy from Greece and persuading Otho to agree to a formation of a constitution.

The French constitution of 1830 was

used as the model for the Greek Constitution of 1843 which
was to change the political system and hopefully bring economic relief and general progress to "little Greece."

In

the field of religion, the Greek Orthodox Church was recognized as the official national Church but all religions would
8
be tolerated.
(Arts. 1 & 2.)
In the field of civil rights
important accomplishments were achieved.
equal under the law • • • • " (Art.3.)

"All Greeks are

"The press is free,

and censorship is not allowed." (Art.lO.)

The new Constitu-

tion secured certain legislative rights for the representatives of the people as it stated that the legislative power
belongs to the king, the Boule

9

(Parliament), and the

7 See Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 434-52.
8 For the full text of the Constitution see G. Aspreas,
Politike Historia tes Neoteras Hellados (Political History of
Modern Greece) (Athens), I, 175-84.
9 All transliterations and translations in this work
are those of the author unless otherwise indicated.

4

Gerousia (Senate).

(Art.lS.)

"The official interpretation

of the laws belongs to the Legislative authorities." (Art.l9.)
Even though the Constitution did provide for many
political and civil rights of the people, it was still a Constitution which fell short of creating a liberal form of government such as enjoyed by Great Britain at the time.

The

king was guaranteed such powers that if put to use, as they
were, would in fact make him an absolute monarch.

The king

had the right to appoint and dismiss ministers at will. (Art.
24.)

He had the right to declare.war and conclude treaties

of peace, alliances and commerce. (Art.25.)

He also had the

right to dismiss the Parliament, (Art.30) and also to appoint
senators, (Art.70) and judges, (Art.86).

The most important

accomplishment of the revolution of 1843 and the constitutional achievement was the elimination of the Bavarian
bureaucracy which administered the affairs of the country
since 1832, and the theoretical limitation of the monarchical
power.
There were three political parties; the "French 11
party or moshomanga as it was commonly known, the "Russian''
party or napist and the "English" party.

All parties were

in a position to share in the power of governing their
10
country.
As the names of these parties indicate they
were set up and supported by individuals who were convinced
10 See Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 96-106, for
the origin of the parties.

5

that the Protecting Power, which they modeled their party
after, had helped the Greeks in the past and would help
Greece more than any other in the future.

The parties also

designated the internal policy supported by their followers.
Those who were affiliated with the "Russian" party wanted
the government of Greece to be modelled after that of the
Tsarist Russia and to be as friendly as possible to that
Protecting Power.

Those who followed the "English" tended

to be constitutionalists and were opposed to the Bavarian
Dynasty in Greece as long as it would insist in ruling absolutistically.

The "French" party was somewhere in between

the one extreme and the other though it tended to side with
the "Russians" more often than with the "English."

Natur-

ally the three Protecting Powers infiltrated the political
parties of Greece in order to exert the maximum possible influence in the governing process of the country.
to the treaty of 7 May 1832

11

According

drawn up by the Protecting

Powers, Greece would be under the constant surveillance of
Great Britain, France and Russia until it had discharged its
financial obligations to these countries.

Article XII of

the Treaty states that Greece was guaranteed a loan of 60
million francs by the three Powers for which:
The sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be
bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest
and sinking fund of such instalments of the loan as

11 K. Strupp, ed., La situation internationale de la
Grece (1821-1917); Recueil de documents choisis et ~dites ~
une introduction historigue et dogmatigue {Zurich, 1918), 136-39,

6

may have been raised under the guarantee of the three
Courts, the first revenues of the state in such a manner
that the actual receipts of the Greek treasury shall be
devoted, first of all, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for
any other purpose, until those payments on account of
the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee
of the three Courts, shall have been completely secured
fo~ the current year.
The diplomatic representatives
of the three Courts in Greece shall be especially charged
to watch ~ver the fulfillment of the last mentioned stipulation. 1
Under such conditions it was clearly impossible that the Protecting Powers would not interfere in the internal affairs
of Greece.

The stage for foreign political dominance was

set therefore by the Treaty of May 1832 when the Bavarian
Prince, Otho, was elected to rule over the Greek people and
when strict measures were set up by the Powers to influence
the government of Greece.
The history of the Othonian period in the political
sphere is marked by rivalries among the parties and therefore among England, France and Russia.

From 1837 when Otho

dismissed Armansperg and assumed the role to an absolute
monarch until 1840 the "Russian" party was the dominant fac13
tion in Greece.
From 1841 until 1850 the "French" party
enjoyed political supremacy, leaving the "English" party
with a brief period of four months in 1844 to play the dominant role in the political sphere.

The importance of con-

12 J.A. Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the
Great Powers, 1821-1898 (New York, 1944), 36.
13 Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 291-320.

7

troling or having a good deal of influence in the Greek
Government was immense for the Great Powers.

There were

economic, strategic and political reasons which made Greece
an attractive nation to control in the Near East.
The dominance of one party in the government meant
the alliance of Greece with that party's patron nation and
her opposition to the patron nations of the other two parties.

During the 30-year period of "foreign party" rule

Greece became victim of such politics which continuously
placed her under the antagonisms of the Protecting Powers.
The worst of all the devastating consequences suffered by
the young nation was in the period during the Crimean War
when her foreign policy antagonised that of the Allied
Powers and favored Russia.

In this work the development

of foreign and domestic Greek policy as well as international incidents which occured in Greece from 1844 until
1857 will be traced to unfold the whole story of the insurrection of 1854 and the Franco-British occupation of Greece
which followed.

The reason that this study begins with the

Kolettes administration in 1844 and not with the Menshikov
mission in 1853 is because the causes which gave rise to
the events of 1854 are to be found in the decade earlier.
First, the government of Kolettes, founder of the "French''
14
party,
supported a policy of irredentism, as opposed to
internal development, second, it supported brigand chiefs
who were a potential threat to the neighboring Turks, third,
14 ~., 137-41.

8

it opposed constitutionalism in Greece, and fourth, it created
a very hostile environment for Greek-British relations which
led to a number of confrontations between the two countries,
Greece always coming out as the loser.
At the opening of Greek-Turkish hostilities in 1853
the British minister at Athens, Thomas Wyse, felt that the
era of the Kolettes administration was responsible for the
problems which were currently facing Greece.
"Place" and "Religion," "Hellenic Nationality" and
"Eastern Church" against the Proselytism and Anti-hellenism of the Western Religions and Politics, is the
cry put forward in plain terms, in all their recent
publications. This cry might have been resisted some
years ago with every prospect and probability of success, by the counter cry of Commerce and Constitution
and by a cordial cooperation in support of both, on
the part of the two great Western Powers, England and
France. But these claims have of late years much diminished principally owing to the narrow and purely
personal policy pursued by France since the Administration of Mr. Coletti (Kolettis), surrendering for the
illusory influence derived from ephemerel Portofolios
and Court favors that solid power, now required, which
can only be attained by honest and pre~~rving exertions
for the true interests of the people.
As the Kolettist era was linked with the rise of the events
of 1854, the Greek-British hostilities from 1847 to 1850
were also responsible for harsh measures adopted by the
Allied Powers against Greece during the occupation.

The

three-year Franco-British occupation, the persistent attempts
by the king to carry out a policy of irredentism, and the
socio-economic consequences of the war and occupation will
15

F.O. 32/205 (No. 33) Confidential, Wyse to
Clarendon, Athens, March 23, 1853.

9
all be discussed in order to determine what the role of
Greece was during the Crimean War.

CHAPTER 1
THE KOLETTES ADMINISTRATION AND
ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN GREECE
A.

The Nature of the Kolettes Government

John Kolettes, the founder and leader of the "French"
party, was appointed Prime Minister of Greece by the king on
6 August 1844 after he had contributed a ·great deal to the
disturbances which led to the resignation of the Mavrokordatos Government.

Alexander Mavrokordatos, leader of the

"English" party, was elected Prime Minister on 30 March 1844.
Besides the political opposition pressures from Kolettes and
Metaxas, founder and leader of the "Russian" party, several
other incidents occured which contributed to the downfall
of Mavrokordatos on August 4th.

The press accused him of

"becoming an English organ for a British conquest of Greece
according to the method applied by the British in the conquest of India and presently applied in Greece."

1

Another

factor which damaged the image of the Prime Minister was
the publication of the Londos, Minister of Justice, letter
which ordered the authorities of Patras to "secure his election at any price."

Finally, the illegal election of Kalergis,

1 D. Fotiades, Othonas: E Exosis (Otho: The Exile)
(Athens, 1975), 26.
10

11
the General who led the military against the absolutist
regime of Otho in the revolution of September 1843, helped
2
to bring the resignation of Mavrokordatos.
The new Prime Minister's sympathy with the Crown
influenced the royal decision.

In a message sent to Desages,

the French Charge d'Affaires, dated 29 February 1844, Kolettes
expressed his real views about the constitutionalists of 1843.
He claimed he had to infiltrate the National Assembly "in
order to neutralize the influence of the revolutionary sector," so that the King, the monarchy, and the country would
be saved.

3

Kolettes became one of the most notorious dictators
in the history of modern Greece when he realized that his
affection for the Crown would give him unlimited power to
act at will instead of following the Constitution.

Even

though he declared in public that he was a firm believer

2 For details on the resignation of Mavrokordatos
and the summoning of Kolettes see Aspreas, Modern Greece, I,
188-92, also P. Karolides, Synchronos Historia ~ Hellinon
kai ton Loinon Laon tes Anatoles, 1821 mechri 1921 (Contemporary-History ~he-Greeks and the Rest of the People of
the East 1821 until 1921) (Athens, 1922), III, 138-70. For
details on the revolution of 1843 see D. Fotiades, Othonas:
! Monarchia (Otho: The Monarchy) (Athens, 1963), 281-369,
also see B. Jelavich, Russia and the Greek Revolution of
1843 (Munich, 1966). For details-on the origin, nature-and
purpose of the Greek political parties see A. Skandames,
Selides Politikes Historias kai Kritikes, E Triakontaetia
tes Basileias tou Othonos, 1832-1862 (Page; of Political
lli;tory and Criticism, The Th!rty=y;ar Kingdom of Otho, 18321862) (Athens, 1961), 596-660, also Petropoulos, Kingdom of
Greece, 53-106.
3 Karolides, History

£f

the Greeks, III, 145-46.

12
in justice, impartiality, and constitutional principles,

4

he acted in a dictatorial manner and disregarded the laws of
the land.

Most of his contemporaries as well as modern his-

torians agree that Kolettes abused the Constitution (of 1843).
Nicholaos Dragoumes, affiliated with the "English" party, described Kolettes as a liar, a man who suppressed public authorities, persecuted the press, intervened in elections, and sys5
tematically eliminated political opposition.
Another contemporary - - a French writer - - wrote:
The manner in which Kolettes attempted to wipe out the
Parliament, is all new, alien to Greek ethics • • • •
The last struggle of the government against the island
of Hydra in the election recognized by the examining
committee as perfectly legal was cancelled. This struggle proclaims • • • the first step toward the establishment of a system of dictatorship. 6
Scholars of modern Greek history, whether they are leftists
8
like Kordatos, 7 liberal like Douglas Dakin,
or monarchists
9
like Aspreas,
all characterize the Government of Kolettes
4 Fotiades, Otho: The Exile, 29, also see Nikos A.
Antonakeas, Favlokra~ 1821-1950 (Government by Villains,
1821-1950) (Athens, 1950):-I; ~
5 N. Dragoumes, Historikai Anamneseis (Historical
Recollections) (Athens, 1925), II, 124-126.

6 "Revue de Deux Mondes'' quoted in Dragoumes, Recollections, II, 127.
7 G. Kordatos, Historia tes Neoteras Helladas (History of Modern Greece) (Athens, 1957-1958), III, 367-76.
8 Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 17701923 (London, 1972), 80-8~
9 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 206-10.

13
as "Parliamentary Dictatorship."
Born in Epirus and educated in Italy, Kolettes became the doctor of Ali Pasha of Janina which may explain his
attitude about government.

Bower and Bolitho, biographers

of Otho I, write that:
His (Kolettes) idea of ruling Greece was founded on the
principles of his former master Ali Pasha; bribery, corruption and malversation of public funds. His party was
composed of the least stable elements of the country and
he deliberately set out to assimilate as many of these
as possible into the administration in order to prevent
them from making trouble. 10

.

At the beginning of his appointment "the Prime Minister of
the 6th of August," as Kolettes was known by his contemporaries, had the support of Metaxas and the "Russian" party
otherwise he would not have been able to maintain a majority
11
needed to form a government.
Metaxas was in charge of
the Ministries of Navy and Economics, and the Prime Minister
reserved for himself the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of
Internal Affairs and of Ecclesiastical Affairs.

The Kolettes-

Metaxas coalition was designed to eliminate the threat of
constitutionalism in Greece.

By the time of the first elec-

tiona, "having at its disposal the military and political
authorities, using force and intrigue, the allied government almost anihilated the "English" party in all of Greece."
10 L. Bower and G. Belitho, Otho I: King of Greece:
A Biography (London, 1939), 137.
11 Mavrokordatos had 53 Deputies while the KolettesMetaxas coalition had 67. See Fotiades, The Exile, 31.
12

Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 196.

12

14
It was not the intention of this dictator, however,
to share his power with the "Russian" party and Metaxas.
By 30 December 1844 Piscatory, the French Minister at Athens,
could write to Guizot that, "the success of Kolettes is continuing.

Metaxas until now is following an honest policy.

And he sees that his party is disintegrating under the sun
13
of Kolettes' [party]."
On July 26th Metaxas gave his
written resignation to the King and so Kolettes and the
Moschomanga, as the "French" party was commonly known, mono14
polized political power.
With the Napists out of the picture Kolettes had
concentrated his power in his own hands but he was also
fearful of the political opposition which was building as
a result of the government's inability to accomplish anything other than corruption.

On 2 September 1845

~

(Century), the Russian newspaper, published an article exposing the unconstitutional practices of the government.
"Greece is ruled constitutionally and Kalerges, Spiro-Melios,
13 Cited in Karolides, History of the Greeks, III
205-6.
14 The apparent cause for the withdrawal of Metaxas
from the Kolettes Government was that the Napists-"Russian"
party - - wanted to control Church affairs. Metaxas had
asked for the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs but was
denied by the Prime Minister since two of his men, (R. Palamides and D. Kalifronas), also had a strong claim to it.
See Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 523-24.

15
Skarveles, Rodites and other "Septemberist" officers are
being ostracized, mourning away from their families, and
Makrygiannes is considered suspect of discovering the plot
15
against the Constitution."
John Makrygiannes, a military hero affiliated with the "French" party, was one of
the leaders who fought for Constitutionalism in 1843.

In

his memoirs Makrygiannes recalled the determination of
Kolettes to annihilate the "Constitutionalists" of 1843,
and do away with the Constitution itself and its influence
on the public mind.

In March 1845 Kolettes ordered that

the inscription of the Constitution should

~

be displayed

in the public ceremony of the 25th March national celebration.

He further had plans to disperse the

"Constitution-

alists" at the ceremony by the military forces.

"They were

determined," writes Makrygiannes, "to destroy the Constitution.

They make an Association at first, to assassinate at

one time all the "Septemberists" all who did not shut up on
their own. •

. ."

16

The Prime Minister's plans were never

carried out for they were discovered by

~lakrygiannes

and his

friends, but this one particular case of Kolettist tactics
exemplified how his government operated while in power.

15 Aion September 2, 1845.
16 G. Makrygiannes, Makrvgianne Apomnemoneumata
(Makrygianne Memoirs) (Athens, 1972), 290-91.

16
Kolettes would not have been able to emerge as the
dynamic dictator that he was in a country whose monarch was
known for his absolutist tendencies even after he accepted
the Constitution unless he had the solid support of the
Crown;

In a letter to Metternich, Otho expressed his grea-

test satisfaction with his Prime Minister and his achievements.
My present Government for the happiness of Greece has
faced fortunately all the storms, which threatened it.
I say for the happiness of Greece, for I doubt seriously
whether another Government would be in position to insure tranquility in the country.
I have also reason to
be pleased from the devotion of Kolettes to me. 17
Royal support for the administration of Kolettes secured an
unchallenged government in power whose major task was to
stay in power.

The major opponent of the "French" party

was the Mavrokordatos faction which was weakening considerably under the increasing power of the existing administration.

Elections were conducted in an openly illegal manner

by the use of force exercised by the government in power on
the voters in order to secure the re-election of the party
18
member.
The result of course was the lifetime Prime
Ministership of John Kolettes and the dominance of the
"French" party in politics for the decade of the forties.

17 Otho to Metternich, Athens, April 27, 1846, quoted in Skandames, Political History, 942.
18 E. Kyriakides, E Historia tou Synchronou Hellinis~ ~ tes Idryseos ~ Basileiou tes Hellados 1832-1892
(History of Contemporary Greeks from the Founding of the
Kingdom of Greece, 1832-1892) (Athens, 1972, I, 523-24.

17

Such was the nature of the Kolettes administration;
brutal, corrupt, dictatorial, all elements which contributed to the degradation of the young Greek nation in need of
economic growth and development.

If the word "favlokratia"

(government by villains) is applicable to any Greek administration in the nineteenth century, it is certainly a fair
label for that of Kolettes.
the following goals:

His government set out to achieve

(1) The restoration of prestige to the

Crown, (2) the permanent establishment of his Prime Ministership, and (3) the expansion of the country's boundaries.

The

first two goals were accomplished; as a result the work of
the Constitutional revolution was wasted as Greece once again
after the Kolettes administration became in practice an absolute monarchy.
B.

The Expansionist Foreign Policv of Kolettes
and the Mousouros Incident
Kolettes' foreign policy has been described by his-

torians by the terms Megali Idea (Great Idea).

This concept

owes its origin to prerevolutionary thought and dreams of
those Greeks who believed that one day they would free themselves from the Ottoman Empire and restore in its place the
immortal Byzantine Empire.

This was a dream which kept the

Greek spirit alive amidst a Muslim conqueror.

For many

Greeks including Kolettes this dream was taken very seriously.
In 1844 the "Prime Minister of the 6th of August" conceptualized the Megali Idea in the following manner:

18

Greece, by her geographical location is the center of
Europe; with the East on her right and the West on her
left she was destined through her downfall to enlighten
the East. Our forefathers executed this task, the second is assigned to us.
In the spirit of our oath and
this great idea we saw always the delegates of the nation assembling to decide not for the fate of Greece but
for the entire Greek race. A nation which through its
own downfall enlightened so many other nations, is reborn today, not divided into many small states, but consolidated, with one government and one religion • • • •
What do all the Orthodox Christian peoples in Europe,
the East, and elsewhere do? All wait to hear whether
we still possess the Greek idea. 19
In opposition and as a practical alternative to the foreign
policy of irredentism of Kolettes and the Crown the "English"
party with Mavrokordato offered a policy of internal development and economic growth.
Mavrokordatos was a liberal whose main concern was
the economic strengthening of the weak.young nation.

He be-

lieved that the Greek Government should not be looking to
free the remaining Greek occupied territories of Thessaly,
Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, and Crete but rather it should
concentrate on developing internally its economic sector.
Once the country was strong enough internally it could take
up the challenge of the Ottoman Empire in order to regain
its desired territories.

Kolletes on the other hand was

convinced "that the first and major goal of the young country should be boundary expansion and that the work o£ internal revival was unattainable with the poor means of the

19 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 337-40.
The translation used here is in Petropoulos, Kingdom of
Greece, 509-10.
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free fragment of Greek land.
the Kingdom

He felt that the creation of

a condition of truce, not peace, and this
20
truce should be broken as soon as possible."
Even though,
wa~

as Tatsios remarks, "the solution to the nation's internal
and external problems were identified with two antithetical
pol i tical groups, • • • " 21

namely that of Kolettes and

that of Mavrokordatos, it was clear to most people in the
government and to those comprising an educated public opinion that a policy of internal development was more urgent
than a policy of irredentism which antagonized not only the
Sublime Porte but the Great Powers' Near Eastern policy as
22
well.
The only opposition to the Megali Idea foreign policy came from the "Russian" and "English" parties.

In a

series of articles published in the Aion, the "Russian"
organ, (on the lOth, 13th and 17th September 1847) the
Megali Idea was bitterly attacked as a treacherous policy
23
dangerous to the interests of Greece.
The Western Powers,

20 G.N. Philaretos, Xenokratia kai Basileia en Helladi, 1821-1897 (Foreign Rule and Royal~in Greece,-r8211897) (Athens, 1897), 82.
21 T. Tatsios, "The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish
War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897'' (Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University,
1973), 26.
22 During the Kolettes Administration the Great Powers Near Eastern Policy was the maintenance of the status
quo.
See M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Ouestion, 1774-1923
(New York, 1968), 112-13.
23 Cited in Fotiades, The Exile, 43.

20
namely France and Great Britain, also criticized the expansionist policy of Kolettes.

The French foreign minister of

Louis-Philippe, Francois Guizot, a long time friend of
24
Kolettes,
and his most faithful European political supporter, opposed the personal policy of expansionism entertained by Kolettes.
The Near Eastern policy of Guizot during the Kolettes
administration was parallel to that of England, namely, the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire and maintenance of the status
25
quo in the Balkans.
In a letrer to Kolettes before the
new Minister took office, Guizot made it clear that France
supported the Integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
You are much preoccupied with the future of the Greek
race, but don't be deceived; this will not come tomorrow.
It is very far.
Be certain as to this. Europe, and when
I say Europe I mean the good as well as the bad European
policy, our friends as well as our enemies, Europe does
not want the near falling of the Ottoman state • • • •
Europe had made a firm decision and Greece will not blackmail the hands of Europe • • • direct your attention to
the domestic affairs of Greece, in order to r~gtate her
simply as a country governable domestically.
Kolettes, who had found it convenient to lie about his beliefs and convictions concerning the Constitution and the
idea of justice for all, also found it convenient to lie to
24 Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, 509.

25 In the correspondence between Princess Lieven and
Lord Aberdeen there is a desire expressed on the part of both
France and England not to have a confrontation over Greek affairs, Jones E. Parry, The Correspondence of Lord Aberdeen
and Princess Lieven, 1832-1854 (London, 1938-39), I, 216-17,225.
26 Cited in Karolides, History of the Greeks, III,
192-93.
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a European statesman about the foreign policy which he had
designed to carry out.

He wrote to Guizot that the present

administration in Athens had no intentions or plans to antagonize the Ottoman Empire even though he was firmly convinced
of the·injustice of a "little Greece" carved out by the will
of the Great Powers.
This is my belief; but never was it meant that this destiny should be fulfilled by an invasion in the Ottoman
state of by a forced conversion (propaganda}.
I am therefore a devotee of the status quo. This is why from the
beginning of my entrance into the government I seriously
struggled to curb the forceful excitement of the small
prudent and small provident of the Parliamentarians who
push the government on a dangerous and anti-rational road.
The measures which I have taken have pleasant results;
the frontier relations between the Greeks and the Ottoman
authorities are perfectly friendly; and they give cause
for mutual help to each other.
I declare my respectable
friend that for as long as I am Prime Minister Turkey
will have nothing to fear for my part. Every unfriendly
movement against the neighboring frontiers I regard least
political and very dangerous. 27
These promises made to Guizot were never kept nor were they
meant seriously.

Kolettes knew what the policy of Europe in

the Near East was but he had to choose between following the
wishes of Europe or following his own policy and become popular with the King as well as with the majority of the people.
By raising the flag of the Megali Idea the "Prime Minister

of 6 August" appealed to the nationalist sentiments of the
masses who were eager to see all Greeks in the Ottoman Provinces join the mother country.

27

Cited in ibid., 194.

On the one hand the Prime

22
Minister was promising to Europe to support the status quo
in the Near East and on the other he was promising the people of Greece expansion of territories.

This contradictory

policy of Kolettes had as its purpose the popularity of his
own government both with Europe and with the Greek people.
Some of his astute contemporaries, however, who were
involved in political life could see this contradiction in
the government's policy and criticized it as a deceptive
policy.

''But because the disappointment against the autho-

rities,'' wrote Dragoumes, "inflam~d openly by foreigners,
was general, the government was fearful of the springing up
of general disturbances, the Megali Idea was

forwarded~

elec-

trifying the people distracting and altering their attention
28
from the domestic to the foreign grandeur of the country ...
In this passage Dragoumes explains that the Prime Minister
used the Megali Idea policy to distract the people's attention from the domestic to the foreign problems giving them
hope of national expansion.

It cannot be maintained, however,

that the Kolettes administration went no further than verbal
promises about national expansion.

One of the practical

steps that the government which believed in the Megali Idea
adopted was the support of Brigandage.

Throughout Greece

as well as in the Greek-Turkish borders the "war-party'' of
Kolettes (as it was labeled since they supported war), allowed

28

Dragoumes, Recollections, II, 135.

I''
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Brigandage to continue to grow and actually supported it.
The Prime Minister viewed the Brigandage chiefs as valuable
warriors who would be used in an event of a Greek-Turkish
29
war.
"Always the domestic questions were small and secondary," writes Kyriakides, ''commerce and industry never occupied his thoughts and his conceptions; about transportation, about road planning he never thought, because he conceives one and only road to plan, that toward Thessalonika,
and toward Constantinople; about Brigandage he is never concerned, because the brigands are his future soldiers • • •
31
The Ottoman Empire as well as Great Britain
criticized
32
the government in Athens for its support of Brigandage.

"

30

In the House of Lords, Lord Beaumont criticized the domestic
as well as the foreign policy of Greek aggression against
Turkey.
Not only had Athens become the scene of the deepest and
strangest intrigues • • • but even beyond the internal
affairs of Greece, beyond the frontiers, had that country already shown a total disrespect, not only for treaties, but for the common laws of nations - - for the
common practice of international friendship; and set a
defiance at the common laws of humanity, by establish-

29

Aspreas, Modern Greece, I 203.

30 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 527.
31 Palmerston was chiefly responsible for the deeper
British involvement in Turk~y and t~e Near East for economic,
strategic and political reasons.
See G.D. Clayton, Britain
and the Eastern Ouestion: Messolonghi to Gallipoli (London,
1971), 73-39.
32 Brigandage was a phenomenon that had been in existence for as long as Greece was under the domination of the
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ing on the frontiers of Turkey an absolute system of
Brigandage. 3 3
The Megali Idea propagated through the government newspapers
caused Chekib Effendi, the Turkish minister for foreign affairs, to complain to the ambassadors of the three Protecting Powers on 17 March 1845.

Chekib Effendi accused the

Greek Government of exciting revolutionary activities in
ThessaLy and Epirus, Turkish provinces, populated mostly by
Greeks.

He warned that if support to revolutionary intrigues

continued in these provinces the Sublime Porte would resort
34
to strong measures of repression.
Under the pressure of
the Turkish Government as well as of the Great Powers Kolettes
was forced to adopt measures less hostile to the neighboring
nation.
The most faithful supporter of the Sublime Porte at
this time was the British foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston,
who reacted with extreme anger toward the government of Athens
when informed of Greek anti-Turkish schemes.

Influenced by

reports from the Constantinople embassy as well as the Lega-

Sublime Porte.
Brigands became the heroes of the country
during the War of Independence as they took the name of
klefts (thieves) and armatoloi (guerrila warriors). Brigandage continued after the War of Independence as many hoped
to free all of the Greek territories.
33 Sessions of May 22, 1845, Hansard, 3rd series.
LXXX, 7 56.

34 George Finlay, ! History of Greece from its Con----quest £y the Romans to the Present Time, R.C. 146 to A.D.
~, VII, (Oxford, 1877), 200.
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tion at Athens, the British Foreign Secretary accused Kolettes
of encouraging disorder and granting amnesty to bands of brig35
ands.
The government in Athens hoped to counter the British
antagortism to Greece by using France, the supporter of the
Moschomanga (the "French'' party), as its protector.

Kolettes

was convinced that he needed to counterbalance the power of
Lord Palmerston, who opposed the Greek administration in power, with that of French Foreign Minister, Guizot, and the
French Legation in Athens who supported the administration.

36

Since France had stood solidly behind Kolettes ever since he
took power, the Greek Prime Minister believed that his patron
nation would once again come to his rescue.
The situation was not as simple, however, as Kolettes
viewed it at the time.

Guizot had an obligation to support

the pro-French government in Athens but he was also committed
to support Mustafa Reshid Pasha, the progressive Turkish
statesman who had served as ambassador to Paris after he was
37
dismissed as Foreign Minister in 1841
and was as much pro38
French as Kolettes.
If Guizot would have decided to support the Kolettes administration his country would have risked

35 Ibid., 200-1, also L. Sergeant, Greece in the Nineteenth Centurv: A Record of Hellenic Emancipation and Progress,
1821-1897 (London, 1897), 236-7.
36 Douglas Johnson, Guizot: Aspects of French History
London, (Routledge, & Kegan, Paul 1963), 312-13.
37 Anderson, Eastern Question, 108.
38 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 525-6.
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losing both Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire as important allies.

So it was impossible for the French foreign

minister to sacrifice the interests of his country by opposing Palmerston and the Ottoman Empire in order to satisfy
the expansionist dreams of a petty Greek politician.

As the

observations made in the House of Lords in 1845 by Lord
Beaumont indicate, the Near Eastern interests of both Western
Protecting Powers were identical and not conflicting as
Kolettes and many other Greeks believed.
The interests of the two countries were essentially the
same in both quarters - - their object was, and ought to
be identical. England and France alike were deeply interested in preserving the independence, integrity and
due influence of the Ottoman Empire, who was and could
be the only safe keeper of the Dardanelles; for should
the key of that gate be wrenched from her, and the opening and shuting of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus be at
the discretion of the Northern Power, the trade and possessions of England and France in the Mediterranean be
at the mercy of Russia. 39
Since England and France shared common interests in the Mediterranean against Russia it would have been logical for
Kolettes to appeal to the Tsar for help but since the revolution of 1843 Russia had taken a back seat in the affairs
of Greece.

First, the napists were not in control of the

government, and second, Russia disapproved of the constitu40
tional change which had taken place in Greece.
Furthermore, the Tsar had "made it clear" to the British government
39 Sessions of July 31, 1845, Hansard, 3rd series,
LXXXII, 1279.
40 Russia approved of the Kolettes government even
though she did not support it. Nesselrodo to Meyendorff,
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in the summer of 1844, "that he would oppose control of Constantinople and the Straits by any one of the Great Powers
(including Russia) or by an enlarged and strengthened Greece."
Considering that none of the Powers were ready to support expansiou of Greece at the cost or upsetting the status quo in
the Near East, it would be realistic for Kolettes to abandon
his immediate plans of Megali Idea.

No force, however, was

large enough to control the germ of expansionism in the Prime
Minister's mind so he continued searching for an opportunity
to strike at Turkey.

Such an opportunity presented itself

during the crisis of the Mousouros incident.
The Mousouros Incident
Greek-Turkish relations continued to deteriorate
even after the warnings of the British government to Greece
and the complaints of the Sublime Porte to the Great Powers.
In 1847 the ''Mousouros Incident" was responsible for the
total break in diplomatic relations between the government
of Athens and the Ottoman state.

This affair, which was to

have far greater consequences than any one in the Kolettes
ministry could forsee, began in January 1847 when Tsames
Karatasos, asked for a Turkish visa to visit Constantinople.

St. Petersburg, December 5, 1844, Nesseerode, compte de
Lettres ~~ Papiers du Chancelier Compte de Nesselrode 18701856, VIII, 261.
41 Anderson, Eastern Question, 112.

41
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The Turkish embassy denied Karatasos the granting of a visa
because he was involved in insurrectionary schemes against
42
the Porte.
When the secretary of the Turkish embassy,
Komenou Bey, told Karatasos that he could not renew his passport without the proper authorization from the Turkish govern43
ment,
the latter replied that such a rejection was an in44
sult to the king of Greece,
and proceeded to report the
incident to the Prime Minister.

Kolettes seized upon this

incident and chose to blow it out of proportion in order to
create friction with the Sublime PDrte.

45

The reasons that

the Greek Prime Minister acted in such a manner was first
because he needed public support and second because he desired to open hostilities in the Near East for the purpose
of gaining the adjacent Turkish Provinces of Thessaly and
Epirus.

As Professor Karolides explains:

That Kolettes through these and other aggravating internal and foreign diversions, precisely in order to rid himself from these diversions inventing a great and more
serious foreign matter, he asked to provoke a rupture in
the Ottoman state, in order to domestically direct the
attention of the Greek people to the Megali Idea while
externally to provoke a clash and a Greek-Turkish war,
extending it very likely to an Anglo-French and possibly
42 w. Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors,
1801-1927 (Cambridge, 1936), 177.
43 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 252.
44 Karatasos was an aid de camp of Otho, Fotiades,
The Exile, 48. Also see Athanasios Angelopoulos, Dimitrios Tsamis
Karatasos (Balkan Studies, XVII, 1976)
45

Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 204.

29

converting it into a general European, so that in the
general confusion of everything he would rise as a
great political man, a great Greek patriot. 46
the king was informed of the affairs involving Karatasos and
the Turkish embassy at a palace dance which Mousouros, the
47
Turkish charge d'affairs in Athens, attended.
Otho approached the Turkish representative and angerly said,
\

"J'esperais, que le roi de la Grece meritait, plus de res-

,

pect que vous n'avez pos montre monsieur," and he returned
his back on Mousouros.

When Mousouros related the incident

to Edmund Lyons, the British minister at Athens, the latter
advised the Turkish minister to leave the Palace with his
48
entire personnel.
Two days later, (15 January) after further instructions from Lyons, Mousouros blamed the king's attitude towards
49
50
him on Kolettes.
The Turkish government
and all the
representatives of the Powers - - except for the French
in Constantinople sympathized with the
Athens.

Tur~ish

minister in

When Kolettes refused to personally go to the Turkish
46 Karolides, History~ the Greeks, III, 256-57.

47 Mousouros was a Greek Phanariot (Constantinople)
who was loyaly serving the Sublime Porte.
48 Kyriakides, Contemporarx Greeks, I, 557.
49

Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 205, claims that the
British embassy in Constantinople was also giving instructions
to the Turkish embassy in Athens, Lyons and Kolettes were on
very hostile terms, (see Bower & Bolitho, Otho I, 136) so the
former had personal as well as political reasons to blame
Kolettes for the occurence at the palace dance.
50 The Sultan was Metzid a peace loving ruler Grand
Vizier was Reshid Pasha, and foreign minister Aali. Both
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embassy and apologize on behalf of his government's conduct,
the Turkish foreign minister, as Aali had demanded, diplomatic relations between Greece and Turkey broke off and were
not to resume for an entire year.

There was a long corres-

pondence between Otho and the Sultan during 1847 which was
a rather fruitless attempt to restore relations between the
two countries since the Great Powers behind the scenes exercised a great influence in the major foreign policy decisions made by either Greece or Turkey.

The incident there-

fore remained unresolved and the two powers were only to
resume diplomatic relations after the death of Kolettes, the
man responsible for the entire affair.

c.

Anglo-French Rivalry in Greece

Anglo-French rivalry in Greece existed before the
pro-French government of Kolettes as a result of conflicting
51
interests and power poli·tics among the Great Powers.
When
Mavrokordatos resigned and Kolettes became Prime Minister in
1844, however, the antagonism between France and England over
political influence in Greece was greatly accentuated.

Kolettes

made no particular efforts to hide his antipathy for Great
Britain and, especially, for Edmund Lyons.

Both Lyons and

Palmerston, who supported Mavrokordatos' policy of internal
Aali Pasha and Reshid Pasha were ''European-minded"politicians.
51 See Petropoulos, Kingdom of Greece, for the period
before 1844 for Anglo-French rivalry in Greece.
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reform and development, despised Kolettes' policy of irredentism.

Palmerston described Kolettes in a letter to Lord

Normanby as follows:
I have no doubt that Coletti would, as Wallenstein says,
prefer France to the gallows, but I do not see why he
should be reduced to that alternative. To be sure, St.
Aulaire said to me the other day that Coletti was a necessary minister, for that he is the chief and leader of all
the robbers and scamps of Greece, • •
Otho loves him as
a second self, because he is as despotic as Otho himself;
and as long as a majority can be had for Coletti in the
chambers, by corruption and intimidation, by the personal
influence of the king and by money from France, Coletti
will remain minister. 52
6

Guizot, however, felt that Kolettes was a good Prime Minister
for Greece and supported him against the British government's
53
attacks.
During his administration Kolettes made numerous
attempts to have Lyons replaced as minister to Athens.

In

August 1845 Kolettes persuaded the king to use his influence
in removing Lyons from Athens.

In August 1845 Kolettes per-

suaded the king to use his influence in removing Lyons from
Athens.

When Otho was informed that the Queen of England

would visit Germany accompanied by Aberdeen he wrote to his
father:
• quite pleased I was informed that the Queen of
England will travel to Germany • • • • I hope therefore,
that you will have no difficulty in meeting her • • •
then perhaps the Queen since she has a will power of her
own may be won over by your politeness dear Father, and
52 Evelyn Ashley, The Life £i Henry~ Temple Viscount Palmerston, 1846-1865 (London, 1876), 181-82.
53 Robert Bullen, Palmerston, Guizot and the Collapse
of the Entente Cordiale (London, 1974), 75-78:-;lso-see
Guizot to Aberdeen, Octomber 28, 1844, quoted in E. Driault
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that she will believe in your guarantee of my friendly
feelings toward England and realize the necessity of
recalling Lyons without jeopardizing his career. One
can't ignore the danger of Lyons's violent prejudices,
and no order even from his government, would prevent
him from intriguing in secret. You most probably know
yourself that recently, when he was talking to your minister, he said that if Greece was not able to pay its
foreign debts, then it was apparent that the country was
too small for a monarchy. 54
The conflict between the Moschomanga and the "English" parties did not have an effect on the Anglo-French rivalry or
the Kolettes-Lyons power struggle but its influence extended
to the people of Greece who fell victims to power politics.
As Aspreas explains:
As the parties evolved, Greeks fought against Greeks,
but the flags under which they were fighting were not
Greek. Piscatory was no longer behind Kolettes and
Lyons behind Mavrokordatos. The representatives of the
two rival Great Powers had openly come to the arena.
They were the opposing party leaders under whose inspiration the Greeks fought, wearing out their strength,
paralyzing the gountry and giving a pitiful view of political idiocy. 5
Piscatory, who was devoted to Guizot, and Lyons "who had begun his diplomatic career as a protege of Palmerson," were
not on speaking terms and were constantly attacking each
other in the Greek press. 56
and M. Lheritier, Histoire Diplomatique de la Grece de 1821
jours (Paris, 1925-6), II, 268-69.

~ ~

54 Skandames, Political History, 940, also see Bower
and Bolitho, Otho _!_, 13 9.
55 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I. 202.
56 Bullen, Entente Cordiale, 75.
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The continuing support of Guizot to the Greek government 57 forced Aberdeen to order Lyons to break off all re58
lations with Piscatory.
The ascendancy of the "French"
party in Greece not only presented a political threat to
the British interests in the Near East but an economic threat
as well.

One of the instructions by the British government

to Edmund Lyons was to promote British economic interests in
59
Greece.
As Thouvenel wrote to Desages:
England has interests in Greece. The neighboring Ionian
Islands, the between Syra and Patra's commerce, the London based colony of Chios' merchants, the totally profitable grain transport executed under the Greek flag,
finally the commerce of imports, all these elements give
England a material place in Greece. 60
In 1854 the total imports of Greece amounted to 22.3 million
drachmas and total exports to 11 million.

Corinthian raisin

(which British merchants exploited) amounted to 3.5 million.
The major importing ports were Syros and Patras, and the following countries contributed the majority of imports to

57 The following letter from Guizot to Kolettes
which was sent 17 April 1845 reveals the enthusiasm of the
French government toward the Kolettes administration. "mon
cher et honorable ami, pardonner moi, mon long silence, j'ai
tort, mais je suis pardonable.
• vous avez tres bien conduit les affairs de la Grece. Elle enfin un gouvernement, un
gouvernement Grec.
Durez, durez et continuant.
C'est ce que
je vous demande.
C'est le premier interet de votre pays comme
le premier desir de vos amis en Europe.
• • " cited in
Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 534.
58 Ibid., 535.
59 V.J. Puryear, International Economics and Dip1omacr in the Near East, 1834-1853 (Stanford, 1935), 117.
60 Cited in Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 364.
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Greece: Great Britain amounted to 7.3 million, Turkey 4.3
61
million, Austria 4 million and France and Russia 2 million.
One of the ways by which England exerted its influence and protected its interests in the Near East was by making continuous demands on the Greek government to pay the interest on the guaranteed loan of 1832. 62

When Kolettes be-

came Prime Minister he inherited an empty treasury and a payment of 6.3 million drachmas due to the Protecting Powers.
Considering that there was a budget deficit every year but
one, 1836, since 1832 interest
poned.

pay~ents

were repeatedly post-

In 1845 the Prime Minister tried again to postpone

payments due to the Powers, and Lord Aberdeen as well as
Cochrane 63 criticized Greece in Parliament for not making
its payments.

Lord Aberdeen stated that:

We have also guaranteed the payment of the interest of a
loan contracted by the Greek State, which we have been
called upon to discharge ourselves for the last two or
three years.
This, therefore, ~ives us undoubtedly a
right to interfere so far in the internal affairs of
this State as to see that we should be released from
these obligations as rapidly as possible. And the Greek
Government would do well to recollect that, by the provisions of the Treaty, we are enabled to enter into possession of such of the revenues of Greece as we think

61 S.R. Markezines, Politike Historia tes Neoteras
Hellados (Political History of Modern Greece) (Athens, 1966).
62 This loan of 60 million francs was guaranteed to
Greece by the Protecting Powers by the Treaty of 7 May 1832.
See Martens, Recueil des Traites, X, 550-64, also Strupp,
La situation internationale de la Grece, 125, and Levandis
63 Hansard, 3rd series, LXXVIII, 902-03.
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proper for the repayment of the debt so contracted.

64

The concern of the British government over the payments on
the loan kept increasing as did their dissatisfaction with
the pro-French Kolettes administration.

The British wanted

the Greek Prime Minister and his government to know just
how disappointed the Aberdeen government was with the state
of affairs in Greece so Lyons was instructed to send a letter
from the Earl of Aberdeen informing the Greek government of
its negligent financial practices.
retary stated that Greece had

The British Foreign Sec-

vi~lated

the terms of the Treaty

of May 7th 1832 by not making complete efforts to discharge
its financial obligations to the three Protecting Powers.
Aberdeen further noted that Great Britain was determined to
insist on administrative reform and a reduction in the armed
forces of Greece.
The expenses of the war department continue to absorb
one-third of the revenues of the state. Brigandage has
increased. The tranquility of the counterminous Turkish
provinces has been repeatedly troubled by acts of rapine;
and the Ottoman territory has been repeatedly violated by
armed Greek bands.
Out of respect for the independence
of Greece, Great Britain is unwilling to interfere in her
internal affairs.
But it is manifest that if Greece desires to be exempt from external control, she must place
herself in a position to discharge her own financial obligations without having recourse to the aid of the guaranteeing Powers. 65
Interest payment on the loan was the strongest, although not
64 Session of July 31, 1845, Ibid., 3rd series,
LXXXII, 1280.
65 Aberdeen to Lyons, Foreign Office, October 2, 1845,
British and Foreign State Papers, XLV.

.
'
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always the most effective means used by the Peel administration, by Palmerston and by the Earl of Clarendon to pressure
Greece to yield to British demands.

The British Parliament

and certain historians favorable to Palmerston and Great
Britain maintained that the concern of the Foreign Office
was with the growth and development of the Greek nation and
that Great Britain stood for constitutionalism against the
absolutism of the Bavarian monarchy in Greece and the cor66
rupt and dictatorial Kolettes administration.
Nothing
could be further from the truth.·

As Palmerston's letter to

Prince Albert will reveal below, the concern of the British
government was not the internal development of Greece and
her general economic and social progress, but rather the
dominant influence exercised by the French in that country
which diminished British influence in the Near East.
Palmerston made it clear to Prince Albert that his
nation had nothing against the people of Greece but only
against Kolettes.

He hinted that Trikoupis, the pro-English

politician, was far more capable of governing Greece in a
constitutional manner, and that the royal support of Kolettes
was resented by the Foreign Office.

Most strongly the Bri-

tish Foreign Secretary objected to the French influence in
the Kolettes administration.

66 George Finlay, History of Greece, VII, is one of
Also Lewis
the historians partial to the British government.
Sergeant, Greece, shares similar views though not as notoriously British as those of Finlay.
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In the foreign relations of the couitry Mr. Koletti seems
to have had three leading objects in view, aggression towards Turkey, subserviency of Mr. Koletti toward France,
and insult towards England.
The subserviency of Mr.
Koletti toward France is too notorious, too evident, and
has been too publicly boasted of by the French Government
to be now denied. 67
Throughout the month of April 1847 Lyons kept asking for the
700,000 drachmas which the English government paid to the
Greek nation for the guaranteed loan.
In Parliament the heat was building against Greece
which could not make the payments to the Protecting Powers.

68

At the same time domestic political opposition to the Kolettes
administration was building as a result of the Prime Minister's mishandling of the Mousouros incident.

In panic,

Kolettes consulted with Otho and then dismissed Parliament
- - the Boule - - and called for elections.

69

The elections

which took place were conducted in the same corrupt and unconstitutional manner which suited Kolettes' purposes.

The

leaders of the "Russian" and "English" parties decided to
form a coalition in order to be able to stop the present administration from getting reelected.

Their plan, however,

failed as the government was too well prepared and determined
to meet the opposition.

Makrygiannes described the misfor-

6 7 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho ~' 155-65.

68 Sessions of February 23, 1846, Hansard, 3rd series,
LXXXIII, 1389-90.
69 D. Petrakakos, Koinobouleutike Historia Hellados
(Parliamentary History of Greece) (Athens, 1935-1946), 137-38.
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tunes of the elections and how Kolettes was able to retain
power as follows:
Grivas went to Bonitsa and raised the flag.
They (the
partisans of Kolettes) attacked him, not even having
fired at them, and dumped him in the sea. He would have
been lost if the English had not saved him. Mamoures
took 35,000 drachmas from Metaxas and Mavrokordatos,
which they had collected to help the movement; he cheated
them and turned on the side of the government • • •
Kolettes began his elections. Everywhere in the nation
there were murders and disappearances of residents.
70
Kolettes won all of the electorates out of one hundred.
This process was called "elections" in mid-nineteenth century
Greece.

A young nation in need of honest progressive politi-

cal leaders was subjected to rule by villains.
The loss of the "English" party created bitter reaction in England against the existing government.

Lord Palmer-

ston openly accused Kolettes in the Rouse of Lords for his
Francophilism.
I cannot understand the great value placed by France in
maintaining in Greece a ministry which is regarded representative of French interests. If the French Government believes that it is the advantage of France and
the French nation to regard this as its triumph, that
the Prime Minister of Greece is their chief • • • • I
cannot say anything more • • • no one in England wants
to think of bothering the French dominated events. 71
The Anglo-French rivalry was not destined to last in Greece,
for Kolettes, leader of the "French" party, died on 1 September 1847.

The Revolution of 1848 which brought an end to

70 Makrygiannes, Memoirs, 198-99.
71

Cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 421-42.
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the government of

~ouis

Philippe also brought an end to the

dominating French influence of Greek politics.

Even though

the struggle for power never stopped, the tensions between
France and England tended to ease as they both realized that
the foreign policy of the Hegali

~

was in conflict with

their policy of the Ottoman Empire integrity.

The other

factor which eased the tensions between French and English
policy in Greece was that Otho was not really favorable to
either France or England and tended to be drawn towards
Russia after 1850.
During the three years of his dictatorial rule
Kolettes was successful in accomplishing in the domestic
sphere: (1) the alienation of the "Russian" and "English"
parties, (2) the violation if not total rejection of the
Constitution, and (3) the establishment of the Prime MinisterKing dictatorship.

In the external sphere, (1) the antago-

nism of England against Greece, and (2) the support of Brigandage against the Ottoman State, and as a result the antagonism of Turkey against Greece.

This is the Kolettes' legacy.

The tragedy of it was that its influence extended beyond the
decade of the 40's to the war period of the 50's.

The king

would follow Kolettes' foreign and domestic policies to
plunge Greece into a senseless conflict involving Turkey
and the Western Powers.

CHAPTER II
ANGLO-GREEK HOSTILITIES AND THE RISE
OF RUSSOPHILISM IN GREECE
A.

Foreign Policy and Anglo-Greek
Hostilities 1847-1850

The period from the death of Kolettes to the AngloFrench occupation of 1854 in Greece was characterized domestically by monarchical tyranny, and in the field of foreign
affairs by expansionist schemes directed against the Ottoman
Empire.

Kolettes reinstated the king's prestige in 1844

after it was downgraded and limited by the Constitutional
revolution.

When Kolettes was out of the political scene

the Greek monarchy was determined to absorb all the powers
of the government into its own hands.
The only two powerful leaders, Metaxas and Mavrokordatos, who were likely candidates to replace Kolettes, would
not be acceptable to the pro-French Parliament (Boule) and
much less to the Crown which both politicians had fought
against.

From 1847 to 1853, therefore, absolute monarchy

was reinstated in practice though not in theory in the background of void in political leadership.

The governments

which were in power during these seven years were known as
"court governments" or "court ministries," since the Prime
40

41
1

Ministers were puppets of the king.

During the period of the "court ministries" the
constitutional rights of the citizens were abused by the
king and his court whose ultimate goal was the full rein-·
statement of absolutist powers to the Crown.

The Kolettes

administration had already set the stage for a political
system which would give all the governmental powers to the
king and create a monarchical dictatorship behind the disguise of puppet ministers.
The first "court ministry" was headed by an illiterate man, Kitsos Tsavellas, who served as Minister of the
Army in the administration of Kolettes.

2

Kitsos Tsavellas

was the grandson of the infamous Lambros Tsavellas, a hero
in the War of Independence.

He was not a politically minded

man but his devotion to the Crown made him the best candidate for the position of Prime Minister.

The primary con-

cern of the Tsavellas government was the suppression of
legitimate political opposition to the government which had
begun while Kolettes was in power,

3

as well as revolution-

ary activities throughout Greece which presented a serious
threat to the Crown.

In the summer of 1847 there was a

1 For political development during the period 1847
to 1853 see Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 210-220, also Petrakakos, Historx £i Greece, 137-153.
2 Fotiades, The Exile, 74, also Makrygiannes,
Memoirs, 300-01.
3 The Greek Senate (Gerousia) or Council of Elders,
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wave of opposition to the government of Kolettes.

Under

the leadership of Makrygiannes and other prominent military
figures a coalition of peasants, military officers and politicians of the opposition was formed and called for the restoration of the constitutional principles in government.
Otho and his court managed to silence Makrygiannes and his
followers by armed force but the wave of revolution which
swept Europe in 1848 had too great of an effect on Greece
even for Otho to control.

4

As long as the tide of unrest remained free from
implicating the Protecting Powers, the Tsavellas government
could control it.

There were two incidents, however, of

major importance which implicated Great Britain in the revolutionary activities of 1847-1848.

The first incident in-

volved Theodore Grivas, inspector in the army during the
Kolettes government, and Nicholas Kriezotes, Province Inspector in Euboia.

Both men were supporters of Kolettes up

to the April 1847 elections when the "Prime Minister of the
4th of August" dismissed the Parliament.

At that time

Grivas and Kriezotes decided to fight against the dictator-

began openly to oppose the unconstitutional practices of
the monarchy and asked that the king uphold the principles
of the Constitution. This attack on the monarchy by the
Senate came as a shock to Otho for senators were appointed
by the Crown.
See Petrakakos, History of Greece, 140.

4

For the Makrygiannes rising see Kordatos, Modern
Greece, III, 238-39.
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ship of Kolettes even though the latter had promised both of
them seats in the senate.

Kolettes sent an armed force

against Grivas and his rebels but with the help of the British, Grivas escaped to Prevesa where he received assistance
and cooperation from the British Consulate and ultimately
resorted in the Turkish province of Janina.

5

The second incident involved Merendites, a Captain
in the army during the Kolettes administration.

Merendites

was dismissed from the army by the Tsavellas government for
suspicion of being in the opposition.

This tragic occurence

in the captain's life prompted him to resort to brigandage.
He robbed the Patros Branch of the National Bank of Greece
of 25,090 drachmas, the Customs House of 32,000 and he took
92,000 from the Public Fund.

He then sought refuge in the

Austrian embassy but was not accepted so he went to the
British who were eager to give help to anyone in the opposit ion.

6

In both instances, one with Grivas and the other
with Merendites, the Greek government found itself in
another confrontation with the British authorities.

When

Greek officials became aware that the British took part in
aiding rebels such as Grivas and brigands such as Merendites

5 Skandames, Kingdom of Otho,· 451, also Bower-Bolitho,
~

l' 168.
6

Fotiades, The Exile, 77.
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they became infuriated.

Glarakes, the Greek Foreign Minis-

ter, complained to Lyons about the role of the Rritish authorities in Greek internal affairs and Lyons reported the
incident to Palmerston.

The British statesman who had little

to be sympathetic about with the government in Athens wrote
a very aggressive and degrading letter against the Greek authorities which he sent to Lyons.

He maintained that:

Mr. Glarakes will do well to abstain in the future from
unfounded accusations against her Majesty's government
and her personnel • • • and if this government showed
the slightest sympathy towards him (General Grivas) it
did this only because he has been a victim of tyranny,
oppressing and agitating the Greek people all over, ·
where the activity of this system is now felt: a sys- 7
tern provoking natural consequence and evident revolt.
This letter came as a shock to everyone and, especially,
the king, who ordered the Foreign Ministry to respond to
Lord Palmerston in a ''very declaratory manner."

8

The irony

of this entire affair was that Great Britain the defender of
liberty and constitutional principles, the only one of the
Great Powers really to speak out against brigandage in Greece,
turned to aid rebels and brigands, which proves that all the
talk of Palmerston and the debates in the House of Commons
and House of Lords against brigandage was just talk and noth-

1 Cited in Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 396.

8 For the letter of Glarakes to Palmerston see ibid.,
410-11.
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9

ing more.

When it came to making a choice between the

pragmatic interests of their nation and ideology the British
put aside their ideological jargon.
As Anglo-Greek relations continued to deteriorate
the Gieek government was half-heartedly trying to restore
relations with the Sublime Porte.

The Musouros incident,

which occurred during the administration of Kolettes, was
unresolved when Tsavellas took power.

A solution to this

incident was imminent not only because it represented a possible threat to Greek economic, that is to say, commercial
interests which were threatened by such a break of relations
between the two countries, but also because the Great Powers
sympathized with the Turkish position on this matter.

On

October 4, the Greek Foreign Minister sent a memorandum to
the five Great Powers - - Britain, France, Russia, Austria
and Prussia - - stating the Greek government's concessions
to the Sublime Porte's demands and the latter's unwillingness
10
to accept these.
In response to this memorandum the Sub-

9 Mr. B. Cochrane declared in the House of Commons
that, "I am pleading for a country from which we, in common
with all Europe • • • derive all that softens and refines
the heart, and all that gives life and animation to our debates.
It is the cause not of Greece and her isles •
but the cause of constitutional liberty in all parts of the
't-Torld." And Palmserston added to this that the Greek usovereign should give to the Greek nation a constitutional system of government." Session of March 2, 1848, Hansard, 3rd
series, Commons, XCVII, 137-8.

°

1 For the memorandum see Kordatos, Modern Greece,
III, /•53.
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lime Porte charged that Greek brigands were organizing to
invade Turkish territories.

The Turks maintained that the

Greek position was irreconcilable and should therefore be
regarded as hostile by the Great Powers.
Otho realized that unless a friendly power intervened in support of Greece the Turkish demands would have
to be met and this would mean diplomatic defeat for the
Greek Court and humiliation of the Crown.

The Greek Court

decided, therefore, to appeal to Tsar Nicholas, who Otho
felt, would be more sympathetic -to Greece than to the Ottoman Empire.

The Tsar answered Otho on 18 October 1847 not

at all to the satisfaction of the Greek monarch. " • • • it
always seemed essential to me that Greece, in the delicate
position which she is should observe wherever possible, mostly a policy of abstention from displeasing the Porte and
England.

It was the only way not to fall into extreme ten-

sions which was produced successively in the relations with
these two Powers and Greece." 11

The Tsar went on the blame

the Kolettes' administration for the existing tensions between Greece and the Porte and England, and did not commit
himself to helping Greece resolve her existing problems with
12
Turkey.
It should have occurred to Otho that Russia would
11 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 141-45.
12 The letter of Nicholas to Otho is cited in
Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 958-60.
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not side with Greece for a minor incident and jeopardize her
13
friendly relations with England.
In the face of political opposition and social unrest
domestically, and diplomatic opposition from practically all
of

th~

Great Powers the Greek government gave in to the de-

mands of the Sublime Porte.

Glarakes wrote a letter express-

ing the apologies of his government to Aali; on 25 January

l

Mousouros returned to his post and diplomatic relations be14
tween Greece and the Sublime Porte resumed.
This incident marked the end of Greek-Turkish hostilities which were
not to reoccur in the Turkish provinces until 1853. 15
The revolution of 1848 in Europe had a decisive influence in Greece.

Throughout the country there were spora-

die revolts expressing the peoples' dissatisfaction with the
monarchy, the continuing foreign intervention in Greek internal affairs, the poor economy, and the corruption on all

13 Russia was opposed to the enlargement and the
strengthening of Greece.
It was also committed to act in
cooperation with Great Britain in deciding the fate of the
Ottoman Empire.
See Anderson, Eastern Question, 111-12.
14 Mousouros was shot and wounded by a Greek radical
on 28 April 1848. After this incident he was transfered to
the London Embassy.
The Sublime Porte took no hostile action against the government of Greece for the shooting of
its ambassador.
For details on the solution of the Mousouros
incident see Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 596-97.
15 See chapte~ III section A.
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levels of government.

16

Under the pressure of revolutionary

activity the Tsavellas government fell in March and was re17
placed by the Koundouriotes' administration.
Before
Koundouriotes was chosen to head the ministry by the king,
Lyons used his offices to pressure Otho to form a pro-British
government.

18

Otho would not give in to British pressure

even though he knew that he no longer had the support of the
19
French government
and that the Russian Court continued to
maintain a policy of abstention from Greek internal affairs.
The principal preoccupation of the Koundouriotes
ministry in the domestic field was to silence the political
opposition and put an end to the sporadic revolts.

In the

field of foreign relations, the settlement of the disputed
Greek-Turkish frontiers

20

and the establishment of friendly

relations with the Powers, took precedence.

Domestically,

therefore, the same problems which faced Kolettes and Tsavelas
also threatened the Ministry of Koundouriotes.

In the field

of foreign affairs also the problems were the existing tensions between Greece and the Ottoman Empire and the Great
Powers - - primarily England.

16 The authoritative work on the 1848 Greek revolts
is Tasos Bournas, To Helliniko 1848 (The Greek 1848) (Athens,
1952).
17 See Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 212-13, for details.
18 Philaretos, Foreign Rule, 86-7.
19 When the government of Louis-Philippe fell from
power in 1848 "the prestige of France in Greece fell so low
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It was to be expected that any government which could
not be influenced by the British would make Lyons and Palmerston adopt a hostile policy towards Greece.

In a dispa:tch

to Palmerston 29 March 1848 Lyons expressed his disappointment with the king's influence in government.

He charged

that the current administration in collaboration with the
Crown was responsible for abusing the Constitution and robbing the people of their rights.

If there were any ministers

in power who wished to alter the course of things for the
better, they were prevented from·acting out their wishes by
a Boule which was at the disposal of the king and the Camerilla
which actually governed the nation.

Further the British mini-

ster wrote,
I am informed that the ministers are determined to resign
in case the king would continue to reject the measures
which they would like to employ and it is regarded possible that the king will make certain concessions because the news from Pari~! Vienna and Munich have created
here great disturbance.
Lyons was eager to keep his position in Athens as he had engaged in a personal war with the "French" party.

Even though

he had at one point told Piscatory, "there is only one good
policy - - for France and England to act together," he never
acted on this principle himself, and as Seton-Watson mainthat the French Charge d'Affaires found it difficult to
change francs into drachmas." See Bower-Bolitho, Otho .!_, 171.

°

2 For details on the dispute see Karolides. History
of the Greeks, III, 434-37.
21 cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 462.
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tained, he "treated the Greeks as inferior mortals."

22

In 1848, however, Lyons had more than just personal
feelings against the "French" party to complain about to
the Foreign Office.

The European revolutions of 1848 in-

tensified the existing political opposition to the Greek
government during the early months of that year.

The Bri-

tish Charge d'Affaires at Athens, fearful of further French
dominance of Greek domestic politics, welcomed revolutionary
23
activity in Greece
which might weaken the government to
the point where the king would have to dismiss the Koundouriotes ministry and look to the British for support.
Lyons was not successful in persuading Otho to call
for the formation of an "English" government so Stratford
24 .
Canning
was sent to Athens in May of 1848 to achieve this
25
task.
Canning's mission proved unsuccessful
for the king
l>ras determined to keep members of the "English" party out of
22 Robert Seton-l-latson, Britain in Europe, 17 89-1914,
(Cambridge, 1933), 235.
23 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 462-63.
24 For the life and career of Stratford Canning see
s. Lane-Poole, The Life £i the Right Honourable Stratford
Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe from His Memoirs
and Private and Official Papers, (London, 1888).
25 Canning quarrelled with both Lyons and Sir Richard
Church within two days of his arrival at Athens and stated
publicly that they - - Church and Lyons - - were personal
enemies of the king.
This made the position of Lyons in
Athens very difficult after this affair even though he still
had the support of Palmerston. See Bowe~ & Bolitho, Otho I,
173-75.
---- -
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Finally after immense domestic and foreign
26
came to its senses and dismissed
pressure the Camerilla
the government.

the unpopular Koundouriotes government; this time Otho was
ready to give Mavrokordatos a chance to form a ministry.

Be-

fore he summoned Mavrokordatos, however, the king had an interview with him concerning his domestic and foreign policy.
The first question put to Mavrokordatos was, "Which places
27
can and must Greece take?"
The answer given was unsatisfactory to Otho.

Mavrokordatos felt as he had in 1844 when

he was Prime Minister that the internal development of Greece
was a far more essential matter to deal with and deserved
all the attention of the government, whereas the question of
territorial expansion was an issue of the future.

Otho's

foreign policy was basically identical to that of Kolettes,
namely, territorial expansion should be the primary issue
of the government.

A greater Greece, Otho felt, would mean

prosperity for the nation: the domestic problems - - economic
and social

would be solved as the goal of territorial ex-

pansion was realized.

This basic disagreement on domestic

and foreign policy between Otho and Mavrokordatos resulted
in the rejection of the latter as a likely candidate for
Prime Minister.

26 Camerilla was the label given to the Greek Court
as it was often compared with the Spanish Court.
27 For the full text of questions and answers see
Dragoumes, Recollections, 137-50.
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Once again Lyons asked that Mavrokordatos be summoned to form a government but the king went along with the
wishes of Thouvenel and in October 1848 appointed Admiral K.
Kanares.

28

The French influence in Greece and the refusal

of the king to accept Mavrokordatos or Trikoupis in the
government made Palmerston so furious that he declared that
he would never approve a government in Greece unless its
29
leader was from the "English" party.
Greek-British relations continued to deteriorate
even further as a series of incidents occurred in the next
five years which contributed to the existing friction of
30
relations between the two countries.
The first incident
involved the British claim of the two islands Elaphonese
31
and Sapientza, at the southern tip of Peloponnese.
The
importance of these islands was commercial - - they were
used as loading bases

but to the Greek nationalists the

sentimental value was far greater than the commercial.
28 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 545.
29 Dragoumes, Recollections, 134-35.
30 The period 1844 to 1850 in British relations with
Greece has been labeled accurately as "cold" see The Cambridge
History of British Foreign Policy, edited by A.W. Ward and
G.P. Gooch, II (New York, 1815-66), 594-96.
31 In 1839 the Governor of the Ionian Islands wrote to
Lyons that the two disputed islands belonged rightfully to the
Ionian Islands.
In 1849 Wyse, who had replaced Lyons, wrote
to Glarakes that Elaphonese and Sapientza were under the jurisdiction of the Ionian Islands, so Greek authorities had no
legal right to these islands. The Greek government considered
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There were three more demands made by Palmerston's
government all which were intentionally used to exert pressure on the Camerilla so that Otho would welcome British influence in Greek internal and foreign affairs.

The first of

these three demands was indemnity for piracy by Greeks of
six Ionian ships in September 1847.

In this affair Greece

was blamed for the acts of piracy committed by Greek citizens.
The government of Greece declared that it could not be held
32
responsible for all wrongdoing of its citizenry.
Secondly,
the British demanded indemnity for damages committed against
Dom Pacifico, a Portugese-Jew who was a citizen of England
residing in Athens. 33

The damage to Pacifico's property

was claimed at 886,736 drachmans, an unrealistically high

the two islands part of Peloponnese and chose to ignore the
claims of the British authorities. Great Britain had a
legal claim to Elaphonese and Sapientza according to the
treaty of Paris (5 November, 1815), the second article of
which read "all islands, small and large and those uninhabited lying between the coasts of Peloponnese and Albania"
should be considered dependant to the Ionian government.
For details on this subject see Fotiades, The Exile, 126-28,
also Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 585-87.
32 For documentation on this subject see British and
Foreign State Papers 1849-1850, XXXIX under Greece: Corres=pondence with Great Britain. "Plunder of Six Ionian Boats
at Salcina 1846-1847," 315-32.
3 3 On the day of Good Friday a mob in Athens raided
his house - - for he was a Jew and identified with Judas - and burned and destroyed several of his valuables.
Instead
of going to the Greek authorities and trying to settle the
matter in court Mr. Pacifico went to the British embassy
making it thus an international incident.
See Kyriakides,
Contemporarx Greeks, I, 588-89, also Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, 328-33.
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34
figure considering the value of the money at the time.
The British embassy would under normal circumstances turn
this matter over to the Greek authorities to handle.

They

chose, however, to make an incident out of it blowing it out
of proportion and interpreting the abuse of the property of
a British subject, Dom Pacifico as an act of hostility by the
Greek government against the British government.

When the

claim of Pacifico was handed over to the Greek authorities
by the British officials, naturally the reaction of the
Greeks was the same as it had been in the case of the pirates
who plundered the six Ionian ships, namely, that they could
not pay for damages committed by irresponsible individuals
and that the matter should be taken to the Greek Court to be
35
settled.
Finally, there was a claim of the Scottish historian
36
George Finlay to be settled.
In 1842 Finlay wrote to the

34 For Pacifico's claim see British and Foreign State
Papers, 1850-1!, XL, 619-26.
35 A. Thomaidou, Historia Othonos, (History of Otho).
(Athens, Kostichairopoulos).
36 There were two grievances against Greece by the
British government which are of some significance. 1. The
ill-treatment of British officers of a ship, 11 Fantome" by
Greek authorities at Patras.
See British and Foreign State
Papers, 1849-50, XXXIX, (Correspondence between Great Britain
and Greece, respecting an outrage committed upon a Boat's
Crew of Her Britanic Majesty's ship "Fantome" at Patras 1848),
216-53.
2. Correspondence between Great Britain and Greece
respecting the ill-treatment of Ionias at Patras and Pyrgos,
1846-47, 254-313.
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Earl of Aberdeen complaining that part of his property had
been incorporated into the Royal Garden and he was not in37
demnified for this property by the Greek government.
Aberdeen instructed Lyons to proceed to represent the claim
of Finlay but the matter was not resolved and in 1846 Lyons
began to pressure Kolettes for indemnification of Finlay's
38
property.
The Greek government felt that the 45,000
drachmas which Finlay demanded for his property was enormous
39
and it refused to meet these demands.
All of the incidents mentioned above started before
September 1847 but they were all compiled by Palmerston to
form a series of charges against Greece at the end of 1849.
The main reason for this as explained by a prominent Greek
historian was British fear that Otho might provoke antiTurkish activities in the provinces adjacent to Greece.
Besides the grave political anomalies of Europe the relations between Russia and Turkey were seriously irritated as a result of Walachia and Moldavia Principalities
which were occupied by a large number of Russian soldiers
and fears existed concerning an explosion of war between
the two powers. Knowing Otho's intentions and fearing
the Greek call for disturbances in Turkey, regarded opportune the situation in order to attack Greece during the
occasion when the complication of.the Powers did not nllow them to distract themselves with Greek affairs. 4

37 Finlay to Aberdeen, London, October 18, 1842.
British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX, 410-12.
38 Lyons to Coletti, Athens, June 17, 1846, British
and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX, 430-31.
39 Colokotronis to Lyons, Athens, November 9, 1848,
British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX, 480-81.
40 Kyriakides, Contemporarx Greeks, I, 592-95.
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The British government received intelligence reports to the
effect that in case of a Russo-Turkish war Greece would side
41
with Russia.
The Near-Eastern crisis of the fall of 1849
was the primary reason for the severe demands of Palmerston
on the government of Otho, but the desire to teach Greece a
lesson in discipline and British dominance in the European
community was another reason for what was to follow.

At the

end of 1849 the threat of Russian attack on Turkey was no
longer in existence as the British ambassador in Russia reassured Palmerston.

"I think we may reasonably expect that

at all events during the reign of the emperor Nicholas no
attempt will be made by Russia to subvert the Ottoman Em42
pire."
In spite of this reassurance of Russian peaceful
intentions towards Turkey, Palmerston sent the following dispatch to the Admiralty.
I have to signify to your Lordships the Queen's commands
that Sir William Parker should be instructed to return
to Athens or Salamis on his way back from the eastern
end of the Mediterranean, and that he should, on arriving
on the coast of Greece, place himself in communication
with Mr. Wyse, Her Majesty's Minister at Athens, who has
been instructed to require a final settlement of certain
claims which have been long pending the Greek government •
• • • Sir William Parker should support Mr. Wyse in his
demands for an immediate adjustment thereof. 43
41 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 553.
42 Cited in A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery
in Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford, 1971), 35.
43

Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, Foreign Office, November 30, 1848, British and
Foreign State Papers, XXXIX.

57
On January 3, 1850 the British Fleet of Admiral Parker set
anchor at Piraeus.

The admiral did exactly as he was in-

structed by Palmerston; he went to the British embassy in
Athens and together with Wyse they visited the Greek Foreign
Minister.

They gave an ultimatum of twenty-four hours for

their demands to be met otherwise they would be forced to
44
execute the orders received from their government.
When
the Greek Foreign Minister told Wyse that the presence of
the other two representatives of the Protecting Powers was
required in order for the Greek

g~vernment

to come to a final

decision, the British minister simply granted another twenty45
four hour ultimatum.
The Greek government did not meet
the ultimatum so Admiral Parker's fleet proceeded to blockade
the port of Piraeus and to place under arrest all Greek vessels.

Londos, the Greek foreign minister, immediately infor-

med Thouvenel, the French Minister at Athens and Persiany,
the representative of Russia in Greece.
Thouvenel wrote, without delay, to Wyse: - - According
to Article IV of the Treaty of 7 May 1832, Greece is an
independent monarchy under the guarantee of the three
Powers. The interdiction which made her dispose freely
of her war-vessels must be considered as a first blow
to her independence. Without doubt independence equals
responsibility and the British government has the right
to pursue the recovery of her grievances. But the question does not present itself only in these simple terms.

44 Karolides, Historx of the Greeks, III, 465-66.
45 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 596-97.
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For the Greek government demands an arbitration which
conforms with the terms and the spirit of the article
aforementioned; 46
Persiany also sent a note of complaint to the British embassy at Athens and both ministers - - of France and Russia
- - urged Wyse that Londos' suggestion to settle the GreekBritish dispute in the presence of all three representatives
of the Protecting Powers be accepted.

47

Europe was shocked at Palmerson's actions.

The Tsar

wrote a letter to Otho expressing his dissatisfaction with
British policy towards Greece.

He stated that he was very

displeased with the actions of the British government in
Greece and he had made his formal protest to the Foreign
Office.

Nicholas advised the king of Greece not to yield

to the British demands for to do so would mean yielding his
legitimate claim which belonged to every independent sovereign.
"It only remains to heal the country's wounds and also to make
good the losses which recent events have caused to the commerce
of Greece and Your Majesty can count upon my willingness to
lighten, for some period of time the pecuniary, burden which

46 Cited in Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 342-43.
47

Thouvenel to Wyse, Athens, January 5, 1850, and
Persiany to Wyse, Athens, January 5, 1850, British and Foreign
State Papers, XXXIX. Also see for the Greek translation of
these dispatches Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 555-57.
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your finances have to bear.'' 48

The press in Greece as well

as in Europe criticized the actions of Lord Palmerston as
49
severe and hostile towards a friendly small nation.
Popular poetry was written and recited by A. Soutso against the
British imperialists while praises were heard of Russia who
50
The
was assuming the role of the supporter of Greece.
public mind turned to Russian favoritism and away from the
Western Powers who seemed always 'to interfere in the internal
affairs of Greece for their own interests.

The layman as

well as the politically minded Greeks could see that the

~a-

tional interest of Russia as well as of Greece was the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

The Western Powers had

a policy of supporting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
Their policy, therefore, ran counter to Greek national interests.

Furthermore, the Russians viewed the blockade of

Piraeus as an indirect British display of power to Russia.
As Professor Karolides explains:
Russia regarded the Parker events in Greece as a continuation of the British fleet's display of Hellespont, and
somehow as reprisal to the failure thereof the intended
British activities; she took from the beginninf of the
crisis a hostile position at British action. 5

48 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho. 184, also in
Petrakakos, History of Greece, 147-49:--49 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 496.
5

° Kordatos,

Modern Greece, III, 559-60.

51 Cited, ibid., 500.
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On February 7, Nesselrode announced that his government was
displeased with the hostile activities of the British fleet
in Greece.

The Count criticized Great Britain for reassuring

the Russian government of the harmonious Anglo-Greek relations
just before Admiral Parker's fleet entered the Port of Pireaus.
He also denounced the secrecy of British operations in Greece
and its insistence on leaving France and Russia, the other two
Protecting Powers of Greece, in ignorance of British intentions in Greece.

He ended his remarks about British involve-

ment in Greece with a strong warning against the illegal
blockade of Admiral Parker:
The Imperial Government, commands her ambassador to direct
towards the British Government serious remarks, asking her
very seriously to quickly put an end to matters in Greece,
which are neither necessary and by no means justifiable.
The prompt acceptance of this measure would indicate to
the Imperial Government in what manner Great Britain
wishes to regulate the rest of her relations with the
Imperial Government. 52
This announcement of the Russian government motivated France
to act in the same respect and denounce Palmerstonian diplomacy in Greece just as harshly as had Russia, out of fear that
French influence in Greece might be in danger of being overshadowed by that of Russia.
allowed

Wisely, the Russian government

France to take the upperhand in the matter since

French opposition to English policy in the Near East could

52 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 502-04.
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only mean the weakening of the Anglo-French alliance which
53
resulted from the Near-Eastern Crisis of October 1849.
On February 7 Drouyn de Lhuys sent a dispatch to
Palmerston expressing his government's disapproval of the
hostile actions taken by Britain against Greece without
54
previous consultation with the French government.
Palmerston's answer to Drouyn de Lhuys was very friendly and it
revealed his fear that France was drawn away from the recent
Anglo-French alliance, siding on the issue of the Piraeus
blockade with Russia.

He agreed that a French negotiator

should be appointed to mediate between Britain and France.
In order to leave the freest scope to the action of the
French negotiator, Her Majesty's Minister at Athens
shall be instructed not to mix himself up with the negotiation of the French Agent, except in go far as he
may be requested by the Agent to do so. 5
Palmerston's kindness to the French in the Greek crisis was
due not only to the diplomatic reality of a possible FrancoRussian alliance but also to the internal pressures against
his mishandling of the British grievances in Greece.

The

British Minister for Foreign Affairs was attacked by the

53 See Taylor, Mastery in Europe, 34-35.
54 Drouyn de Lhuys to Palmerston, London, February 7,
1850, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX.
55

Palmerston to Drouyn de Lhuys, Foreign Office,
February 12, 1850, British and Foreign State Papers, XXXIX.
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press, from both Houses and from the Queen for jeopardizing
the role of Great Britain by mindless actions and by what
seemed to many a personal foreign policy.

In the House of

Lords, Lord Stanley not only criticized the "ill-advised expedition to the Dardanelles," but he felt that "we had proceeded to acts of injustice and violence against a friendly
foreign Power, or rather, a weak friendly foreign State, the
very weakness of which state should have been the strongest
inducement upon our part to exercise that greatest forbearance, whose peculiar position rendered any misunderstanding
with regard to the affairs of Greece a matter of more impor56
tance of the state itself."
Palmerston's secrecy regarding his proceedings in the Near East and the official communication between the Powers and England was also criticized
57
by Lord Stanley as well as by the House of Commons.
By the middle of February, the blockade in Greece
had become a major international matter which was to do the
greatest damage to the career of Lord Palmerston.

"This

Greek question," wrote Charles Greville, "is the worst scrape
into which Palmerston had ever got himself and his colleagues.
The disgust at it here is universal with those who think at
56 Sessions of February 4, Hansard, 3rd series,
House of Lords, CVIII, 258.
57 Sessions of Harch 11, Ibid., 3rd series, CIX,
645-47.
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all about foreign matters; it is past all.doubt that it has
produced the strongest feelings of indignation against this
country all over Europe, and the ministers themselves are
conscious what a disgraceful figure they cut, and are ashamed
of it. 11

58
It was agreed by England, Russia and Bavaria that

France should send a negotiator to Athens in hope of a settlement.

Baron Gros was chosen to mediate on behalf of Greece

and arrived in Athens on 6 March.
found progress impossible due to

He began negotiations but

determination to
59
collect full indemnities and to concede nothing.
Drouyn
B~itish

de Lhuys in London also tried to negotiate a settlement for
the Anglo-Greek dispute but with no results.

In early May,

the Greek government in Athens informed the French government that Lord Palmerston used the demands for indemnity payments to the British subjects in an extortionist manner to
humiliate and ridicule the Greek government.

This gave cause

to the government.of Prince Louis-Napoleon to recall its ambassador from London and cause a near Anglo-French diplomatic

58 Charles C.F. Greville, The Greville Memoirs: A
Journal £i the Reign Queen Victoria from. 1837-1852, II (New
York, 1885), 425-26.
59 Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 448-50, see
also Palmerston to Bloomfield, March 27, 1850, cited in
Ashley, Palmerston, 196-97.
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rupture.

60

Palmerston believed that the recalling of Drouyn

de Lhuys was carried out by the French government as a display to the public in France of Louis-Napoleon's strong abili61
ties and determined leadership in challenging English policy.
The House of Lords, however, had a different interpretation
on the matter.

Apparently it was announced that Drouyn de

Lhuys left London of his own free will when he was actually
recalled by his government.

Upon the news of the truth con-

cerning the recalling of the French minister Palmerston was
blamed for keeping secret the facxs from both Houses and he
was once again criticized for jeopardizing the position of
England in the European community.

Lord Brougham stated:

It turns out that the French government, in the exercise
of its undoubted discretion, has deemed it to be its duty
to take a step which has not been taken since the year
1803 • • • • The complaint of the French government is,
that Lonson is made to focus of all intrigues against its
existence - - that it is source from which all communications are made to the "Parti Rouge" - - so called because
it takes the colour of Blood as its appropriate ensign.
Yes the "Parti Rouge" takes its orders from the Caussidieres and the other erapulous leaders and miscreants who

°

6 For the negotiations of Drouyn de Lhuys in London
and the rupture of Franco-British relations over the failure
to reach an agreement in the Greek crisis, see Kyriakides,
Contemporary Greeks, I, 604-07, also see Karolides, History
£1 the Greeks, III, 520-25, also Driault, ibid., 352-61.
61

Pa1merston to Normandy, Foreign Office, May 17,
1850, cited in Ashley, Palmerston, 201-02.
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now infest this country after
desist from infesting France.

~~ey h~d

been forced to

The French government, which felt that Great Britain was exceeding its power in Greek affairs as granted in the Treaty
of 1832, was really concerned with its own power which was
threatened by the presence of the British fleet, but out of
a Franco-British diplomatic quarrel Greece benefited, if not
in anything more than the removal of the blockade.

Qn July

6th the negotiating parties reached a settlement in Athens
and the nightmare which had brought instability to FrancoBritish relations and deplorable conditions to Greece was
63
over.
The blockade of Piraeus cost Greece more than the
180,068 drachmas indemnity damages.

The Greek commerce suf-

fered greatly and as a result the already weak economy of
Greece was seriously damaged.

It would be no exaggeration

to maintain that by far the most damage was inflicted in the
64
minds of the Greek people.
England, one of the nations
which once fought for the independence of Greece and signed
62 Session of May 17, Hansard, 3rd series, House of
Lords, III, 159-61.
63 Londos, Greek Foreign Minister, agreed to British
demands on April 15th but this settlement which was reached
without the French mediation resulted in a total British diplomatic victory.
This was the reason negotiations in London
were discontinued.
64 Karolides, History of the Greeks, III, 520.
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the treaty which made that country legitimately recognized
in the European community, came to a point of doing her
great damage.
The only one in Greece who really benefited politically from the blockade was the king.

He was viewed as the

defender of the national rights of the people against the
65
interventions of foreign powers.
Of the three parties,
the "French," the "English" and the "Russian," the last
benefited the most from the crisis.

France was viewed with

suspicion by many Greeks for her role in Greece seemed to
be purely selfish, namely, the curbing of British influence
66
in the country,
whereas Russia was regarded as the only
true defender of Greek interests. 67

As far as relations

with England were concerned, Greece got off to a friendly
start after the settlement of the British grievances but it

65

The English government thought that the blockade
would cause political turmoil in the country bringing the
Court government down from power and making Otho unpopular.
Furthermore it hoped that the "English" party would benefit
from all of this and would rise as the popular party. None
of this occured however. On the contrary the Greek people
stood firmly behind the king.
See Aspreas, Modern Greece,
182.
66 Fotiades, Exosis, 141.
67 Karolides, History of ~Greeks, III, 525-34,
also L. Th. Laskaris, Diplomatike Historia tes Hellados,
1821-1914 (Diplomatic History of Greece, 1821-1914) (Athens,
1947)' 69-70.
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was not very long before another issue, that of brigandage,
was to create friction in Anglo-Greek relations.

After

Trikoupis was sent to London as the representative of the
Kriezes government, Palmerston wrote the following letter to
Delygiannes, the Greek Foreign Minister:
I have the honor to assure Your Excellency that Mr.
Trikoupes has been received and treated with all the
consideration and regards due to a representative of
a sovereign with which the Queen desires sincerely to
maintain relations of the most friendly characte~.
I
avail myself to this occasion to offer to Your Excellency the assurance of the distinguished consideration
with which I have the honor to be. 68
This letter was written in December 1850.

Nine months later

the Foreign Office invited the Powers to use their influence
in Athens to pressure the Greek government to put an end to
69
brigandage.
Even though brigandage was at a considerably
low level, only to reach its peak in 1854, there was a good
deal of concern in London with regard to the potential threat
of brigandage to the Ottoman Empire.
At the same time that the issue of brigandage was
brought up there was another crisis developing which was
to drive Greece even further away from both England and
France and bring it closer to Russia.

68 Cited in Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 362.
69 Ibid. 362-65, for details on the British concern
on brigandage in Greece.
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B.
1.

Russophilism 1850-1853

The Synodal Tomos
After the British blockade the attention of the Greek

public was shifted to ecclesiastical matters.

The Greek

Church had been declared independent and autonomous in 1833
70
and had remained so until _1850.
As a result of this the
Patriarch of Constantinople broke off all relations with the
Greek Church.

By 1850, however, it was becoming apparent to

most Greeks that the Patriarchate desired to reestablish relations with Athens and the reason behind this factor were
primarily political.

Tsar Nicholas was in 1832 opposed to

an autonomous Greek Orthodox Church, and he resented the
fact that a Roman Catholic king would assume the role of
71
the ceremonial head of an autonomous Orthodox Church.
After the Anglo-Greek hostilities of 1850 the Tsar urged
the Synod and the Patriarch in Constantinople to "soften
72
their position toward Greece in its moment of crisis."
The change of attitude toward Otho and the· Greek
government was due, therefore, to the Tsar's interest in
penetrating the higher clergy in Greece and in capitalizing

70 See Laskaris, History of Greece, 53-4.

71 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 566-67.
72 Charles E. Frazee, The Orthodox Church and the
Independent Greece, 1821-1852 (Cambridge, 1969), 173.

69
on the recent anti-British movement in the country.

73

Al-

though the Tsar maintained a cool attitude toward the king
and the Greek government from 1833 to 1850 the "Russian" party was won over by Kolettes and his anti-Turkish foreign pol74
icy.
By 1850 a great number of people in Greece desired to
see an end to the existing schism of the Greek Orthodox Church
and the Patriarchate.

The king of Greece also desired the

same thing but for political and religious reasons.

Otho hoped

that a resolution to the Church controversy would bring him in75
to closer cooperation with the Tsar whose support he needed.
Missael Apostolides was sent to the Patriarch Anthimos IV delivering a message written by the Holy Synod of the Church of
Greece with the desired goal that the Patriarchate would rec76
ognize the Church of Greece.
Anthirnos IV rejected the message but the Russian minister to the Porte, Titov, who participated in the discussions concerning the subject of recogni-

73 The reason that the Tsar and the "Russian" party
were against an autocephalous church in Greece in 1833 was
because they wished to exert political influence through the
Patriarchy in Constantinople.
See About, Gr~ce, 178.
74 Russia did not favor Kolettes, even though the
"Russian" party did, for the Tsar felt that Kolettes was
devoted to the king and therefore to an autonomous Greek
Orthodox Church.
See Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 166.
75 The first to normalize relations between the Greek
Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate was made by Patriarch
Anthimos IV in December 1849 when he attended the funeral of
the devoted servant to Otho in Constantinople (Rizo-Neroulos,
Minister to the Porte) see Ibid., 171-74.
76 Kordatos, Hodern Greece, III, 567.

70
tion of the Greek Church, supported it.

77

The Holy Synod

met again and decided to ask recognition from the Patriarch
once more, only this time they would present an official
letter of support to the Synod by Otho.

The Patriarch accep-

ted the second request and the king of Greece as well as the
"Russian" party achieved a great political victory.

Nicholas

was also quite satisfied with the realliance of the Greek
Orthodox Church and the Patriarchate.

He wrote the following

letter to Otho as soon as he was informed of the recognition
of the Church by Anthimos IV:
Sir my Brother, it is with real satisfaction that I received from the hands of Archimandite Missael the letter
of Your Majesty by which it announces to me the canonical
recognition of the Church of the Greek Kingdom and from
this Synod by the Patriarchical Ecumenical Throne of Constantinople.
It delights me, just as Your Majesty, this
event, that it responds so well to the desires of the
people and fulfills one of their spiritual needs, the
most legitimate so far as it restores the unity and the
evangelical brotherly relations between her (Greek) Church
and the other venerable chairs of Orthodox Churches of the
East and of Russia.
It was most particularly pleasant to
learn that my instructions to my minister at Constantinople
have contributed to this happy result, to which the solicitude of Your Majesty wisely prepared the way. 78
Not everyone, however, was as happy as Nicholas, Otho and the
"Russian" party about the results of the Synodal Tome.

Many

progressively minded individuals in Greece opposed the late

77 Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 175.
78

Cited in Petrakakos, History of Greece, 151-52.
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recognition of the Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church
and believed that it was an insult to the Greek nation that
the Patriarchate had acted as though no independent Greece
79
existed between the period of 1833 to 1850.
The British
government was also displeased with the actions of the Synodal
Tomes.

The British Minister, Wyse, at Athens was stunned

about the reestablishment of relations between the Greek Church
and the Patriarchate.

He interpreted the recognition of the

autocephalous Church as a means which Russia used in order to
exert her influence in the

affair~

of Greece.

The French Mini-

ster, Sabatier, reacted in the same manner as Wyse.
It is certain today that M. Titov was the grand agitator
of this affair at Constantinople and that Russian influence has dictated the Patriarchical Bull. M. Deliany was
fooled or seduced but Otho, however, fully accepted the
results of the Tomos and as a result the Church of Greece
received the recognition it sought from the Patriarch and
the Greek government received the moral support of the
Tsar. 80
The alliance of the Greek Church with the Patriarchate marked
the beginning of friendly Greek-Russian relations and the end
of French support to Greece.

The solidarity of the Anglo-

French alliance of October 1849 which was shaken by the British blockade in Greece was restored when Greece chose to side

79 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 568.
8

° Cited

in Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 179-80.
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with Russia against the Western Powers.

This alliance was

only to become stronger in the following years when the Holy
places controversy broke out.
2.

The Role of Greece in the Holy Places Question.
At the same time that the Greek Church was requesting

recognition from Constantinople, developments leading to one
of the major crises in the Nineteenth Century were taking
place in the Middle East.

The affair known as the "Holy

Places Question" began in the middle of 1850 when Louis-

.

Napoleon decided to demand from the Ottoman Porte Catholic
81
dominion in the Holy Places.
The Sublime Porte decided,
82
for purely political and not religious reasons,
to grant
the wishes of the Emperor risking a possible Russo-Turkish
conflict.

The Religious policy of Turkey towards the various

millets, or religious groupings in the Empire, was very lenient as all regions were treated with equal respect.

83

Tra-

ditionally, the Orthodox who were the majority in the Empire
dominated the Holy Places as a privileged religious group.
So when the Latins requested what seemed to the Sultan's
government religious rights in the Holy Places their wish
was granted for it was in accordance with the law.

"By a

81

General Aupick, French Ambassador at Constantinople, made the first demand in 1850. H.W.V. Temperley,
England and the Near East, The Crimea (London, 1939), 287,
82
83

Ibid., 287-88.

Ann Pottinger Saab, The Origins of the Crimean
Alliance (Charlottesville, 1977), 5-6.
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note February 9, 1852, it (the Sublime Porte) directed that
the keys of the north and south gates of the great church at
Bethlehem and of the grotto of the Holy Manger 'must be given'
to the Latins, 'as of old' and they were allowed to erect a
silver star adorned with the French arms in the shrine of the
84
The French had not counted on direct Russian
nativity."
85
interference in the Holy Places Question:
they thought instead that since this was a matter of religion it would be
handled by the Patriarchate in Constantinople which represen86
ted the Orthodox millet.
Napoieon III used a religious
matter for diplomatic reasons, namely, to harm "Russia and
the Holy Alliance, surely normal activity for a Bonaparte
87
ruler."
Due to the religious controversy over the Holy

84

Miller, The Ottoman Empire, 200.

85 Professor Stavrou maintains that the Holy Places
had become a Russian interest center during the decade of
the 40's of the nineteenth century. At the same time French
interest also began increasing in that part of the world so
"this produced a religious and diplomatic debate involving
directly Russia and France." The confrontation therefore
which broke out into a major diplomatic war in the early 1850's
had its origins a decade earlier. See G.T. Stavrou, "Russian
Interest in the Levant 1843-1848" Middle East Journal, 17
(1963): 91-103.
86 Saab, Crimean Alliance, 10.
87

Ibid., 11.
See also Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian
Empire, 1801-1917 (Oxford, 1967), 864.
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Places, "Franco-Russian relations deteriorated considerably
to the point that neither side was totally satisfied with
88
the Turkish settlement of the affair.
During this crisis the Greeks and the "Orthodox"
party, composed of radical pro-Russian elements, sided with
Russia against the Roman Catholic French.

Russophilism was

constantly increasing in Greece and the spirit of revolt and
war against the Turks was once again haunting the country.
A rising in Montenegro which began as an internal strife contributed to the existing anti-Turkish atmosphere in Greece.
Prince Danilo, the ruler (the vladika) of Montenegro, attempted, after he succeeded his uncle Peter II in 1851, to make
Montenegro more independent from the central control of
89
Turkey.
A minor incident between Montenegrins and Turkish
authorities was turned into a major Ottoman invasion at the
request of Orner Pasha, a military leader who became governor
of Bosnia Hercegovina and Montenegro in 1850.
The revolutionary activities in Montenegro, whose
cause was supported by Austria, and the events of the Holy
Places set the atmosphere for revolution in Greece.

Forth-

88 V.J. _Puryear, England, Russia~ the Straits
Question, 1844-1856 (Berkeley, 1931), 197.
89

Saab, Crimean Alliance, 19, also see for details
on the rising of Montenegro Temperley, The Crimea, also
F.L. Stevenson, A History £f Montenegro-rLondon, 1912),183-84.
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Rouen, the French Charge d'Affaires in Athens wrote to Paris
that the conflict in the Holy Places had brought the "Russian"
party in Greece real strength.

He noted further that the

flag of religion which had often been used in Greece, was
brought out again.

"Religion is in danger and its children

are called once more to run to its defence. • • • Religion
is in Greece a powerful element of intrigue, and in representing Catholicism as invading, as menacing Orthodoxy • •
90
one is sure to move the spirits profoundly."
France and
England became increasingly worried when Otho appointed
Stavro Vlahos, a prominent member of the "Russian" party, a
Minister of Worship.

Wyse and Forth-Rouen were concerned

with the Russophilism of the king as well as of the public.
The "Orthodox" party which was totally devoted to Russia was
becoming more powerful by 1850 and its activities were widely
91
became an instrument
publicized. The Papoulakos movement
of the

11

0rthodox 11 party openly to express its hostilities

against the Catholics, the Liberals - - "French 11 and

11

Eng-

lish" parties - - as well as the Catholic king.

90 Cited in Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 184.

91 Chrisoforos Papoulakos was a monk who apparently
went mad - - had a vision - - and went around the country
preaching that all evils in Greece were due to the Catholic
king, Otho. The "Orthodox" party decided to capitalize on
this situation of the mad-man in order to revenge the·king
who was responsible for throwing out of the government the
prominent Russophile Kolokotrones, and also for becoming the
ceremonial head of the Greek Orthodox Church while he remained a Catholic and refused to convert to the religion of

,..
76
The representative in Athens of France and England
mostly blamed the king for the Russian extremism among the
public.

They felt that Otho was reflecting Tsarist policy

against the interests of the Western Powers in the Near East.
Upon the appointment of Vlachos, Wyse commented that the man
whom Otho chose to be his Minister of Worship, "is little
qualified by his want of religious moderation for the onerous duties of an office become lately of peculiar responsibility." 92

Neither the British nor the French would rea-

lize that Otho was not acting as an agent of the Russians
against the Near Eastern interests of the Western Powers
but that he was acting in accordance with the "Megali Idea"
policy which he hoped would bring him personal glory.
C.

The Menshikov Mission and Greek Reaction

On January 14, 1853 Nesselrode wrote to Brunnow:
To the indignation of the whole Greek population following the Greek rite, the key of the Church of Bethlehem
has been made over to the Latins, so as publicly to demonstrate their religious supremacy in the East.
The mischief is done, and there is no longer any question of
preventing it.
It is now necessary to remedy it.
Nesselrode added:

the Greek people.
For details see Fotiades, The Exile, 16778, also Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 582-88.
92

Frazee, The Orthodox Church, 185-86.

77
The (Russian) emperor is very irritated with the Sultan
and thinks it necessary to intimidate him to avoid being
obliged later to come seriously and actually to war,
which according to him must at all costs be avoided,
whether in the East or West. 93
The measure taken by the Tsar to put an end to the Holy Places
controversy was to send Prince Sergeevich Aleksandr Menshikov,
head of the Naval Ministry, to Constantinople with a set of
Russian demands to present to the Ottoman government.

The

Menshikov mission was doomed to failure for its purpose as
revealed in the Russian demands was one which invited hostili94
ties by the Great Powers and the .Sultan's government.
As was anticipated by Nesselrode the negotiations of
Prince Menshikov and the Turkish authorities were a failure
when it was apparent that the Sublime Porte refused to comply
with a number of the Tsar's requests and especially the request "for a note from the Sultan to the Tsar, pronouncing
his intentions with reference to Greek Christians and guaran95
teeing Russian rights in Turkey."
The government and most
Greeks anxiously awaited developments of a Russo-Turkish conflict,

They would then be able to strike at the Turks in

the provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia in order to

93
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free all Greeks from the Ottoman yoke and also expand the
national boundaries of Greece.

Then the unexpected occurred.

Prince Menshikov's aide-de-camp, Admiral Kornilov arrived in
Athens on 15 March 1853 on the war steamer, "Bessarabia.''
The visit, the Russians explained publicly, was due to the
Admiral's archeological and historical interests.

For the

Western Powers, the Greek government and the people of Greece,
the Kornilov visit was somehow politically connected to the
Menshikov mission.

On March 17th, the day the Russian war

vessel departed from Athens to Constantinople the British
Minister at Athens wrote to the Earl of Clarendon about the
Kornilov visit to Athens expressing his dissatisfaction and
suspicions about it.
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Forth-Rouen was even more apprehen-

sive about the unexpected visit of Kornilov to Greece.

He

expressed his fear that a visit such as the one the Admiral
made would have grave consequences in the public mind especially when Russo-Turkish negotiation settlements were
prepared for the rights of Christian subjects in the Ottoman
97
Empire.
Five days after the ''Bessarabia" had left the port
of Pireaus, Wyse had met with the Turkish Charge d'Affaire,
Nechid Bey, in Athens to discuss the Kornilov visit.

Wyse

96 F.O. 32/205, Wyse to Claredon, Athens, March 17,
1853.
97 Grice 61 (Files 196-201) Rousen to Drouyn de
Lhuys, Athens, March 27, 1853.
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wrote to Clarendon that:
Nechid Bey said that whatever might be given to the contrary he was convinced that the visit was political. He
brought dispatches for Mr. Persiany with whom he was in
continual communication and had on the day of his arrival a private audience with the king of two hours. The
'.'Bessarabia" war steamer which brought him here, left
Constantinople after midnight, and her departure and
destination were kept so secret, that it was not known
that she had gone till the next day, and then it was believed for exercise to the sea of Marmora. It. is also
to be added that the Admiral returned to Constantinople
in utmost speed, though Prince Menshikov it is understood remains there for some months. Mr. Persiany denied all this; he stated to me the other day that the
Admiral came for personal objects only, ~ he had ~
private interview with the king, and that he leaves
Prince Menshikov and the mis~ion for Russia immediately
on his return to Constantinople. 98
If the French and British representatives were suspecting
the Russian government's intentions concerning Greece they
had every right to do so since events made the Russian position a suspicious one.

Contrary to the suspicions of Forth-

Rouen and Wyse, however, the Russians had no intention of
arousing excitement against Turkey in Greece since the Tsar
was determined to avoid war 99 and as long as Prince Menshikov was in Constantinople there was a chance of a peaceful
settlement.

"Persiany," writes Dr. Donta, "tried to con-

vince the Greek government to prevent the press from pre-

98 F.O. 32/205, Confidential, Wyse to Claredon, Athens,
March 23, 1853. The same observations are made by Rouen, see
Grece 61 (No. 25) Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, March 27,
1853.
99 Theodore Martin maintains that the Tzar had told
Seymour that he opposed an extension of the Greek state, but
a few months later Russian agents were preparing the Greeks
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senting to the people a misleading picture of Russia press100
ing for war against Turkey."
The Menshikov mission, however, was interpreted in Greece by the people as well as by
the authorities as an indication of increased Russian power
in Constantinople.
The king and the Greek government thought that the
Tsar's plans did not include a Russo-Turkish war nor did
they include the reestablishment of a Byzantine Empire with
101
Otho as the emperor.
Even though Paicos, the Greek
foreign minister, tried to reassure the representatives of
France and England that no hostilities would be undertaken
against the Turks, and even though Fort-Rouen strongly urged
the Greek government to suppress the anti-Turkish and pro102
Russian propaganda in the press,
the public mind was pre-

for a war against Turkey in the frontier. He further claims
that Russia helped in organizing troops for the insurrection
and that on March 2, 1854 Count Nesselrode sent a note to all
Russian representatives abroad "in which active support of
Russia to the movement was promised • • • • " It is highly
doubtful that Russia gave any support to the Greek insurrection of 1854 other than moral support. The insurrection as
it will become clear in the following pages was the work of
the Greeks and the Greek government.
Theodore Martin, The
Life of His Royal Highness the Prince Consort, III, (London,
1877), 53-4.
100 D. Donta, E Hellas kai ai Dynameis kata ton Krimaikon Polemon (Greece and the Powers During the Crimean War)
(Thessalonike, 1973), 23.
101 Ibid.,
23, also see M.S. Anderson, Near East, 69.
''(d) Reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire, (e) Reunion
with Greece, (f) Impossibility of both."
102 Gr~ce 61 (no. 27) Fort-Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys,
Athens, April 7, 1853.
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pared by the "Russian" party propaganda and by the nationalist press, which continuously exalted the Megali Idea, for
a Greek-Turkish conflict.

In a dispatch on the state of the

public mind in Greece, Wyse reported the following:
"Religion 11 and 11 race" the two great objects from principle and passion, of Greek devotion, are used as watchwords to stimulate the popular enthusiasm. Heterias
never extinguished are again rising.
Their organization
has been long familiar to every Greek and it requires not
time nor discipline but opportunity to bring them into
action. 103
Wyse went on to report that the only ones in Greece who were
against Russia and did not support a policy of irredentism
and Greek-Turkish conflicts were the professional and commercia! classes, but that the king and the "Russian" party
104
were in favor of territorial expansion.
The commercial
105
class
was against Russia and a policy of expansion for
the simple reason that a war against Turkey on the side of
Russia would be inviting another blockade as in 1850, if not
an actual war by the Western Powers against Greece.

Such a

103 F.O. 32/205, Confidential, Wyse to Claredon,
Athens, March 23, 1853.
104 The government at the opening stages of the
Greek-Turkish hostilities was made up of individuals loyal
to the Crown! The Minister of Foreign Affairs was A. Paicos,
the Minister of Worship and Education was s. Vlahos, the Minister of War, Spiromelios, all affiliated members of the "Russian" party. The Prime Minister Admiral Kriezes, Minister
of the Interior, Riga Palmides, and Minister of Justice Sp.
Pelikas all were affiliated with the "French" party.
Of all
the ministers only Pelikas showed any definite signs of opposition to inviting hostilities between Greece and Turkey.
105 Commercial class included primarily Greeks involved in navigation and trading.
For details on the com-
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conflict would have a disastrous outcome for the commercial
class which did a great deal of business with the West.

The

idea of a Greek-Turkish war appealed to the masses, however,
who were constantly under the propaganda machine of the Greek
religion and press.

These people knew nothing of power poli-

tics and were not, as Wyse and Fort-Rouen presented them,
more inclined to favor Russia than the Western Powers for any
other reason than perhaps the common religion and common enemy
- - Turkey.

As one prominent historian of Greek diplomatic

history explains:
The unofficial Greece, however, in the exhortation of
Russian extremists, had as its only purpose the dynamic
realization of the Megali Idea, because as it proclaimed,
the existing suffocating restricted boundaries did not
permit Greece to evolve into a contemporary and organized
state. 106

mercia! families in Greece and their growth see Petropoulos,
Kingdom of Greece, 56-7.
106 Donta,

~

Crimean War, 24.
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CHAPTER III
GREEK-TURKISH HOSTILITIES IN 1853 AND
ANGLO-FRENCH REACTION
A.

Causes of the 1854 Greek-Turkish Conflict and
Anglo-French Reaction to Greek Foreign Policy
The Turkish provinces of Thessaly and Epirus were

predominately populated by Greeks at the outbreak of the
1
Crimean War. According to one French official
in 1850
the population of Thessaly ranged from 350,000 to 400,000
inhabitants.
Turks.

From the total population only 70,000 were

In Epirus the population was approximately 450,000

with two thirds Christian and one third Moslem.

2

In a part of the world where religion and common
heritage were regarded as the binding forces of all Greeks
it was only natural that after the War of Independence

1 E. Grasset to General Lafitte, Salonique, tom. 24
(1850-1858), 82-107, Thessalonike, 24-12-1850, cited in
Elias Pangiotes Georgiou, "Gallikou Schediou Aposbeseos tes
Thessalikes Epanastaseos tou 1854" (French Plans to Extinguish the Revolt of Thessaly in 1854) Thessalika Chronika,
(Athens, 1965), 746. Nomikos, "International Position of
Greece" has the Thessaly population at 250,000 of whom four
fifths were moslem. The source for these figures is questionable this is why I have chosen to use the figures derived from French documentations.
2 Nomikos, "International Position of Greece," 83.
83

84
nationalist uprisings would take place in an effort to "liberate" all Greeks from Turkish domination.

The geographi-

cal position of Thessaly and Epirus as well as Macedonia
facilitated the attempt of the Greek nationalists to revolt
against the Turks in 1854.

These provinces which were pre-

dominately populated by Christians and were adjacent to
Greece were subject to constant raids from brigands ever
since the War of Independence.
The brigandage acts carried out by Greeks on Greek
soil as well as on Turkish - - Thessaly and Epirus - - were
not entirely acts of looting but were primarily intended to
stimulate insurrection in the Turkish provinces.

Such acts

led to the break of relations between Greece and Turkey and
eventually into a war in 1854.

There is a complexity of

reasons as to how and why brigands were turned into professional revolutionaries and brigandage became a means of expressing the nationalist commitments of the Greek people.
Although many brigand chiefs who took part in the rising of
Epirus, Thessaly and Chalcidice in 1854 were determined
nationalists who needed no external agitation to drive them
to fight the Turks, many were recruited by the Greek government either directly or indirectly, and still others joined
the brigand bands after they came under the enormous propaganda of the "Russian" party and the Greek Court.

3

3 Greek brigands of Asia Minor influenced by antiTurkish propaganda were transported on Greek ships to the
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A recent study of the insurrection of 1854 in Thessaly entitled The Insurrection of 1854 and the Thessaly Undertaking

4

presents the events which led to the war of 1854 as

purely acts of liberation on behalf of the Greek people who
sought to free themselves and their brothers who were living
in the Ottoman Provinces.

As it will become apparent towards

the end of this chapter there is a certain amount of truth
to this thesis, but to go as far as equating the revolution
of 1854 with the War of Independence as not only Professor
Koutroumbas has done but other Greek historians as well, is
misleading if not biased.

The reality of the Greek-Turkish

conflict and the events which led to it are too complex to
be dismissed as another war of independence.
The Montenegro rising, the Holy Places controversy,
the Menshikov mission, and the Kornilov visit to Athens were
all elements which contributed to an already critical situation between the Turks and the Greeks.

Naturally, tensions

ran just as high on the Turkish side as they did on the Greek.
The Sublime Porte feared that serious trouble on the GreekTurkish frontiers would be stirred up by the Greek brigands.
On March 2nd, 1853, Metaxas, Greek minister to Constantinople

Agean Islands with a final destination of Thessaly.
Crimean War, 25.

Donata,

~

4

D.G. Koutroumbas, E Epanastasis tou 1854 kai ai en
Thessalia, Idia Epicheireseis (The Revolution of 18~and the
Thessaly Undertaking) (Athens, 1976).
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and a member of the "Russian" party, informed Paicos that
Rifaat Pasha, the new Turkish foreign minister, informed him
that the Ottoman government threatened to take possession of
two villages on the Greek-Turkish frontier which were legally
5

The Turkish foreign minister claimed
6
in a dispatch to the Greek government that the villages
leg-

occupied by the Greeks.

ally belonged to the Ottoman Empire.

Furthermore, the Sub-

lime Porte claimed the villages under its authority because
of the universal brigandage which threatened the peace of the
Ottoman Empire.
had no

d~sire

Rifat further asflerted that the Sublime Porte

to go through another struggle with revolution-

aries as it had recently in Montenegro. 7
The Turkish occupation of villages, which the Greeks
claimed legally belonged to them, triggered a number of incidents which intensified hostile feelings between the Greeks
and the Turks.

The Greek government, which really sought an

opportunity for confrontation with the Sublime Porte made no
effort to compromise, that is to say, to take measures to

5 A.Y.E. 1853 4/la (no. 330), Metaxas to Paicos,
Constantinople, March 2, 1853.
6 The real concern of the Greek government was over
the 3,000 armed Turkish troops concentrated on ~he ThessalyEpirus frontier.
Donta, The Crimean War, 26-7.
7 A.Y.E.

1853 4/la (No.54), Copy (Dispatch of the
Turkish Foreign Minister).
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repress brigandage on the frontiers in order to relieve tensions and reassure the Turkish authorities of their peaceful
intentions.

Instead Paicos wrote the following letter to

Metaxas challenging the latest Turkish acts in the Provinces:
The Ottoman Porte has forgotten it seems, that the separate Ottoman State's boundaries in Greece stretched under
the terms of the three Great Powers under whose guarantee
Greece remains, and therefore the present question cannot
be solved by taking the law into one's own hand arbitrarily
but the consent of the three Guarantors is required. 8
Paicos proceeded to inform the Greek people of the presence
of Turkish troops on the frontiers which intended to take
over the Greek villages.

By thus provoking the anti-Turkish

sentiments of the public, Paicos and the Greek government
hoped to gain public support in order to justify sending
troops to the Epirus-Thessaly frontiers to counter the action
of the Sublime Porte.

Nothing could be more dangerous and

explosive than the presence of both Greek and Turkish troops
on the frontier, for immediately the Greeks in Thessaly and
Epirus thought that the time for a showdown had finally arrived and they were preparing for war.

9

Neshid Bey, the Ottoman Charge d'Affaires at Athens,
complained to both representatives of the two Western Powers

8 A.Y.E. 1853 4/la (No. 1393), Paicos to Metaxas,

Athens, March 19, 1853.
9 Donta, The Crimean War, 28.
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about the action taken by the Greek government on the GreekTurkish frontier.

On March 23rd he informed Wyse that Greek

emissaries in Albania and neighboring Provinces had been active.

He further complained that the Greek emissaries and

brigands who were on the frontier and in the Provinces of
Epirus, Albania and Thessaly were connected with the parties
in Greece and acted under the watchful eye of Greek authorities.

Neshid Bey also complained about the Brigands in Asia

Minor and the islands and especially Crete.

All these events

were taking place under the eyes·of Greek authorities who
10
allowed them to continue.
Wyse informed Clarendon, the British foreign secretary, that Neshid Bey related these complaints of his government to Paicos but,
Mr. Paicos in answer to these remonstrances had promised
nothing: nor did he (Nehid Bey) expect from what he had
already seen anything really effective from the Greek
government.
At the same time he was convinced that if
his representations continued to be disregarded, this
indifference sooner or later would infallibly lead to
open dissensions and disturbances in the Turkish villages 11
and to consequences he need not say, the most disastrous.
Forth-Rouen also reported to Paris that even though Paicos reassured him that the mission of Scarlata Soutzo and his troops

10 F.O. 32/205, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, March 23, 1853.
ll Ibid.
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to the frontier was to put an end to brigandage, the Greek
troops were there for security reasons only.

Forth-Rouen ex-

plained to Drouyn de Lhuys, French foreign minister, that in
spite of these reassurances the presence of Greek troops gathered on the frontier could only have negative consequences and
leave an impression of tensions among the Greeks of the Prov12
inces.
The Greek government was well aware of British, French
and Russian policy in the Near East and especially Greece.
All three Powers maintained that.Greece should not be enlarged
at the cost of Turkish territory.

Greece had experienced dev-

astating consequences as a result of her long antagonism with
Great Britain during the Kolettes ministry and later during
the "Court governments" with the Pacifico and Finlay claims.
After the Holy Places question her good relations with France
deteriorated as both the court and the people sided with Russia.

At the opening of the Menshikov negotiations the Greek

government was composed primarily of Russophiles and royalists, 13 an indication that the king was blind to Near-Eastern
policy of the Western Powers.
12 Gr:ce 61 (No. 33), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens,
April 1, 1853.
13 Paicos, Foreign Minister, Vlachos, Minister of Education and Religion and Sp. Melios, Minister of War, were all
members of the "Russian" party and were supported by Queen
Amalia.
A Krieze, Prime Minister and Minister of the Navy,
R. Palamedes, Minister of the Interior, and s. Pelikas, Minister of Justice, were moderate pro-French politicians who
would support the Crown and the "Russian" party.
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Otho and his Russophile ministers chose to disregard
all realities of international politics and pursued a risky
policy of antagonizing the Sublime Porte.

In the first week

of April, reports showed that regular and irregular troops
numbering one thousand two hundred were sent from Athens to
the frontier near Lamia by orders of the government.

This

action was taken on behalf of Greek authorities without informing the representatives of France and England and Neshid
Bey.

This arbitrary action greatly alarmed both Wyse and

Forth-Rouen who immediately reque·sted a conference with
Paicos and demanded an explanation of the Greek government's
hostile moves towards the Ottoman Empire.

Paicos explained

that the reason the troops were sent to the frontier was because Rifaat Pasha had threatened forcibly to take the two
villages which were rightfully inhabited by Greeks.

Forth-

Rouen and Wyse warned Paicos of the damaging consequences a
Greek military occupation of the villages could have but
Paicos reassured the two ministers stating that

Greec~

abstain from any military advances on the frontier.

14

would
Wyse

in a private meeting with Forth-Rouen found that the French
minister was as worried about the turn of events in Greece
as he was.

When the British minister visited Persiany to

14 Gr~ce 61 (No. 33), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys,
Athens, April 1, 1853, also F.o. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, April 7, 1853.
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find out what his feelings about the late developments in the
frontiers were, he was surprised to hear that the Russian minister also was not informed about the Greek military operations on the frontier.

Persiany sympathized with his French

and British colleagues and pledged his full support and coop15
eration to them in this crisis.
The cooperation between the Protecting Power's representatives and Paicos reassurances to maintain peace on the
frontiers left Wyse, Rouen and Persiany optimistic about the
future conditions in Greece although they both expressed concern about the revolutionary and warlike state of mind of
Greek public opinion.

Reacting to the pressure of the three

Powers and fearing another blockade such as the one that had
taken place in 1850) the Greek government temporarily retreated
from any further agitation with the Turks.

Public opinion,

however, influenced by the propaganda of the press, and especially Aion, the organ of the "Russian" party, openly expressed its anti-Turkish and pro-Russian sentiments; it was
ready for a conflict.

An article, which appeared in Aion

written as an address to the English state reveals the nature
of propaganda to which the Greek public mind was exposed.

15 Gr~ce 61 (No. 33), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys,
Athens, April 1, 1853, also F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, April 7, 1853.
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We love Russia because she crushed the head of the Turk
which you want to lift again and to last forever.
The
all powerful and magnificent eagle of the North, which
possesses seven parts of Europe, who has advanced to the
new frontiers, the Emperor Nicholas occupied Dacia and
Moldavia in the end forcing the English to renounce their
protection over the Ionians in favor of the future Hellenic Empire, which it will restore in opportune time Dacia
and Moldavia. 16
The Greek Court took no measures to curb propaganda in the
press for it wishes that the public be indoctrinated with
ideas which conformed to the Megali Idea.

Demonstrations

and protest gatherings directed against Turkey were allowed
to continue in Athens, in spite

o~

solemn promises made to

Wyse and Forth-Rouen and to Turkey by Paicos that Greeks desired peace.

17

Not only were the anti-Turkish demonstra-

tions and propaganda allowed to continue, but the Greek gov18
ernment encouraged and supported them.
After the Sultan, Abdul-Mejid, had made up his mind
not to give in any more to Russia's demands even if it meant
going to war, the Ottoman Empire was determined to take strong
measures to deal with Greece, Rifaat Pasha who replaced Fuad
as foreign minister demanded from the embassy in Constantinople
that the Greek troops on the frontier be removed, otherwise the

16 Cited in Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 376.
17 F.O. 32/206 (copie), Paicos to Neshid Bey, Athens,
April 5, 1853.
18 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 600.
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Turkish government would resort to armed force.

19

The last

thing France and England wanted was another Greek-Turkish
conflict over two insignificant villages, during the time
when Russo-Turkish relations were becoming more strenuous.
Both Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys instructed their ministers
in Constantinople to intervene between the Sublime Porte and
20
Greece in order to settle the dispute diplomatically.
The Greek troops by the middle of April numbered two
thousand.

A firm indication that Greece was no more looking

for a peaceful settlement than was Turkey.

Paicos insisted,

however, that the troops were to suppress brigandage and not
21
to begin a war.
When a conference took place in Constantinople between the Greek and Ottoman legations "the three
Protecting Powers provided that the Greek government on its
side would immediately withdraw the troops lately concentrated on the frontier and thus obviate the necessity on the
part of the Sublime Porte of augmenting its force in the
same direction."

22

In spite of the efforts of the three

Powers (Turkey, France and England) to have the Greek troops
removed from the frontier, the Greeks did not recall a single

19 Donta,

~

Crimean War, 31-2.

20 Ibid., 32-3.
21 F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 26,
1853.
22
1853.

F.o. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 29,
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soldier back to Athens.

23

This indicated that the Greek

government was not at all serious about maintaining peace
with Turkey.

In reality Greece was looking for an oppor-

tunity to start a war.
The break in diplomatic relations between Russia
24
and Turkey on May 17th
and the four-hundredth anniversary
of the Fall of Constantinople on May 29, 1853, helped to set
the stage for great expectations by the Greek people and, especially, by king Otho.
Now that the Russians had struck at the Turks, the longawaited moment for increasing his dominions seemed at
hand; greater men than Otho might be excused for yielding to this temptation. He would never remember that
the guarantee of Greek independence by the Protecting
Powers was, in a sense, a two edged weapon. These Powers,
or at any rate England and France would be as anxious to
protect the existing frontiers of Turkey as those of
Greece. 25
If the king was blinded by the expansionist ideas which he
formulated largely under the influence of Kolettes, his ministers and many politicians who embraced the foreign policy of
"Megali Idea" were deceived by looking back at the position
of France and England during the War of Independence.

Many

Greeks felt that, in case of a Russo-Turkish conflict, Greece
should strike in the Northern Provinces, and if the takeover
of the Provinces was successful they argued, the Western Powers

23 F.o. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, May 13,
I
1853, also see Grece 61 (No. 32), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys,
Athens, April 22, 1853.
24 See Temperley, The Crimea, 324-29 •
.
25 Bower & Bolitho, Otho l• 190-91.

--
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would not try to intervene.

A similar situation had occurred

during the War of Independence, with the only difference being that there was no Greek state to fight against Turkey,
only Greeks.

In 1853, however, if Greece would strike against

Turkey this would mean official declaration of war of one country against another, which could very well mean that Turkey's
allies would come to her aid in case of war.

Many chose not

to follow this course of reasoning and rely on history instead hoping that it would repeat itself in their favor.
realities of international

polit~cs,

The

however, were quite dif-

ferent than the reality conceived by most officials in the
Greek government.
The Western Powers had a much greater problem to
solve in order to allow Greece to become an obstacle in their
Near Eastern policy.

On May 7th Wyse sent a formal letter to

Paicos expressing "the regret of her Majesty's government that
at a moment when it was so manifestly desirable to preserve
the public tranquility, measures should have been adopted by
the Greek government which could not fail to produce the
greatest public excitement." 26

The efforts of the "Russian"

party continued to press for open hostilities against Turkey.
With the exception of the small professional class and the
classes of merchants and businessmen, the majority of the

2 6 A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos (copy) Athens, May 7,

1853.
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country the peasants and much of the working class supported
27
The actions, military
the "Russian" party and the king.
or brigandage, taking place in the Provinces against the Turks
were wholeheartedly supported by the masses in Greece.

Towards

the end of May a band of brigands from Lamia murdered the exdemarch (mayor) of Eubea and wounded several persons while
the two thousand troops of the Greek government were stationed
in the frontiers with their only purpose being to suppress
brigandage, and maintain tranquility.
During the time that

hosti~e

actions were taking place

on the Greek-Turkish frontiers and were allowed to continue under the watchful eye of the Greek local authorities, the government in Athens placed an order for twenty-five thousand to
twenty-seven thousand rifles from France which were to be
28
shipped without delay to the National Arsenals.
The French
government obviously turned down the request but the fact that
the Greeks ordered arms from the French with the covert intention of using them against the Turks shows their naivite about
international politics.

The irony of this entire affair is

that Paicos continued to reassure Wyse of the Greek peaceful
29
intentions towards the Ottoman Empire
while the intelli27 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 599-600.
28 F.o. 32/206, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 2, 1853.
29 A.Y.E. 1853 (copie), Paicos to Wyse, Athens, May 13,
1853, also A.Y.E. 1853 (copie) Paicos to Wyse, Athens, May 26,
1853.
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gence reports of the British Legation in Athens indicated
that Greece was indeed preparing for war or an organized
revolt in the provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Chaliidice.
The efforts of the Western Powers after the month of
May to neutralize Greece in case of a possible open war between Russian and Turkey became more intense.

On June 4th

Wyse sent a dispatch to Paicos pointing out the determination of the Western Powers to maintain the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire.
I have the honor to inform you that I am instructed by
the Earl of Clarendon to state to you that her Majesty's
Government have had much reason to complain of the Greek
Government for sending troops to the Frontier and keeping their intentions secret from the representatives of
the three Powers at Athens; that at a moment, when it was
important to allay invitation these troops were sent under circumstances calculated to increase and to turn to
account the pressure of Prince Menshikoff and Constantinople and the unfounded rumors currently respecting the
object of his mission; that in thus causing excitement,
and creating false hopes, in the minds of the Greek people the Greek Government have displayed a want of judgement as well as knowledge of the policy of the Great Powers of Europe, who have never been more firmly determined than at the present time, to maintain the integrity
and independence of the Turkish Empire. 30
Even though this warning dispatch came as a shock to the Greek
government and took by surprise both Persiany and Forth-Rouen,
it cannot be argued that the British government had not warned
Greece before about its hostilities towards Turkey and that
Clarendon was not justified in taking such extreme measures
to warm Greece about any anticipated plans of war against its

30 A.Y.E. 1853 4/lc, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, June 4,
1853, also, F.O. 32/206, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, June 4, 1853.
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neighbor.

31
The British suspicions about Greek anticipa-

tion of war were well founded.

The British and Ottoman in-

telligence had discovered that, as early as June, Greeks
from London, Vienna, Trieste collected funds in order to aid
32
the Greek population in Turkey in case of war.
France was as concerned about the developments in the
frontiers as England.

The Quai d'Orsay had been informed

that the Orthodox, pro-Russian Greeks, identified with the
Russian cause and that Greece would find herself in danger
if she followed a policy which endangered the interests of
the Western Powers in the Near East.

33

At the same time troubles and incidents among the
irregular troops stationed on the Greek Turkish frontier and

31 Dr. Donta argues that there was no call for such
harsh warning by Clarendon to Greece, since it could do little
good and even perhaps cause the Greek government and the people to become more attached to Russia.
It remains, however,
that the Greek government had done nothing to show that the
troops in the frontiers would be removed and furthermore brigandage continued to grow.
Given that the Greek court government
and the majority of the people were turning pro-Russian and
anti-Turkish there was very little else Clarendon could do under such circumstances. For Donta's argument see.!..!!.!. Crimean
Har, 44-5.
32 F.O. 32/207, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 17, 1853.
33 See Grece 62 (No. 47), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys,
June 7, 1853. France was also concerned over the fact that
Menshikov had frequently visited the Greek Charge d'Affaires
while in Constantinople.
See Grece 62 (No. 49), Rouen to
Drouyn de Lhuys, June 10, 1853.
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the residents began to annoy the Turkish authorities.

Also

the Greek press kept increasing its anti-Turkish propaganda
and was not at all discouraged by the government's injunction to refrain from attacking a friendly neighboring nation.
Finally, Nechet Bey complained about the developments in
Greece which placed the Ottoman Empire in a defensive position and jeopardized the peaceful coexistence of the two
Paicos replied to the Turkish Charge d'Affaires

nations.

that he would endeavor to maintain tranquility in the border
Provinces.

He stated, however, that he could not regulate

or suppress the press which was engaged in a press war with
Turkey.

"Permettez-moi, tout-fois de

vo~s

faire observer

qu'il n'est pas 'a son pouvoir de corriger le languge de quelI

I

ques journalistes, ni de regler les idees et les pensees de
tout le monde." 34

He went on to charge that bands of brig-

ands were supported by Turkish authorities and ''were admitted
to the public service" of the Ottoman Provinces.
The Paicos communique was obviously not intended to
soften Neshid Bey but he was correct that there were brigands
used by the Turks to run the Provinces and, as the interLegation correspondence concerning the frontier indicates,
Greek subjects under Ottoman rule in the Provinces were harshly treated throughout 1853 (another reason why so many Greeks
of the Provinces of Thessaly and Epirus joined the insurrec-

34 A.Y.E. 1853, Paicos to Nechet Bey, Athens, July 7,
1853.
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tion as will be shown in following sections).

35

The mal-

treatment of Greeks by the Ottoman authorities was due partly
to the rise of Russophilism in Greece and anti-Turkish propaganda, and partly to the recent developments on the frontiers
which made the Turks very apprehensive as they very well knew
that liberation of all of Greece - - from Crete to the gates
of Constantinople - - was the goal which they had to confront.
The Greek government sought the opportunity to capitalize on the cruel treatment of Greek subjects in the Provinces and on the use of brigandage by Turkey.

On July 8,

the Greek ministers in London, Paris, St. Petersburg and
Munich expressed to the Protecting Powers and to the European
community the Greek government's grievance against the irregular Albanian troops, and the government's desire to maintain Greek troops in the frontiers for the sake of keeping
36
order in the troublesome areas.
All the Protecting Powers
advised the government in Athens and the king to retain order

35 For more on this see A.Y.E. 1853 4/lb, Peri ktematon
kata ta Methoria Proxenike Allelographia (Concerning the Embassy Correspondence of the Lands on the Frontier).
(No. 8508),
D. Kyriakides to the Embassy of Epirus and Albania of His Majesty the King, also (No. 142) Gregoriades (agent at Arta) to
the Epirus and Albania Embassy of Greece.
36 The Ottoman regular troops were pulled out of the
Provinces in June and reports from the Greek embassies in the
Provinces complained about Albanian irregular troops abuses.
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and not to step out of line. 37
pathy of Europe

The plan to gain the sym-

as during the War of Independence - -

did not work for it was obvious that Otho and his Court had
38
more in mind than keeping peace in the Provinces.
While
the government in Athens promised Europe that her plan for
the future only included peaceful coexistence with Turkey,
there were undergoing secret preparations for war. 39

On

September 19, Wyse wrote to Paicos that he had been instructed by the Earl of Clarendon to bring to the attention of
the Greek government several

inci~ents

transport on Greek vessels.

Gun powder was transported from

involving ammunition

Syra to the ports of Prevesa and Arta for the use by the
Greek brigands.

The transportation of gun powder and other

war supplies were carried out with a prior knowledge by the
Greek authorities, Wyse charged and further

37

Donta, Crimean War, 47.

38 The movement for a Greek-Turkish war was pushed
behind the scenes by such extremist nationalists as Spiromilio and Scarlata Soutzo who were instrumental in having
their influence exerted in the Greek Court, see Crece 63
(No. 69), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens, July 29, 1853.
I
Also Grece 63 (No. 74), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens,
August 17, 1853.
It cannot be deduced from this that the
king was really pushed into a conflict he did not ask for.
Because as the next section will reveal the role of the
king in the preparations for war was very much of his own
will.

,

39

See~.,

48-9.
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It has been stated to the Lord High Commissioner (of the
Ionian Islands) that a large depot of powder and other
military stores had been framed at Syra by persons in
connection with the Greek Hetaerias, 40 and Signor Posali,
a responsible merchant at Corfu, while he denies any connection with the present cargo admits that to his knowledge many similar consignments have been made from Syra
to Prevesa and Arta during the last few weeks, the object
of which can be easily understood. 41
l~hile

preparing for war the Greeks searched desperately for

allies who would support their expansionist policy.

Obvious-

ly, England and France would never support Greece since its
foreign policy stood in opposition to theirs.

Russia would

have no part in supporting Greece ·in extending its territory
since Nicholas feared that the creation of a strong state in
the south would mean limitation of his country's power in the
Aegean Sea.

Greece therefore appealed to Bavaria for help

but the Bavarian Court would not support an expansionist policy since the Tsar had declared that he opposed Greek territor i a 1

.

expans~on.

42

The situation for Greece and especially

for Otho who was the most devoted supporter of the Megali
Idea was critical.

He had to make a difficult decision:

40 Hetaerias were the various nationalist .liberation
organizations which provided money and supplies for the cause
of freeing the Greeks from Turkey and reestablishing a "Greater Greek" nation.
41 A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, September 19,
1853.
42

See Donta, Crimean War, 49-50.

r

103
either to go to war with Turkey and

ther~by

risk an Allied

blockade of Greece, even an occupation, or to give up all
immediate plans for expansion and wait for the propitious
moment in the future.
B.

Otho's Support for Greek-Turkish Hostilities
Historians of contemporary Greek history agree that

Otho and the Greek Court were responsible for pressing for
a Greek-Turkish war and territorial expansion.

Even though

the king has been praised by some scholars for acting on be43
half of the nation's interests,
most agree that the foreign
policy executed by him during the Crimean War period was disastrous to the welfare of the nation.
~vrites

.,Otho and Amalia,"

Philaretos, "nursed under Kolettes in the Megali Idea,

were thirsty for greater ambitions in which they found consultation from the bitterness of their childlessness and
weariness from the domestic convulsive wailing.

Thus Otho

became the leader of the war policy himself assuming the
44
direction of every operation."
Another prominent Greek
historian writes:
The war-like psychology of the Greek people as we saw,
was adopted by Otho and Amalia, not because they were
patriots and wished to free Epirus and Thessaly, but so
43 Aspreas who is a royalist argues in this manner,
see Modern Greece, I, 224-30.
44 Philaretos, Foreign Rule, 98.
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that they could strengthen their throne which was shaky.
And they succeeded by pretending to be warlike. So for
a period they succeeded to win the sympathies of the
greater mass of the people. 45
King Otho was confronted with a very peculiar situation in
1853.

He remembered how he became popular with the masses

in 1850 during the British blockade for not giving in to the
demands of a Great Power.

Now he had once more the oppor-

tunity to become popular by posing as a Greek nationalist
and if everything went his way he would be popular and a
king of a "Greater Greece."

At the same time, however, he

.

was confronted with serious warnings from the Western Powers
against any undertakings in the Turkish Provinces.
In June Otho wrote to his father that he had to postpone his trip to Germany due to the developments in the Near
East.

"The latest events," he wrote, "have irritated the

Great Powers to the point that in order to calm them I have
46
A month and a half later the situation
to remain here."
in Greece was much more critical and the king expressed his
thoughts about it as follows:
Conditions here are stretched at the highest level, as
a result of the Russo-Turkish dispute.
I believe that
the matter will result in war • • • • And this because

45

Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 605.

46 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, June 7, 1853, cited in
Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 970.
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the fanaticism of the Turks has reached such a point that
the Sultan is afaid of the question of retreat because of
the possible disastrous consequences. I am trying to calm
the minds of my faithful subjects • • • • But at the same
time I am convinced that Divine Providence has decided the
enlargement of Greece. 47
The need to increase and secure his power became increasingly
urgent for Otho.
In September 1853 the king called for elections because he feared the power of the opposition would diminish
48
his popularity in the country.
Very few people participated in the elections and the

ge~eral

public apathy caused

rumors that the king was preparing a coup
mate suppression of the Constitution.

~·

I

etat and ulti-

The day before the

elections Wyse sent the following report to the Foreign Office:
It is unnecessary
to point out the consequences if such
I
(coup ~'etat) a movement is successful; suppression of
all freedom of the press and of all publicity, personal
liberty placed at the mercy of a party; of finances levied, and applied at their caprice and for their purposes; • • • the military occupation of th~ kingdom would
be exclusively in the hands of the king. 4

47 Ibid., 971.
48 The Constitution had not really been enforced in
Greece since Kolettes became Prime Minister in 1844 (see ·
Chapter I).
Otho had nothing to fear- from opposition since
he had done away with the Constitutionalists of 1843. Metaxas
was sent to Constantinople as ambassador, Mavrokordatos to
Paris and Trikoupis to London. So the leading politicians
who could get elected were not even in Greece.
For details
of the 1853 elections see Petrakakos, History of Greece, 153-55,
also Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 576-81.
49 F.O. 32/207, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,

September 27, 1853.
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Wyse went on to urge to the Foreign Office that English policy and intentions in the Near East should be spelled out to
the Government in Athens.
Our best means of standing against Russian or other influences, is the just confidence we inspire that we shall
always continue to in the cause of national liberty, good
administration, public order, commerce and industry in
a word Western civilization against Eastern barbarism.
The least semblance even, of a departure from such a policy would be not only an infringement of our former engagements, but I am quite convinced a manifest sacrifice of our most solid and important interests here, and
would amount to little less than a wholesale transfer of
the sympathies of a large body of this peo~le in our
favour, to Russia or France on the other. 0
Among other things, this dispatch of the British Minister
reveals that although British Near Eastern policy paralleled
French policy, British interests were naturally the primary
objective of the Foreign Office.

Besides the economic in51
terests, which England had in Greece,
it was also essential to develop a machinery, through the "English" party of

course, of political control.

All the talk of "liberty,"

"justice" and "western civilization" was not to be taken
seriously for the purpose of the Foreign Office was to secure

50 Ibid.
51 The F.O. series for the years 1853-1857 contains
numerous reports concerning British economic interests in
Peloponese, and especially in Corinth. In many of these
dispatches the Consul at Patras ask Wyse to use his influence
with the Greek government to favor the interests of the British commerce.
See Appendix 254-255.
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and promote British interests and not to teach the world a
lesson in liberalism.

Greece was nothing more than a tool

for England, at times a tool which was difficult to control
for other Powers had a share of it.

The main obstacle to

exert British political control in Greece was the king.

In

1853, however, the king was left with no one major power to
support his policy so at his moment of weakness it would be
easier for the British government to intervene in Greek affairs than in the past.
Otho, however, did not bend as easily as the Foreign
Office would have liked.

Clarendon warned him three times

in 1853 of the English determination to uphold the Ottoman
52
Empire's integrity
but the king who was the main architeet and supporter of the aggressive acts taking place on
53
the frontiers against the Turks,
chose to disregard them.
In early October additional troops were being armed to be
sent to the frontier and once again Paicos did not inform
Rouen, Wyse and Nechet Bey about this matter.

When ques-

tioned by Nechet Bey as to when the new troops were to be
sent to the frontier, Paicos replied that he did not know
and that he had to ask the Minister of war.

Finally, when

pressed for an explanation the Greek Minister of Foreign
Affairs wrote to Hyse that, "as far as the marching of ad-

52

The last dispatch in A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos,
Athens, September 14, 1853.
53 Koutroumbas, The Revolution of

~,

29-30.

108
ditional troops to the frontier from Nauplia is in question
his colleague, the Minister of War, informs him that a single soldier has not quitted that fortress, a company only
of artillery with four pieces of cannon left Athens within
54
these last few days to replace another at Lamia."
The
intelligence reports of Nechet Bey and the British Legation
in Athens, however, indicated that "an Hetaeria is in full
operation in Lamia and in communication, with sympathizers
on both sides of the frontier, under the eyes of Greek authorities and without any effectual means having been taken
for their repression." 55

It was no secret to any one that

ever since brigand chiefs were affiliated with the Court
they were used as its weapon to manipulate events in domestic and foreign affairs.

56

Wyse feared, as had lyons before

him and many british statesmen before 1853, that brigandage
in Greece was a threatening element to the stability and peace
in the Provinces for it was bands of brigands who were converted into revolutionaries and fought for an independence in

54 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 7,
1853.
55 Ibid.
56

\

About, Grece, 231-35.
Certain brigands were used
as defenders of the regime. They exercised police functions
and were used as the private army of the king.
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57
1821. ·

The king knew this just as well and this is the

reason he liked to patronize chieftains.

In November he ad-

dressed the following letter to his father:
A few days ago I said to an elderly Epiriot who gives
great significances to a prophetic book, The Good Angel,
that we in the period of one year will be in Constantinople.
If this book determines time or not I do not
know.
But it is known to me • • • that a Bavarian is
about to reign there. 58
After the garrison from Nauplia moved to the frontier, Otho
wrote to his brother Maximilian that he "was convinced that
providence had decreed the expansion of Greece" and pointed
the necessity for replacing the old weapons with new ones.
Maximilian disapproved of Otho's activities and intentions,
and Otho appealed to him again, saying "that it was the duty
of all Christians in Europe to fight for their co-religionists
59
who were downtrodden by the Crescent."
Otho determined to carry out his dream of a greater
Greece even though his own relatives discouraged him from engaging in acts which could endanger his throne.

In February

1854 Napoleon III wrote a letter to the king of Greece trying
to discourage him from going too far with his plans to antagonize the Turks.
57 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 26,
1853.
58 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, November 27, 1853, cited in
Skandames, Kingdom 2f ~' 972-73.
59 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho

I•

191-92.
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The recent attitude of Your Majesty's Government has
shown me that its intentions are very different from
what I expected. Instead of enli~htening Your Majesty's
subjects on the situation, the Government has allowed
them to be misled; and through the weakness and connivance of the authorities, matters have come to such a
point that the insurgents in Epirus are openly recruiting supporters, not only among Your subjects, but even
among Your troops. Under any conditions I would regret
bitterly if Greece were to compromise her destiny by
provoking disturbances in the Near East, but Y~ur Majesty will understand that today I should be forced to
consider any attack directed against the Ottoman Empire
as being directed against France herself. 60
After Baron Forth-Rouen delivered Napoleon's letter to Otho,
the king was taken by surprise never expecting such strong
warning to come from France, a nation, unlike England, with
which Greece had had fair relations for most years since its
existence.

The king answered Napoleon in a very touching

letter pointing out that he could not conceive that French
soldiers who once fought by the side of Greeks would now
turn their guns against them.

He went on to add that the

crisis in the Near East was not to be blamed on the Crown
of Greece and that even though there were sympathies in
Greece for the Christian subjects of the Provinces, there
was no attempt on the part of the kingdom to promote a revolt or engage in war against Turkey. 61
60 Translation used here is from Bower & Bolitho,
Otho I, 193-95. For the French and Greek texts see Petrakakos,
History of Greece, 155-57.
61 Ibid., Petrakakos, 157-60.
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It has been argued that Otho was convinced that the
expansion of the Greek kingdom would work not only to the
advantage of his own country but also to that of the Western
European countries as well.

He felt that a greater Greece

would be able to maintain the balance of power in the Near
62
East by checking the Russian power.
Otho did not entertain an expansionist foreign

policy because he was concerned

with the problem of balance of power in the Near East. Among
63
Minister
other sources, the memoirs of Spiridon Pelikas,
of Justice during the Kriezes administration, unfold ihe full
implications of the king's involvement in planning, triggering and supporting

wholehear~edly

the insurrection in 1854,

for more reasons than that o£ his own egotistical goals.
When the revolution

~roke

out in Epirus, Soutsos,

confident of Otho, informed the Ministerial Council which
was convening with the king about the events in the Turkish
Provinces.

The matter of the insurrection was then opened

for discussion by the ministers and all agreed to support it
secretly but they agreed not

to allow the Sublime Porte to

become suspicious of the government's involvement.

The king

agreed that the meeting of the Ministerial Council was secret
62 Donta, Crimean War, 80, has put forward this argument.
62

s. Pelikas, Apomnemoneumata tes Ypourgeias Spiridonos
Pelika (Memoirs of the Ministry of Spiridon Pelika) {Athens,
1893).
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and he dismissed the council.
All of us unhesitantly were waiting, as was natural and
expected to return again to the Ministerial Council so
that the matter can be determined and to set the grounds
which we were supposed to keep in mind in order to conduct the manner of our activities.
Unfortunately the
King, distrustful as it seems, not unjustly of certain
ministers did not give us the necessary information, if
he had from Europe and from the outer Provinces. Therefore as the public, neither did we at the beginning think
that the King would have positive hopes either from France
or Germany.
Only after two or three months I learned from
outside sources various data, which led me to believe that
the insurrection was not genuine, but was instigated from
within (the Court). 64
This indicated that the king did not take the advice of the
Powers in regard to his foreign policy and deliberately kept
the Ministerial Council ignorant of the facts so one can only
conclude that the greater part of responsibility for the
Greek government's actions in the insurrectionary developments
in Northern Greece lies with the Greek Court and Otho himself.
Otho used the patriotic movement of the Greek people for his
own goals.

Otho ignored the interests of Greece and went

ahead to side with the Russians and hoped that they would be
victorious in the Crimean War so that he would benefit from
their victory.

In April 1854 he wrote to Tsar Nicholas:

As a Christian and as King of Greece, I follow with the
greatest interest everything Your Majesty wished to do
in the final cause to protect in an effective manner the
religious rights of the Eastern Church in Turkey to
which belong the great majority of my subjects and to
which will belong my children, if God gives me any, and
in any case, the heirs to my throne.
The decision which
Your Majesty is to take in favour of the Christians who,
pressed to drive out, grabbed the arms for the defence

64 Ibid., 140.
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of the Church and their homes, not a less noble and loyal
manner by which Your Majesty has announced His eminent
and firm will coming in aid to introduce a summit to all
the wishes of these populations • • • • And I do not act
either to satisfy the general sentiment of the deepest
acknowledgement in addressing Your Majesty my most sincere
gratitude. 65
This

~ulogy

to Russia and devotion to the Tsar by Otho was

naturally understandable since Russia was the only possible
ally Greece could have which would approve its foreign policy.
C.

"Internal" and "External" Causes
of the Insurrection

As has already been stated there were a number of
complex causes for the insurrection of 1854.

From the study

of the insurrection, its nature, its beginnings, and its direction, it can be concluded that its causes were of two
types, "Internal" and "External."

In the "internal" causes

can be included the social, economic, religious and political
problems facing the Christian subjects of the Turkish Provinces who chose to join the revolution.

In the "external"

causes can be listed the foreign elements which were to be
found in the insurrection, namely, the involvement of the
king and the Greek government, and also the contribution of
fanatic nationalists who took part in the insurrection but
were not part of the community of Christians under Ottoman
rule.

65 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 160-62.
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One of the most firm supporters of a Greek revolt
against Turkey was the "Russian" party.
Aion had
-eulogies

Their newspaper

been publishing severe criticisms of Turkey and
of Russia ever since the Menshikov mission and

in 1853 this newspaper was so blunt as to publish an article which openly expressed hostility against the Turkish
66
government.
The article was signed by P. Soutzo, a poet,
and N. Bambas, professor of philosophy at the University of
Athens.

Wyse felt that it was an outrage that a public ser-

vant was allowed to write such an article against a friendly
power.

Naturally Nechet Bey went immediately to Wyse after

he read the article and complained that the Greek government
did not refute the article in the government press and took
no action against Professor Bambas, the co-signer of the
article.

Wyse immediately brought this to the attention of

the Greek Foreign Minister who promised to take appropriate
67
action in the matter.
The relations between Greece and
Turkey were on a steady decline in the Fall.

The Sublime

Porte had been hoping to avoid confrontation with Greece
which would result if carried to extremes in a war, and a

66

See F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
October 27, 1853. For the French translation of the Aion
article see F.o. 32/208• X/Lo6972, 82-6.
67 Paicos took action against Professor Bambas but
the article was not censored to the satisfaction of the
Turkish Charge d'Affaires or Wyse. See Ibid.
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two-front war was an adventure the Sultan's government could
do without.

Nechet Bey wrote to Paicos on December 3rd ac-

cusing Greece of actively seeking deterioration of relations
with the Sublime Porte.

He stated that the Sublime Porte

wanted to maintain good relations with Greece but the latter
showed no effort of good-will by continuing to send troops
68
to the frontier.
As the Turkish authorities felt threatened by the
presence of the Greek troops in the frontier, Greek authorities constantly complained about the mistreatment of Christians by the Ottoman authorities.

It was only to be expec-

ted that the sympathies of the Greek Orthodox subjects with
the Russian cause would create alarm among the Turks.

On

October 7th, three days after the announcement of Aion that
the war between Russia and Turkey was under way, Lambros
Beikos, an officer of the Greek army, entered Epirus with a
company of three hundred men.

This was an obvious sign that

the Greek government had every intention of capitalizing on
the Russo-Turkish war.

Suleiman Bey Frasare, General Derven

Aga of Epirus, was forced to gather two hundred men from the
Turkish Provinces and five hundred irregulars from Albania
to go after one of the Greek military leaders, Koutsonika,
who was known to engage in revolutionary activity.

The Greek

68 A.Y.E. 1853, Nechet Bey to Paicos, Athens,
December 3, 1853.
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ambassador in Epirus upon receiving this news called on the
Lieutenant Commander of Western Greece to concentrate his
69
troops in the frontier as "a display of strength."
This movement caused great concern to the European
community as well as to the governments of the involved parties.

The Greek government realizing the danger involved in

the consequences, Anglo-French threat, of such activities
sent to the frontier lieutenant Skylodemo to disperse the
rebels, and immediately placed the blame for the entire incident on the Nomarch (Governor) bf Aitolia and Akarnania
for allowing the incident to take place.

The Turkish au-

thorities having the full support and cooperation of the
Allied Powers did not take the incident lightly especially
when later another Greek revel, Theodore Ziakas entered
Thessaly.

70

Wyse sent the following report informing the Foreign
Office of the incidents on the Frontier:
This, however, is not the only instance, I regret to say
of disposition on the part not only of the Government
but of the Court to add to the unsatisfactory nature of
the relations between the two governments.
Neshid Bey
complained to me a few days since that the lately appointed ministers had alone omitted him among their round of
visits, and that on several occasions of late, their
Majesties had passed him by, though ~lose to them, without the honor of the usual salute. 7
69 Donta, Crimean War, 62-63.
70 The Ziakas movement gave rise to revolutionary
societies in Thessaly, see Koutroumbas, The Revolution of
~' 60, 70-2, also Donta, Crimean l1ar,~-4.
-71 F.O. 32/208, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, November 17, 1853.
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Wyse advised Nechet Bey to communicate with the Greek Foreign
Minister before he officially notified the Sublime Porte.
Paicos was in a real dilemma.

On the one hand he

was overtly trying to prevent a war or revolution from breaking out for he feared the Anglo-French threats to Greece and
on the other hand the Greek government was too deeply involved
in the events on the Frontier and Provinces.

In a dispatch

to Trikoupes, Paicos expressed his fear that if Greece dared
to engage in a conflict with Turkey, France and England would
support the Sultan not only by their moral but their armed
force as well. 72
The majority of Greek statesmen had a difficult time
understanding that the two Western Powers which contributed
to their independence and fought for the creation of the
Greek nation would fight to prevent that same country from
expanding its borders and taking territories which, in their
view, were rightfully Greek.

The decision had to be made,

however, whether Greece would follow a policy of expansion or
stay neutral.

The dilemma could only be resolved by Otho;

the king chose to glorify his Crown. 73

72 A.Y.E. 1853, Confidential, Paicos to Trikoupes,
November 15, 1853.
73 In December 1853 Otho chose to send ambassadors
and other agents to foreign countries "without requiring
the sanction of the Greek Chambers.'' This caused a good deal
of concern at the Foreign Office and Clarendon instructed
Wyse to inform Paicos of Her Majesty's government dissatisfaction with the king's abuse of his powers. The concern of
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The external causes of the Greek-Turkish war were
reinforced by the internal causes which did not play as important a role in international politics but did contribute
to the explanation of the beginnings of the revolution in
the Provinces.

One could easily understand why the repre-

sentatives of the Allied Powers would not admit the "internal" causes of the insurrection even if they were looking
for them.

Wyse denied any possibility of the existence of

"internal" causes for an insurrection and in December he
wrote:
I do not perceive any immediate probability of such,
[internal causes] nor do I think it at any rate time
likely to make much way, unless originated or continued
by the Greek Government or stimulated by reports of
Russian success. 74
This reflects to a great extent the official British governmental attitude concerning the causes for the insurrection.
They placed all emphasis on the influence and actions of the
Greek Court and government, the "Russian" party, and the
propaganda of both Greece and Russia concerning the condition of Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire.

All of

Clarendon was not so much the abuse of power by the king, as
the over-spending for civil and military maintenance. " • • •
at a time, when the establishment both civil and military is
kept up in Greece, is far too great for its revenue, any measures which entail unnecessary expense, can only be considered
as exhibiting an absence of good faith towards their governments, who are still burdened with the debt of Greece." See
A.Y.E. 1853, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, December 15, 1853.
74 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December
17, 1853.
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these are "external" causes which are applicable but only
partially explain the reasons behind the insurrection.

There

was no place allowed for Greek Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire who did not want to be ruled by the Sublime Porte
for religious and ethnic reasons, and Greeks living in Turkey
or other Christians were mistreated or murdered many a time
when there were strained relations between Greece and Turkey.
Legation reports from the Northern Provinces and other accounts
indicate that the events of 1854 were triggered partially by
socio-economic, religious and ethnic causes.

The pressures

of the Turkish officials on the Christian subjects was one of
the reasons many Greeks welcomed· the opportunity to strike
back.

75

One

~f

the first villages to revolt was Radevishi.

The reasons for this were,

(1) there was jealousy among Al-

banians because Greeks from Radovichi were on the payroll of
the Sublime Porte used as troops to maintain order in the Prov76
inces,
and (2) they objected to the heavy taxes imposed
upon them by the Ottoman authorities.

77

The movement of Radovich! was known to the Greek authorities and it was allowed to continue.

What is astonish-

75 Koutroumbas, The Revolution of 1854, 24-5.
76 Ibid.

17 The General Derven Aga Suleiman Bey Frasare was
pressuring the villagers of Radovichi to provide the necessary funds for the salaries of 2,500 of his men.
Zeine, an
Albanian Turkish agent at Arta went to the villagers of Peta
demanding money and food supplies. These abuses of the Turks
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ing, however, is when the news reached Athens that the villagers of Radovichi took up arms against the Turks, there
was a general enthusiasm all over Greece and the events were
78
compared in many minds to 1821.
In the minds of many the
time had arrived for the liberation of all Greek subjects and
territory.
One Greek writer

79

maintained that the insurrection

was doomed to failure before it even began for lack of money
needed to carry out a successful attack against the Turks.
Despite an empty treasure in Greece the chieftains were urged
to continue their venture against the Turks not only by the
government sector but also by the private sector.

When the

Roumeliotes asked for a loan of 30,000 drachmas early in
1854, the President of the National Bank of Greece, G. Stavrou,
replied that he did not have the funds available but they
should continue their strugRle against the Turks with his
blessings.

He clearly implied that the loan could and would

could not be tolerated by the Greeks who knew that they had
the mother country to rely in case they took arms against the
Turks.
See Kyriakides, Contemeorary Greeks, 639-40, also see
for the Radovich! uprising A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) No. 18, Papakopoulos to the Province of Valtos, January 16, 1854, also A.Y.E.
1854 (4/1) No. 54, Skylodemos to the Earch of Valtos, January
19, 1854, also A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) No. 557, A. Deoulas to the
Ministry of the Interior, January 17, 1854.
78 See Pelikas, Memoirs, 140-44.
79 Takis J.. appas, "Agnosta Hartia gia ten Epanastase
tou 1854" (Unknown Papers for the Revolution of 1854)
Thessalika Chronica, Athens, 1965.
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become available to them in the near future.

80
Such re-

assurances from the top in both private and public sectors
left the insurgents confident that they had more than just
the moral support of Greece.
The greatest mistake the government for its part
81
could commit in the insurrection, as Metaxas pointed out,
was to support such a movement (in Radovich!) after the Western Powers had decided on a policy which would call for the
82
suppression of such a mission,
and before the Russians
83
crossed the Danube.
Nevertheless, the revolution of 1854
began in Radovich! and it provided the spark needed to cause
other Christians in the Northern Provinces to revolt.

The

spirit of 1821 lived among the leaders of the revolution
since many of them had seen or participated in the War of
Independence and others were sons of chieftains.

Two of the

most prominent leaders were Spyridon Karaiskakes and Demitrios Grivas, the son of Lieutenant-General Theodore Grivas.

84

80 Ibid., 643.
81 Pelikas, Memoirs, 141.
82

"It is apprehended that in the event of movements
in Servia, Macedonia or Epirus, England and France may be induced to take coercive or precautionary measures by occupation or otherwise." See F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, November 1853.
83 Pelikas, Memoirs, 141.
84 Karaiskakes with 2,500 men seized the town of
Arta and Grivas with 300 men took over Pente Pegadia and Peta of

122
on January 29 all the revolutionaries met at the villages of
peta, Neochori and Kombote to organize new attacks against
Arta.

Karaiskakes delivered the following historic message

to his men on January 30th:
Greek! While dying my father cried: Redeem Athens!
Leaving as the only inheritance to me his sword, he died.
Taking the inheritance of my father and finding Athens
free, the land of his birth is enslaved. • • • Oh people
of Epirus!
The flag of freedom I raised among us.
Greeks!
The second Turkish war is coming; the revolutionary flame
has started and the holy spirit of freedom and faith has
descended from heaven and is increasing the flames of the
fire.
Look at the Heptanesos (seven islands - - Ionian
Islands) as a seven-headed serpent it hisses, Epirus is
moving, Thessaly is shaking, Macedonia is stirring, Thrace
is waiting; Coura~e, then Courage! During the first Turkish war (that of Independence) the Greeks with 50,000
soldiers defeated 500,000 men from Asia, Europe and Africa. Today autonomous Greeks, Epirotes, Thessaloi, Macedonians and Thracians, six million we are fighting a
weak kingdom which is been fought at the Danube by multinumerous and threatening armies. • • • Forward. The
cross on the one hand, the sword on the other • • • •
Freedom or death. This is the voice of 10 million Greeks,
Serbians and Bulgarians in Europe and 4 million Greeks in
Asia. 85
It was apparent from this speech that the spirit, at least
some of it, of 1821 was once again being recreated in 1854.
In many ways 1854 was the year that many hoped to see bring

Epirus. At the same time that Karaiskakes and Grivas were
making advances other revolutionaries (Kitsos Tsavelas,
Giannes Bagos, Giannes and Nicholas Stratos, Andreas and
Demitri Iskos and George Barnakokes, all volunteers) entered
into Turkish soil and began attacking Turkish villages.
See
Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 610-11, also Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 640-3, also Koutroumbas, Revolution oy-f854,
68.
--85

Cited in Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 611.

,
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the War of Independence to a full cycle and free all Greek
christians from the Turks.
The historian who relies solely on British and French
sources for the causes of the insurrection can be mislead a
great deal for Western European sources only reflect the partial observations of Western Europeans primarily who did not
have access to the Greek documents and were also under the
influence of the political biases and policy of the Allied
Po~vers.

It was impossible, therefore, to come to the con-

elusion that any "internal" factors existed in the revolution if one does not review

~he

Greek sources.

A typical

view of a contemporary Western European concerning the causes
of the insurrection is that of the Scottish historian, George
Finlay.

"But in spite of Greek and Russian encouragement,"

he maintains, "the Christian subjects of the Sultan refused
to take up arms the public administration was so bad in Greece,
that independence offered few attractions when the result on
the value would be subjection to Greek misgovernment." 86
Even though the observations of Finlay - - a misehellene,
hater of Greeks, as labelled by Greek historians - -are to
a certain extent correct since not every Greek took up arms
and marched to fight the Turks, there is ample evidence of
a great number of people who joined and did so for they had
political, economic, and social reasons. 87

86 Finaly, History of Greece, 222.
87

The wealthy Greeks did not join the revolution for
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After Mehmet Fuad Pasha, former minister of foreign
affairs (1852-53), who was entrusted by the Sultan with suppressing the revolts in northern Greece, had published the
88
warning to all Christians who joined the insurrection,
the Greeks of Epirus and Thessaly sent him the following
message:
To the brightest Fuad Effendi. We former ragiades etc.
cursed by the Sultan, until yesterday were sitting on
glass and nails and on our rahati (back) as you would
say. And seeing that from the taxes on the value of
products, from instalment taxes, from taxes on sheep,
from taxes on trade, from fire taxes, from luxury taxes
and from commerce taxes • • • not even saliva was left
in our mouth. The irregular Turks of our territory
and the Nizamledes sent by Ali Osman • • • have stripped
us • • • · • They 1 11 sl'aughter us like goats. • • • There
is no other way but to ask for help from our King Otho.
Farewell till we meet at the Byzantium, if you haven't
left there before we come. The Greeks of Epirus and
Thessaly.89
The Greek subjects of Thessaly and Epirus had fallen victims
to a semi-feudal system of Turkish government which could not
reform fast enough for the liberal and nationalist demands of
the Greek people.

The Tanzimat came to these Provinces in

mid 1840's 90 and its effects were insignificant since, as
it would mean risking their property for an ideal called
"Greece." Ibid., 634.
88 See below, page 132.
89 Cited in Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 85.
90

Saab, Crimean Alliance, 140.
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as Bailey maintains,

91

it was not a radical reform program

to satisfy the rebelling spirit of the Orthodox subjects of
the Ottoman Empire.

On June 2, 1853, a letter of the Bri-

tish Consul at Prevesa reported to his government that the
christian subjects of Thessaly and Epirus were "oppressed
by fiscal exations, and subjected to intolerable acts of
violence and injustice.

. . ."

92

He further noted that

these people would readily take up arms in support of an insurrection against Turkey.

In another report by Lord Strat-

ford on July 4, 1853, the Turkish authorities were charged
with treating the Christian subjects with "cruelty, rapine
93
A "proclamation to all Greeks and Philand murder."
hellenists, believers of Christ,"

94

dated January 9, 1854,

is not only a good indication of Greek propaganda before
the insurrection of 1854 but it also serves as an example
of Turkish tyranny and reflects the nationalist and liberal
spirit of the Greek p"eople.

Europe, at least Western Europe,

had progressed economically, politically and socially.

Greece

and the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire were aware of

91

Frank Edgar Bailey, British !_olic~ and the Turkish
Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826~ (New York, 1970), 228, maintains that the Tanzimat was
only "a step away from the old autocratic feudal order."

cxxxi,

92 Sessions of March 13, 1854, Handard, 3rd series,
706.
93 Ibid., 707.
94

Saab, Crimean Alliance, 141.
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this progress and compared their devastating condition to
that of Western Europeans so they desired to abolish all
form of oppression.
Such were the internal causes of the revolution and
it is really difficult to determine their weight in the entire scheme of things.

As they present themselves, the facts

tend to incriminate the Greek government and especially the
Greek Court for the insurrection of 1854, but this does not
mean that the effect of the "internal" factors must be minimized since it took the combination of both "external" and
"internal" factors for the creation of what was intended to
be the second War of Independence for Greece.

CHAPTER IV
WAR AND OCCUPATION
A.

War in Thessaly.

Epirus and Chalcidice

The Radovichi occurrences obviously created much excitement not only among the Greeks but also among the Turkish
and European governments.

Turkey was always fearful of fac-

ing a two front war, one at the Danube and the other at the
Greek frontier.

The Sublime Porte knew that the enemy at the

Danube was much too strong to be held back by the Turkish
forces, so all troops had to be concentrated in the Russian
front.

Aware of their shortage of manpower the Ottoman au-

thorities wanted to end the revolution before it spread into
a major war.

Accordingly, they adopted severe measures in

dealing with the Christians in order to discourage them from
engaging in any adventurous revolutionary activities. 1
On Febrnary 9, about one thousand men were sent to
take Pente Pegadia (Five Wells) held by Greek insurgents.
Pente Pegadia was a village between Arta and Janina which
the rebels had taken along with Peta.
headquarters for the insurgents.

It became one of the main

The Greeks forced the Turks

1 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 75-7, also see Pelikas, Memoirs, 151.
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to defend themselves from Arta.

When the latter were unable

to emerge victorious in their struggle, reinforcements were
sent but they too failed to defeat the insurgents and retreated to Janina. 2

The Greeks were left free to attack the

neighboring Turkish villages and possibly take Arta, the village still held by Turkish forces after the rebels unsuccessfully tried to capture it on February 12.
Another attempt was made by the Turkish military forces to send help to Arta, this time eight hundred men in addition to the seven hundred regulars and two hundred armed police.

5

Like the previous reinforcements these also met with

defeat as they were stopped by the bands of Greek chieftains
led by Rago, Strato and Karaoules.
On February 16 the Greeks scored another victory
against a group of three hundred Turks who attempted to res4
cue those at Arta.
In Epirus, at the village of Peta, the
rebels defeated the

T~rks

as they had in Thessaly.

Theodore

Grivas with three hundred men scored a victory at Koutsoulio,
and on February 28 he was a few miles outside Janina.

5

In the

2 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 13,
1854, also see Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 15153.
3

~.,

Nomikos, 153.

4 These Turks were carrying supplies and were captured
by Nico Kaskares and his band. See Kyriakodes, Contemporary
Greeks, 644.
5

Wyse reports on March 5 that Grivas had increased
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early days of March many villages fell into the hands of the
Greeks and it seemed that the revolutionaries were successful
in their task.

After the outbreak of the insurrection the

notables of Agrafa made the following announcement:
Patriots, a cry had been poured in our hearing, that our
Epirotes compatriots have taken arms asking for their freedom against the centuries long tyrant.
Grab, therefore,
fellow-patriots your arms, place your hand in your heart,
• • • imitate our predecessors, and cast your blood for
the honor of religion, the honor of your freedom. 6
Epirus came under the leadership of Kitsos Tsavelas, former
Inspector General of the Greek army, who had left the military
along with a number of others to join the revolution.

Peta

was the headquarters for the insurgents in Epirus and it was
from where Tsavelas and Karaiskakes operated.

In the eparchy

of Janina Grivas and his son were in control and headed for
the town of Janina.
from Paramethia.

Still other insurgent bands operated

7

The revolution· spread from Thessaly and Epirus to
Macedonia where Ziakas with two hundred men from Lamia entered into Turkish territory.
They occupied the strategic position of Spileon and the
passage between Melia and Krania in the area between

his forces from three hundred to four hundred.
Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 15, 1854.

F.O. 32/215,

6 Father Basilios Sioufas, E Epanastasis tou 1854 kai
e Katastrophe tes Gralistes (The Revolution of 1854 and the
Catastrope of Cralistes) Thessalika Chronika (Athens, 1965),
464

7

Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 68, 82• also see
Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 645,-afSo Nomikos, Inte~!ional Position o~ Greece, 156-57.
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Metsovo and Grevena.
Ziakas' plan was to bar the crossing
of Turkish troops from Epirus to Western Macedonia, and
to unite the insugrection in Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia
through Grevena.
The reaction from the people of Greece to these sporadic uprisings in the north was alarming.

Many who were indoctrina-

ted in the beliefs of "religion" and "nation" took up arms and
ran to the troubled Provinces feeling they had a holy mission
to carry out.

Wyse wrote that:

Recruiting, I am informed, is going on in the open day
and under the very eyes of the Government officials and
local authorities, not only in Missolonghi, but in many
other Provinces, even so far down as the Peloponesos.
• • • A still more daring spirit is conspicuous at
Athens. Four committees have been regularly formed and
are in permanent sitting here, for the purpose of receiving subscriptions and enroling recruits, presided by Deputies and others of authority in town, one of these immediately opposite Neshid Rey's house.
Anot~er similarly organized for the same purpnse at Patras.
It was not only the indoctrinated masses who applauded the
revolts but the king as well.
the Epirus uprising

o~curred

He wrote to his father when
that the Christian subjects of

Turkey were mistreated by the officials and they desired to
free themselves from the Turkish yoke so they could join the
mother country, Greece.

He added that even though the up-

rising was not timed rightly for it broke out in the middle

8
9

13, 1854.

Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 158
F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February
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it did, however, prove that it was not caused by Russia, as
10
the Western Powers suspected, but was indeed genuine.
The Turkish authorities did not take any serious
measures against the repression of Christian subjects in
the Ottoman Empire until after the Tsar announced that the
war against Turkey was fought on behalf of the "repressed
11
brothers."
Fuad Effendi, the former minister of Foreign
Affairs, who became commissioner extraordinary in charge of
12
all operation in Thessaly and Epirus,
was entering Prevesa
with three thousand men as T. Grivas and N. Zervas were making advances toward Janina.

Fuad Effendi landed with three

war ships accompanied by a British frigate, an obvious indication that Great Britain had taken the role of an advisor
13
to Turkey in military operations.
Seinel Pasha, who was
assigned as General Dervend in Thessaly and Epirus was sent
to Volos with one thousand five hundred to two thousand five
hundred men 14 on two steamers which were also escorted by

10 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, January 29, 1954, cited
in Skandames, Kingdom~ Otho, 973-74.
11 Koutroumbas, Revolution

~

1854, 82.

12 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 159.
13
14

Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 614.
Ibid., Koutroumbas, 83.
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a British and a French steamers. 15

The Turks also sent troops

by land to stop the spreading of the insurrection.

Fuad Pasha

published a proclamation holding forth a general amnesty for
all those who were willing to return to their duty and effec16
tive protection to the peaceable and well disposed.
The
publication read as follows:
Though you were staying in your homes inside our borders,
men came • • • and destroyed our lands. Those who desire
to remain under the authority of the Sultan, Kotsombasedes
ect. disassociate yourselves from the insurgents and come
with me.
(1) Those who did not participate in this stiring of events.will be treated kindly by our Sultan.
(3)
Those who remain armed will be punished and with a different treatment.
(4) Villages which did not accept the revolution, will be paid by other villages who did.
(5) Those,
Greeks by any chance caught, brigands amonst the residents
will not be tolerated and will immediately be punished. 17
On March 1st Lieutenant General A. Hatzi-Petros, an aide de
camp of Otho, entered Thessaly with five hundred men.

Another

aide de camp of Otho, Lieutenant General Dimitris Tsames
Karatasos, also joined the revolution which of course was converted into a full scale war after the Turkish troops from
Constantinople had arrived in the Provinces.

Dimitrios or

Tsames Karatasos, son of Athanasios Karatasos, fought with

15 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 162.
16 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, March 17,
1854.
17

Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 85.
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his father in Macedonia and other parts of Greece during the
War of Independence.

18

Many observers in Greece believed

that the revolutionaries had a good start and the chances of
a Turkish victory were slim since they needed their forces
to hold back the Russians.

Wyse explained the situation to

the Foreign Office as follows:
In Greece the impression is, that the force as yet sent
is too feeble, to stop the current, and that even twice
that number would still be inadequate to oppose any effective resistance to a movement which they believe will
become before another month, Pan hellenic.
The passage
of volunteers from the border-provinces, is every day increasing, nourished by these h9pes and reports of a constant succession of victories. 19
The Turkish offensive, however, began to build up gradually
as more help from France and England came to assist them in
fighting the Russians.

General Grivas suffered a defeat on

March 23rd at Metsouo by Abdi Pasha, who commanded two thou20
sand five hundred men.
Grivas retreated to Peta with the
other chiefs and after a long battle with the Turks, which
21
the Greek insurgents lost they dispersed
and this marked
the end of the revolutionary effort in Epirus.

Abdi Pasha

in conjunction with "Fuad Effendi, followed up his (Abdi

18 See Athanasios A. Angelopoulos, Dimitrios Tsamis
Karatasos, XVII, Balkan Studies,
49-51.
19 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 17,

1854.
20 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 615-16.
21 Osman Pasha launched the attack on Peta on April 26.
See Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 175-77.
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Pasha's) victory by taking Pente Pigadia, and reopening the
22
communications between Arta and Ioannina [Janina]."
Thessaly also was ready to Turkish hands as a force of three
thousand men stationed at Almiro were determined to put an
end to the advances of Papakosta at Platanon.

Even though

the forces of Papakosta proved to be much more effective in
holding back the Turks than Grivas' forces, the internal disputes among the chiefs resulted in the general weakness of
23
Disputes among the chiefs were not, however,
the movement.
the only cause which lost the war ·for the Greeks.
worst loses suffered by the rebels was at Volo.

One of the
By March 30th

six thousand Egyptians and a French steamer, "Heron,'' came to
the aid of the Turks and for all practical purposes the undertaking was well on the way to being crushed under such mili24
tary power.
The next important battle was fought on May 10 at
Kalambaka.

Before this battle took place, Soutso, Minister

of War, gave orders on his own accord without consulting with
the Minister of Justice, Pelikas, that prisoners from Chalcide
should be allowed to go free so that they may join the insurrection. 25 The Kalambaka battle between Hadji-Petro and

22 F.o. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 27,
1854.
23 For the Platanon Battle see Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 94-9.
24 Ibid., 99-101.
25 Pelikas refused to pardon the prisoners as the
other ministers wished.
See Pelikas, Memoirs, 147-49.
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Selim Pasha marked the height of insurgent. victories in the
North.

26

The Macedonian revolts were inspired by those of

Epirus and The.ssaly but started late in March.
The two men responsible for organizing the Macedonian
movement were N. Filaretos and Tsames Karatasos.

The griev-

ance the Christians of Macedonia had against the Turks was
about land which was granted to them by the Turkish tourt but
was not obtained by them. 27

A Secret revolutionary group of

three hundred and ten men organized by the two Greek chiefs,
and on March 23rd Filaretos started from north Euboia to Pelio.
By the end of the month the effort was completely demolished
by a combination of factors.

(1) Filaretos felt that the peo-

ple of Pelio were not ready for revolution and war, (2) disputes among the insurgent leaders, and (3) one Demitrios Gabriel announced everywhere that "ten thousand British were
28
coming to Prevesa to punish the rebels,"
which obviously
scared everyone involved in the insurrection.
The revolts in the Provinces were unsuccessful for a
variety of reasons.

One of them, the most important, was

26 For details see Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854,
145-52.
27 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 227.
28 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 101-03, also
Kordatos, Ibid., 621-42, uses many sources to cover the
Macedonian-revolt.
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that Turkey had the support of Western Europe whereas Greece
had only Russian moral support during the entire affair.

The

Foreign Office instructed Wyse on March 23rd. that:
If it should turn out that the Greek troops have violated
the Turkish territory, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, strongly to protest against the act and the unworthy attempt of the Greek Government to accuse the Turkish troops (of crossing the Greek frontier). 29
The Greek Court and the expansionists in the government would
not listen to threats of the Allied Powers.

When the Turks

captured Chrone Nasdeke at the Rattle of Perivolia, of Volos,
they found on him documents incriminating the Greek government
in the revolution.

They immediately sent these documents to

Constantinople as official evidence of Greek government's ag30
gression against Turkey.
This caused the Turks and their
allies to become even more serious and determined in their
efforts to extinguish the revolution.

Great Britain and France

warned that the conduct of the Greek Court and government and,
especially, the king and Oueen, had brought the two Powers to
the point where they were seriously considering breaking off
diplomatic relations.

They further warned, "that the coasts

of Greece would be blockaded, Greek commerce put an end to,
31
and that ulterior measures would then be determined on."

29 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 7,
1854.
30 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 100.

1854.

31 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 14,
Rouen and Wyse addressed a note to Paicos on April 11th
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Paicos and the Court were not about to give in to demands of
the Allied Powers as long as they knew that the insurrection
still had a chance of accomplishing something.

Furthermore,

it was too late to pull out and stop everything as though
nothing had happened.

The people burned with nationalism,

the king was more determined than ever to give full support
to the movement until it was successful, and the press kept
the war propaganda stronger than ever before.
There were other factors, however, besides pressure
from the Allied Powers which resulted in the failure of Greeks
to capture the Turkish Provinces.

First, there was no fully

organized effort on behalf of the Greek government to engage
in war.

The authorities in Greece allowed the revolt to occur,

supported it morally and materially, but as a result of British and French threats and pressure the Greek government abandoned the effort of the insurgents while it was still flourishing.

If there was more determination on the part of the king

and those in government who supported the revolution of 1854,
a greater effort could have been made to risk everything in
order to win the designated Turkish Provinces.
There was also still another factor which has already
been mentioned, namely, disputes among the leaders of the insurgents which made the movement very weak in its internal

warning him that the Naval Forces of France and England were
instructed to visit Greek ships even on Greek waters, which
were suspected of carrying arms and munition.
See F.L. 32/
216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 26, 1854.
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organization.

The following letter of Grivas to Georgandas

reveals much about internal feuds among the chiefs:
After the battle of historic fame at Metsovo, of which I
send you the description and plan today, seeing the greatest conspiracies and treacheries existing against me on
the part of my companions in arms, I was compelled to retreat from thence and take the direction of Thessaly. On
my arrival there I found the same divisions prevailing between the different chiefs, and I came to the resolution
to remain quiet in Agrapha, until I could come to some
understanding with the Government of His Majesty. •
The struggle which we have undertaken is great; it is
higher than that of 1821, in as much as we aim at the
restoration of the Greek Empire. But such a struggle requires union, subordination, order, primary means in abundance, and a Commander in Chief, otherwise there is an
end to all hope.
The Government ought either at
once to take up the struggle appointing publicly the proper persons to a regular army at a regular pay or let us
sit down quietly at home, so that we may not be the causes
of destruction of our fellow Christians. 32
Considering these elements, Anglo-French opposition, no organized Greek governmental support to the revolutionaries and internal feuds among the chiefs, the movement which ambitiously
began as a repeat of 1821 ended in failure.

All this much to

the disgrace and devastation of the people who in the name of
religion and nation had taken up arms to free themselves from
the backward Ottoman Empire.

32

F.O. 32/217, Grivas to Georgandas, Agrapha, April
2, 1854, also see "Moniteur Universe!" (No. 132), May 12,
1854.
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B.

Rupture of Greek-Turkish Relations

and Anglo-French Reaction to the Insurrection
Western Europe was convinced that there was a definite connection between the Russo-Turkish disputes and the
Greek uprisings in 1854.

There can be little doubt that

fragile relations between Russia and Turkey provided a strong
reason for the Greeks to go through with an uprising in the
south-western front of the Ottoman Empire since it would have
been necessary for the Turks to concentrate their forces on
the northern front.

That the insurgents were taking direct

orders from the Russians was untrue.

Nesselrode made an

announcement on March 18 dispelling all such accusations.
He stated that the Tsar sympathized with Greece and with the
Christians who were trying to free themselves from the Turkish yoke, as they had once before in 1821. 33

There was lit-

tle doubt in the minds of Western Europeans, however, that
the Greek revolts were indeed used by the Russians as strategic tools of distraction against the Turks.

During the month

of January the reports received at the Foreign Office were
mostly about the widespread propaganda influence of Aion, the
"Russian" party newspaper.

The press propaganda received more

attention than the real causes of the revolution, so obviously

33 See T.E. Evagelidos, Historia tou Othonos Basileos
tes Hellados, 1832-1862 (History of Otho King of Greece, 18321862) (Athens, 1893~49-50.
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the British government and British public opinion were influenced by what were in many respects the effects of the insurrection and further the pro-Russian Greek newspaper Aion which
had primarily the following only of those who sympathized with
the "Russian" party. 34
In February, Wyse sent a report to his government expressing his fears of Russian influences in Greece and he
linked the uprising on the frontier entirely to this influence.

According to him when Kornilov visited Athens in 1854,

he charged that the present ministry had radical pro-Russian
elements which were dominant in the government and that the
Foreign Minister allowed Greek government officials to contribute money for the Megali Idea.

Further, Colonel Soutso

deliberately substituted old officers of the_army with young
pro-Russian ones who favored Russian interests.

Wyse went on

to write:
The simple impression of the whole case (however it may
be disguised is thus: a Russian government prepared to
take advantage under Russian protection, for purposes of
aggrandisement, of any contingency which in the course
of events may chance to arise.
Should such a contingency occur, should war for instance, become inevitable
and be followed by any decided success on the part of
Russia, or insurrectionary movements sufficiently serious in the Turkish Provinces contiguous to Greece, I am
persuaded it would be a signal for the general movement. 35

34
See F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
January 17, 1854, also F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, January 27, 1854.
35 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 7, 1854.
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The Greek embassy in London also reported the apprehensions of
the Foreign Office concerning Russian involvement in Greece,

36

but until February 9th there was no implication by the British
government that the insurrectionary movements in the Provinces
37
involved the Greek Court.
Russian influence and anti-Turkish sentiments in Greece
caused concern to all European representatives at Athens.

Baron

de Thile, the Prussian minister at Athens, visited the king on
one occasion after an anti-Turkish demonstration by the university students and a number of Greek soldiers which took place
in Athens.

The Baron pointed out to the king the political

danger of such demonstrations and expressed his disapproval
of such events. 38

Finally, upon the suggestion of Wyse, the

representatives of the four European Powers - - England, France,
Austria and Prussia - - decided to send a collective note to
the Greek government asking that it not get involved in the
insurrection and that it remain in a position of neutrality.
Paicos was warned that, "not only was the tranquility of the
country endangered, but the King's liberty of action, his

36 A.Y.E. 1854 (No.3), Trikoupis to Paicos, London,

January 19, 1854, also (No.5), Trikoupis to Paicos, London,
February 6, 1854.
37 A.Y.E. 1854 (No. 9), Trikoupis to Paicos, London,
February 9, 1854.
38 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February
10, 1854.
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rights and person, and perhaps the dynasty."

39

This came as

a shock to Otho, not so much because he and his throne were
threatened as a result of this court's involvement in the insurrection, but because the Prussian and Austrian representatives signed this warning.
The four ministers who sent Paicos the warning about
Greek government involvement in the insurrection advised Nechet
Bey on diplomatic matters and gave him their full support.
Upon the

a~vice

of Wyse, Nechet Bey, wrote to Paicos to pro-

test "against the incursions of armed men into Ottoman territory and accused Athens of not having done anything to stop
40
these hostile activities."
Paicos replied that he was doing
everything he could but the nation simply did not possess the
necessary military force needed to intervene in the uprising
taking place in the Turkish Provinces. 41
Nechet Bey felt that Paicos was not complying with
the requests of the Sublime Porte so he went once again to
Wyse and Rouen for advice.

They suggested that another note

of warning should be sent to Paicos signed by the four European representatives.

Baron Leykam, representative of Austria,

and Baron de Thile did not sign the note.

As they explained,

39 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February
13, 1854.
40 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 230.
41 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February
16, 1854.
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they did not have the proper authorization from their govern42
ments to do so.
After the note was sent, Wyse and Paicos
visited the king so they could get Otho's verbal commitment
that Greece would follow a non-aggressive policy towards
Turkey.

The representatives took the opportunity to warn

Otho that general war would have dangerous consequences for
43
his throne.
In order to be on the safe side, Wyse, Stratford Canning and Sir Henry Ward, the Lord High Commissioner
of the Ionian Islands, "thought it necessary to use part of
the British fleet stationed in the Mediterrenean," for any
unexpected developments in Greece.

44

Instructions were also

sent from London and Paris empowering the British and French
ministers to order a blockade of the Greek capital, if they
thought it necessary. 45
Lord Clarendon took further steps to instruct Wyse to
relay the British government's disappointment with Athens and
with Paicos' refusal to conform to Nechet Bey's requests.
Twenty-four hours before a final telegram was sent to Paicos
with a list of demands by the Turkish Charge d'Affaires in

42 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February
16, 1854.
43 Donta, Crimean War, 90-1.
44 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 232-34.
45 Ibid., 242.
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in Athens Clarendon wrote the following letter to Wyse:
You will inform Mr. Paicos that as friendly advice has
not been wanting but has been disregarded as the connivance of the Greek Court and Government with the hostile
movement against Turkey is now beyond question, and as
Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the
French are determined that their policy shall not be thus
thwarted; the Greek Government must be prepared for the
consequences of its own acts.
If these consequences
should be to endanger the throne and future welfare of
Greece, the responsibility will rest upon the Greek ministers who have shown themselves to be ignorant or careless of the true interests of their own country. 46
On March 7th Nechet Bey sent a telegram to Paicos with the
following list of demands: (1) The officers who took part in

.

the uprising should be punished after trial in a Greek court
of law,

(2) those officials who helped to rouse the people

against the neighboring state should be punished, (3) those
in the political circle (in government) should be penalized
if they contributed to the insurrection in any manner whatever, (4) Aion and other government newspapers should be regulated so that they do not excite the public mind with propaganda in favor of the revolution, and finally:
(5) to give assurance to the Sublime Porte that an investigation will be conducted to find the officer who opened
the prisons of Chalcida and armed the criminals, and in
conclusion, if after forty-eight hours until the setting
of the sun of Tuesday 9 March, the Greek government has
not granted a satisfactory answer to the demands of the
Porte, he (Nechet Bey) is forced to ask for his passport
47
as well as those of the entire personnel of the embassy.

46 Mavrokordatos Archive 008,873, Clarendon to Wyse,
Foreign Office, March 6, 1854.
47 Evagelides, Otho, 550.
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The time had come for the king to make a decision which would
either mean blockade and suffering of the consequences for
the Greek people or to take that daring step towards the realization of the Megali Idea and ignore the Turkish demands.
In reality, at least in the reality as seen through
the eyes of Pelikas, the king wanted to fulfill his dream but
at the same time he was afraid of the numerous warnings from
Western Europe.

In his memoirs Pelikas writes.

In the morning, the postponed Consular meeting took place
before the King. The opinion not to give a hint that the
Greek government was at fault prevailed. The necessity
to buy time because the opportunity would be uncomparably
better for us, when the Russian army had made advances,
was clear. •
With this spirit we examined one by one
of Nechet Bey's demands and we thought, which one we
should give an answer to. When we came to the resignation of the Professors, we said, that this sacrifice
should be made for the good of the nation and the rest
of the Ministers agreed. But the King with a certain
emotion said: How! to start dismissing my personnel?
Never! Paicos suggested, and we all approved, to present the answer tomorrow to the Parliament, as they do
in all Constitutional States in order to gain support
of the nation, and to appear to Turkey and to the Western
Powers united and that of one will is the government and
the nation. • •
The next day (after the secret meeting concerning the drafting of the answer to Nechet Bey)
we returned. Paicos had worked with the King, who had
kept the plans. We stayed almost to midnight, but the
plans were not sent to us, when we received an announcement from the four ministers bringing to the attention
of the government, the announcement of Nechet Bey for
its serious results. Because we announced during the
day, that we rejected the requests of Nechet Bey, the
ambassadors hurried then to make their announcement. 4 8
On March 10 Nechet Bey announced the rupture of Greek-Turkish
relations and left Athens.

The Sublime Porte began to exile

48 Pelikas, Memoirs, 157-60.
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Greek residents of the Ottoman Empire as soon as relations
broke off.

All commercial relations were also broken between

the two countries and the Sultan did not allow ships with the
Greek flag to sail into Turkish ports and also ordered all the
49
Greek diplomats in Turkey to leave.
The four Powers were quick to express their displeasure,
as Pelikas pointed out above, to the Greek government's answer
to Nechet Bey and naturally blamed Greece for the rupture of
50
relations.
Wyse went so far as to say that:
Mr. Paicos' note to Nechet Bey which like so many other
similar communications seem only to have in view to drive
the Sublime Porte to a declaration of hostilities which
would rescue this government from disgrace of any longer
maintaining this ignoble hypocrisy, but which at the same
time would give the signal of a national war, inviting
every class and person, however, objecting to the present
conduct of the government in the disastrous struggle. 51
Even though Greece tried to defend its position in the recent
interruption of relations with the Sublime Porte the fact remained that both Greek court and government were expecting
such an outcome and many of them, perhaps most, were happy
with the interruption of relations with a country which they

49 A.Y.E. 1854, (4/ld) see file labeled as Diakopai
Sheseon Hellados-Turkias (Interruption of Greek-Turkish Relations), Also A.Y.E. 1854 (4/1) Fuad Pasha.
50 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 256.
51 F.O. 32/215, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 17,
1854.
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never regarded as friendly.

Pelikas wrote, that the morning

after Nechet Bey left the Oueen expressed her enthusiasm of
52
the affair and that of her husband.
The month of April brought a renewed tide of diplomatic opposition by the Western Powers against Greece.

Baron

de Thile visited the palace at the request of the king after
the interruption of relations with the Sublime Porte.

In-

stead of trying to cover up or blame the Turks for the recent
events Otho and Amalia told the Prussian minister that the
king of Greece was not at liberty to retreat.

The reason for

this as Wyse reported to the Foreign Office was that:
He [Otho] had received the divine mission to liberate the
Christian races from the yoke of the Mohammedan and that
mission he was bound to answer, and must at every venture
fulfill. • •
The Baron de Thile considers all further
effort fruitless and looks with dismay on the probable
results to their Majesties personally and the Dynasty
from the course now pursued. 53
The Bavarian as well as the Austrian Court was very much displeased with the recent events in Greece and with the king's
position in the entire affair.
Austria was especially concerned with the uprising
in the Turkish Provinces, perhaps as much as France and England for there was a real threat that the revolution could

52

Pelikas, Memoirs, 162-63.

53 F.O. 32/216, Wuse to Clarendon, Athens, April 1,
1854.
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spread to Montenegro.

Since the Greeks were an ethnic minor-

ity and were revolting in the name of nation and religion the
rest of the Balkan people could sympathize with their struggle.
count Buol cooperated closely, therefore, with Clarendon and
Drouyn de Lhuys.

He sent a war vessel to Prevessa on April

21, and he was ready to cooperate militarily with the Turks
in suppressing an unexpected uprising at Montenegro. 54

Bri-

tain and France were ready to take more radical steps against
Greece.

Five days before the Allied Powers warned Paicos that

they were also considering interruption of relations with
Greece, Clarendon instructed Wyse to inform the Greek government that he felt Nechet Bey's demands were fair and moderate.
Further, the British government was greatly disappointed with
Paicos' decision to reject the Turkish demands.

The Greek

government's answer to Nechet Bey was evasive and unsatisfactory.

Clarendon went on to write:

That the so-called national movement to which their Majesties and the Greek Government affected to yield, has been
created and stimulated by the Court and Government, that
its subject was to excite the peaceable Christian subjects
of the Porte to revolt, that the Court and Government of
Greece were therefore deliberately aiding the cause of the
Emperor of Russia, with whom England and France are at war,
and in injuring the Sultan, whose cause England and France
are pledged to support, and that these being acts of direct
hostility against two of the Protecting Powers, the King
and Queen of Greece must be prepared for the consequences. 55

54 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 259-60.
55 Mavrokordatos Archive, 008,888, No. 39, Clarendon
to Wyse, Foreign Office, April 8, 1854.

149
Matters appeared very critical for Greece. ·If Great Britain
decided once again to blockade the ports of Greece she would
have French military naval support and the moral support of
the entire European community.

In 1850 Palmerston's blockade

of Pireaus was opposed by every government in Europe and by
most politicians in Europe including most British. 56
case, however, was not the same in 1854.

The

No nation, including

Russia which was the only country which approved of the Greek
uprising, would come to the rescue of the young nation.

The

philhellinism of the Europeans no longer existed at the level
it had during the War of Independence, so if the Allied Powers
took measures against Greece they would have the approval of
European public opinion.

The government in Athens knew very

well that its international position was weak and having no
allies on its side who were ready to support her, Greece had
necessarily to conform with the demands of the Western Powers.
Reports from the Greek embassy in London to Paicos
indicated that it was absolutely necessary for Greece to
declare neutrality or suffer an Allied occupation.

Two days

after Clarendon's dispatch of April 18th to Wyse, Trikoupis
informed Athens that a meeting took place in London between
Clarendon and the French minister there.

They decided that

56 Parliamentary opinion was against the blockade of
1850.
In 1854 the Greek insurrection, however, was severely
criticized. See sessions of March 13, 1854, Hansard, 3rd
series, CXXXI, 704-52.
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their governments should order their representatives in Constantinople to prevent the Sublime Porte from declaring war
against Greece, but for the present "to seize the ports of
Greece as a payment for the borrowed loans to these (England
57
and France).''
When Wyse visited Paicos on the 13th the
latter knew of the intentions of the Allied Powers so he was
prepared to answer to the warnings and threats of Wyse with
excuses and justifications for_the present position of Greece.
The Greek foreign minister did not attempt to conceal the
role of his government in the uprisings, and even confirmed
that Greece had indeed purchased the Russian ships at Trieste
58
for 120,000 florins.
On April 11, Forth-Rouen and Wyse informed Paicos
that any ships flying the Greek flag would be searched for
arms and munitions, and if such are among the cargo of the
ships they would be confiscated.

Furthermore, the two repre-

sentatives warned that the Russian ships purchased by Greece
for purposes of war would "be stopped and detained by the
English and French naval forces" if they were to be put to
use against Turkey.
yet to come.

59

Paicos realized that the worst was

He wrote to Mavrokordatos in Paris and asked

57 A.Y.E. 1854 (18/3), Trikoupis to Paicos, London,
April 10, 1854.
58 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 14,
1854.
59 F.O. 32/216, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 26,
1854.
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him to appeal to Drouyn de Lhuys and Thouvenel in order to
review the situation in Greece.

The Prime Minister felt that

the threats from the French and British were unjustified since
Greece, after all, did try to arrive at a compromise with the
demands of Nechet Bey but the latter chose to break relations
with the Greek government instead of working out the differ60
ences.
But how could France compromise her Near Eastern interests for the sake of Greece?

The compromise had to be made

by Otho for he was in no position ·to do otherwise.

Instead of

softening his position, however, the king was more determined
than ever to carry out his expansionist foreign policy.

He

was convinced that the revolution would be successful and
that the Western Powers would then have to recognize that
their interests were with a greater Greece and not with a
weak Turkey.

The Queen went even further:

What can the Western Powers do to us, the Queen added,
they'll take over Athens? Let them come; See here, we
leave them our palace; we won't touch anything.
If they
wish to stay here we are moving to Thessaly. They'll
prevent our ships from sailing? See here, Divine Providence is helping us; • • • they'll take a few of our war
ships and will not allow us to move toward the sea?
• • • they will not tie our hands and feet and then say
to the Turks: ''Come and kill them." But they will burn
a few of our cities or our ships? In the revolution of
1821 also they burned but Greece rebuilt, the damage is
only material. 61

60 Mavrokordatos Archive, 008-897, Paicos to Mavrokordatos, Athens, April 30, 1854.
61 Pelikas, Memoirs, 166.
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The only experience Greece had of a blockade was that of 1850,
and it was primarily the commercial class which suffered more
than any other class.

The economy in general was also effec-

ted, however, since the commercial class was one of the strongest economic sectors of Greece.

The king only experienced

humiliation of a political and moral nature not of the economic
stress which did his people.
In face of the threats and warnings of the Western Powers the Greek Ministerial Council was divided, some fully supporting the foreign policy of Otho, others too afraid to follow
extreme measures which could lead to damaging results for the
welfare of the nation.

Two of the ministers, Pelikas and Provel-

gios, who were realistic enough to forsee the consequences of
the Megali Idea policy asked Otho to accept their resignation
as a means of protest and disapproval of the present course
followed by Greece. 62

Not even protests from his own minis-

ters, however, were sufficiently strong to change the king's
plans.
The British and French ministers at Athens realized
that if the pro-Russian ministry was dismissed by Otho and
was substituted by "English" and "French" politicians, then
possibly the king would be persuaded, if not forced, through
the influence of the two Western Protecting Powers to give
up his policy of expansionism.

In a meeting with the repre-

sentatives of Austria, Prussia and Bavaria, who tried to per62 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 663-64.
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suade the king to change the course of his actions, Otho
flatly rejected the idea of change of ministry.

All the

ministers of the four Western Powers admitted that even if
there was to be a change of government "it would be impossible

• to find anyone in the present state of affairs,

to accept such an arrangement, or if they did, there was no
one, after former experience, who could trust His Majesty."

63

On April 21, Wyse informed the Foreign Office that the king
of Greece ignored the advice not only of the Allied Powers
but also of the Germanic Powers and ~'still insists on believing the Russian promises." 64

Otho was not so much sold

on Russian promises, however, as he was on the Megali Idea.
At one point after the Greek-Turkish break of relations he
wanted to lead an expedition to Thessaly and to proceed on
with an army to Constantinople.

He was persuaded, however,

not to carry out such a mission by his ministers, especially
by Pelikas and Provelgios. 65

Under such leadership it was

inevitable that an occupation was the next calamity that
Greece would suffer.

c.

The Occupation of Greece

On April 9, the four European Powers - - England,
France, Austria and Prussia - - signed a protocol at Vienna
63 F.O. 32/216, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, April 21, 1854.
64 Ibid.
65 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 646
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laying down the measures to be taken concerning Greece.

66

There was disagreement between the French foreign minister
and Clarendon as to how the occupation of Greece should be
handled.

Drouyn de Lhuys feared that a blockade at Piraeus

such as that of 1850 would create panic and chaos in the mainland whereas a blockade in Thessaly and Epirus was more practical under the circumstances since there were the areas of
trouble.

Clarendon opposed this proposition because he feared

that an Anglo-French blockade in Epirus and Thessaly would
stimulate more uprisings which could possibly spread as far
67
as Constantinople.
The Germanic Powers on the other hand which were sympathetic to Otho and were deeply concerned about the effects
an occupation would have on his throne voiced their opinions
against both Clarendon's and Drouyn de Lhuys' plans of occupation.

Franz Josef wrote to Maximilian:

I will willingly give you the promise that, whatever results the war might have, I would not permit any agreement which would be against the continued existence of
the kingdom of Greece under the Bavarian Dynasty.
I would
even enlist my good services with England and France so
that these Powers could express their opinions and act accordingly.
I would look upon it as a political advantage,
68
if Greece were to find her supporters in the Germanic Powers.
Otho was fortunate in that he still had some protection for his
throne from the Germanic Powers •. As he was aware of this he
66

Donta, Crimean War, 122-23.

67 A.Y.E. 1854 (18/3), Trikoupis to Paicos, London,
April 10, 1854.
68 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho
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198-99.
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acted as the absolute monarch which he was from 1837 to 1843.

on

May 2, he ordered the chambers closed by royal ordinance.

Pelikas immediately protested this act.

Other politicians

also protested for they felt that at times of crises, as the
one Greece was suffering, there was a need to maintain the
69
Chambers in session.
The king argued that the government
was in need of funds so he thought that by closing the chamhers he would save money from the salaries of senators.

The

reason behind Otho's act, however, was the fear that "the
senate might take some hostile act l.eading to the fall of
70
the Cabinet."
The Allied Powers (France

~nd

England) decided to use

the payments due by Greece to the Protecting Powers for the
guaranteed loan as an excuse to justify legally their occupation of Greece.

Wyse addressed a note to the Greek govern-

ment on May lOth stating that:
Her Majesty's Government will no longer allow the revenues of Greece, the first proceeds of which should by
Treaty be appropriated to the payment of the charges of
the Greek loans, to be diverted from that object and
applied to the promotion of schemes in the interest of
a Power with which they are at war; and that if it persists in its present misguided policy the Greek Government must not be surprised if measures are taken by England and France • • • to control the receipts and expenditures of the Greek ex-chequer, and to deprive the Greek
Government of these pecuniary resources which are so wantonly misapplied. 71

69 Pelikas, Memoirs, 199-201.
70 Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 273.
71 Cited in Levandis, Greek Foreign Debt, 50.
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Rouen sent a similar note to Paicos stating the rights of
French interference in Greek Affairs since Greece had not
been capable of discharging her obligations to the French
72
government.
Drouyn de Lhuys was even more severe with
the Greek government than Clarendon.

He warned Paicos that

Greek war ships should not sail in the open sea, and if any
of them violated this warning they would be subject to con73
fiscation by French naval forces.
On May 13, French and British war ships entered the
port of Piraeus.

The next day Wyse and Rouen sent an ulti-

matum to the Greek government.

When Otho realized that his

throne was at stake he gave up his current policy and pubicly declared the neutrality of Greece in the conflict between
74
the Allied Powers and Russia.
All the advice and warnings
from the European leaders concerning a possible Anglo-French
occupation in the event Greece antagonized Turkey were insufficient to persuade the king to change his policy.

He was

so blinded by the enthusiasm of the Megali Idea that only a
foreign invasion could make him realize the stupidity of his
foreign policy.

As a result of the irresponsible conduct of

the Greek monarch and of the British and French who were
ready to occupy any country that would stand in the way of

72 Le Moniteur Universal {No. 134), May 14, 1854.
73 Donta, Crimean War, 127-28.
74 F.O. 32/217, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, May 27,
1854.
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their political, economic and strategic interests, the people
of "little Greece" suffered a three-year long invasion.
Hith the declaration of neutrality came the fall of
the pro-"Russian" ministry as the Allied Powers had wished
and Alexander Mavrokordatos was summoned by the king on May
75
16, to form a new ministry.
The new administration announced shortly after it took power the position of Greece
in relation to the Western European Powers:
We feel the dreadful position of Greece in which the
nation's matters are found.
Commerce was eliminated
from the hands of thousands of businessmen, navigation
was condemned to idleness, and other dangers threatened
the nation, abandoned to the disfavor of the Great Powers. •
• His Majesty our King, respecting in his
fatherly concern these sufferings and dangers he consented to the two naval Powers, England and France, complete neutrality because from this the dangers are prevented and the benefits, we were being deprived of, are
being recovered. We respect as no one else the kind
sympathy of the Greeks for our brothers in whose fortune are concerned the Great Powers. 76
The new cabinet was made up of members of the "English" and
"French" parties \-lho were against the policy of expansionism
and were not puppets of the Crown as were previous ministers
ever since Kolettes.

As a result of the change of ministry,

and of course the Anglo-French occupation, the king's power

75 A. Mavrokordatos, President of the Council and
Minister of Finance, Riga Palamides, Minister of the Interior,
Admiral Canaris, Minister of Marine, P. Argyropoulos, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, General Kalergis, Minister of War, Calligas, Minister of Justice, and Psylas, Minister of Religion and
Public Instruction.
76 Cited in Kordatos, Modern Gre~, III, 648.
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was substantially diminished.

If it was not for the powerful

influence of the Germanic Powers who had not yet committed
themselves in the Crimean War,
have been forced to abdicate.

77

the king of Greece would

Baron de Thile received in-

structions from his government to protect the king's rights
78
against any possible abuses of the Occupying Powers.
The
king of Prussia was very disappointed to hear of the AngloFrench occupation of Greece and was mostly worried about Otho's
future when he wrote Maximilian that the kingdom of Greece was
dearly regarded by him.

Otho's father, Ludwig, further wrote

that he opposed the sinister plans of the Protecting Powers
with regards to Greece and that their recent occupation was
illegal and would never be recognized by his kingdon.

He

noted that:
A state which has been brought into existence by Three
should be devasted by Two, secondly, that the creation
of the Three shall be accepted and represented in the
European family of States.
In the same way "we" will
only recognize the disintegration of the state of Hellas
by the general decision of all.
European Monarchs: but
we can guarantee immediately that we shall not recognize
such a beginning.
This is my proposal. 79
Even though Otho still had the German support, the occupying
forces made his position very difficult in the realm.

He

17 For the ambivalant attitude of the Hapsburg Empire
in the Crimean War, see B. Jelavich, The Hapsburg Empire in
European Affairs, 1814-1918 (Chicago, 1969), 69-79. Also see
Paul W. Schroedor, Austria, Great Britain and the Crimean Har
(Cornell University, 1972), 143-231.
-----78 Donta, Crimean War, 134-35.
19 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho
Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 978-79.
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began retreating to the wishes of Wyse and Rauen on matters
of policy and of government personnel.

One of the matters in

which the two representatives of England and France came to
sharp opposition with the king of Greece was about the appointment of General Kalergis as Minister of War.
Kalergis was
80
to England where he had met Napoleon III and had beexiled
come a very close friend of his.

When the occupation began

Kalergis, as well as the other members of the Ministerial
Council, was forced upon the king.

At first Wyse objected to

the Kalergis appointment because he feared that the General
was a radical pro-"French" politician and could present problems to the British interests in Greece.

Rouen, however, in-

sisted that Kalergis be retained in the ministry and the
81
French minister's wish was fulfilled.
The removal of the king's pro-Russian advisors was
another desired goal of Wyse and Rouen which was achieved
82
with the occupation.
Before the ministry would accept office they required the
retirement of General Spiro Millos, General Mamouris, General Gardiakotti Grivas and General Molokotroni, Grand
Marechal, from their post of aides de camp to His Majesty.
This post is more than honorary in this country.
It allows

8

°

Kalergis took part in the September Revolution of
1843 and was one of the most hated enemies of Otho.
81 Donta, Crimean War, 135-36. Kalergis wanted to replace Otho with a French Prince and this presented a direct
threat to Otho but also an indirect threat to Great Britain,
see Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 650.
82 Donta, Crimean War, 137-38.
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continual and easy access to the royal ear; these generals
have been recently charged with the special task of supporting the insurrection and generals, Spiro Millos,
Mamouris and Kolokotronis, have been the zealous and unscrupulous abettors and chief leaders under Russian auspices of the whole intrigue. 83
Kalergis was instrumental in many schemes to degrade Otho for
reasons of revenge and for political reasons as well.

As long

as he had the French Legation's support, Kalergis was ready to
display his powers with unlimited selfishness and disregard
for the humiliation of Greece which the Occupying Powers were
responsible for and he was an

instru~ent

of their plans.

"The

conspicuous role," writes Donta, "which the French dramatized
with Rouen as its leader, allowed Kalergis, since Mavrokordatos
had not yet arrived from Paris, to become, in the protection
of the French, all powerful." 84

The king and Greece itself

were further humiliated by the continuous displays of French
85
military strength which Admiral Tinan,
head of French occupation forces, was so anxious to parade in the streets of
86
Athens and even in front of the gates of Otho's palace.

83

F.O. 32/217, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, June 12, 1854.
84 Donta, Crimean War, 139.
85 In March 1854 Admiral Tinal warned the Greeks of
Thessaly that France was committed to help defend the Turkish
soil and that they, the Thessaloi, should not aid the revolutionaries.
See Georgiou, "Thessaly Insurrection of 1854," 740.
86

Dragoumes, Recollections, 192.

161
Such abuses by the French and General Kalergis forced
Otho to call quickly for Mavrokordatos' return to Athens.

Th~

new administration had been declared in the middle of May but
the new Prime Minister was not in Greece to lead the government.

After he received a letter from the king on May 27th,
87
requesting that he form and lead the new ministry,
Mavro-

kordatos responded that he preferred to serve as ambassador
to Paris.

The reason for the decline of the king's request

by the minister was that he wanted to be certain that Otho
understood clearly that there would"be no pro-French favoritism played by Mavrokordatos, and he further wished to clari88
fy the king's position toward the future government of Greece.
The king wrote to Mavrokordatos once again persuading him to
return to Athens by the middle of July. 89
The new Prime Minister was sworn-in on the morning of
July 29, and took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held
by Argyropoulos who became the Minister of Finance, since
May 16.

Otho assured the new Prime Minister of the coopera-

8 7 Mavrokordatos Archives 008,909, Otho to Mavrokordatos, Athens, May 27, 1854.
88 Donta, Crimean War, 141. Otho had sent an official dispatch to Mavrokordatos on May 16 ordering him to become Prime Minister, see Mavrokordatos Archives 008,911, Otho
to Mavrokordatos, Athens, May 16, 1854.
89 Mavrokordatos owed the sum of 50,000 dr. in debts
to French lenders which had to be paid by the Greek government if he wished to be allowed to leave Paris. This delayed
his return to Greece.
See Petrakakos, ~istory of Greece, 163,
also Koutroumbas, Revolution ~ 1854, 158-59.
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tion of the Court in both domestic and foreign affairs,

90

so

there were no problems to be expected since no antagonism
between court and government would exist.

Otho, however, was

used to being an absolute ruler and his sense of the word "cooperation" did not mean subordination to the Occupying Powers,
as Rouen and Wyse thought.
Before Mavrokordatos was sworn-in he met with the representatives of the Allied Powers on July 23rd to discuss what
they thought "ought to be the policy of the government before
91
he formally accepted off~ce.''
The king was informed by
Mavrokordatos that it was his intention to schedule such a
meeting with Rouen and Wyse and Otho had approved, but not
without expressing his discontent with both representatives.
Rouen wrote to Drouyn de Lhuys that, "the king's insistence
in forcing the new ministers to protest against the AngloFrench occupation, had produced a very bad impression on publie opinion and he has given reasons concerning the steady
willingness of this Prince to keep his promises opposite
France and England.'' 92

Wyse also wrote to his government

that Rouen denied that there were any grounds for the impressions which had taken possession of the king.

9
1854.

° F.O.

He also main-

32/219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 31,

91 F.O. 32/219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 27,
1854.
92 Gr~ce 68 (No. 87), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens,
June 7, 1854.
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tained that the policy carried out by both the French and
British Legations in Athens was straight forward and could
be summarized in two categories, (A) the observance of Greek
neutrality and (B) a radical political change in system for
the future.

Wyse went on to write:

With regard to the second object we held in view, a radical change of the whole system. • • • There was no one
department of government which did not need the largest
and most sweeping reforms.
Each of these would in turn
demand and receive his most careful attention.
Elections
were to be made free, finance rescued from ruin, corruption repressed, good faith and national credit restored.
In seconding all these desirable ameliorations, our two
governments had but one policy, as one purpose, the permanent happiness and security of Greece. 93
If one reads beyond all the fine things Wyse and Rouen had
in mind for Greece, it is obvious that political and financial
control were the objectives strived for by both France and
England.

The occupying Powers were promising freedom from

the bonds of absolutism, the restoration of the principles
of the constitution and stability, economic and political,
for Greece while their naval forces occupied Greece thus
denying her independence.

Furthermore, Wyse and Rouen, wished

to eliminate the powers of the king and give those powers not
to the poeple of Greece but to their respective countries.
What is worse than the hypocrisy of the Occupying Powers is
the fact that the Greeks believed in the myth that the Protecting Powers would really help their nation to achieve its
goals, whether they would be national expansion, as in the

93 Ibid.
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case of the "Russian" party, internal reform as was the case
with the "English" party or both as the followers of the
"French'' party believed.
One of the immediate concerns of the Allied Powers
was the restoration of Greek-Turkish relations and the end
of all traces of the revolution in the Provinces.

In order

to be successful in their task the complete cooperation of
court and government were essential.

Monsieur Guerin, French

Consul at Syra, was selected by Rouen to represent France in
Lamia where negotiations were to open in order to end hostilities and restore relations between Greece and the Sublime
Porte.

Merlin, vice consul at Athens, was the British rep94
resentative and Colonel Pakenor represented the Greeks.

The Greek ministry and especially General Kalergis worked with
the British and French representatives to insure the end of
the insurrection and the end of brigandage so further hostilities with the Sublime Porte might be prevented.

Most of the

94 Professor Georgiou, Thessaly Insurrection of 1854,
maintains that the Thessaly undertaking was terminated primarily due to the intervention of the Allied Powers and especially France when M. Guerin was sent to Lamia in June.
See Georgiou, 740-45. Colonel Pakonor was sent to disband
the large force which Hadji-Petros commanded in Thessaly.
According to Wyse 10,000 men were led by Hadji-Petro who
fought his last battle against the Turks on June 6.
See
F.O. 32/217, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 7, 1854. Also
see Koutroumbas, Revolution £l 1854, 166-68.
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chiefs of Greek insurrectionary bands were out of Turkish
95
territory by the middle of June.
Rouen reported to the
Quai d'Orsay on June 7th, that,
Theodore Grivas, Tsavellas, Ragos and a great number of
officers returned to Greece already, in order to declare
submission to the government. Epirus may regard such time
as very peaceable. The defeat of the Greeks in Skoulikargia provoked the last blow in the revolution of that Province. 96
Grivas, as well as other leaders of the insurrection promised
to support the new ministry even though it was in fact a
97
"ministry of occupation."
One o~ the immediate consequences
of the Anglo-French occupation was the political division ereated among politicians as well as the public.

There was a

sharp division between those who supported the Anglo-French
intervention in Greece and those who were Russian supporters.
The division was even sharper when the king became the spokesman against Anglo-French occupation and Kalergis the spokesman of the occupying forces.

In June the Minister of War went

so far as to defend the foreign troops to a group of Greek
army officers who had been outspoken about the abuses of the
98
French in Piraeus and in Athens.

95 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 17, 1854.
96 Grece 68 (No. 87), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens,
June 7, 1854.
97 Grivas was considered suspicious by the new administration and was not trusted by the ministers.
See Koutroumbas,
Revolution of 1854, 178. For the retreat of the chiefs see F.O.
32/218, \-JysetOCTarendon, Athens, June 17, 1854, also Mavrokordatos Archive 008, 916, Grivas to Louka, May 26, 1854.
98 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 27, 1854.
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Public opinion was an important concern of both Wyse
and Rouen.

In the beginning of the occupation Wyse believed

that the people of Greece were thrilled to see foreign troops
99
By the middle of August, however, he was
on their soil.
very concerned about the rising of anti-French and anti-British attitudes among the Greeks.

Wyse was convinced that the

attacks of the Greek press against the foreign troops at
Pireaus were in the interest of the Russians and the "Russian"
party as well as the Camarilla.

He wrote to Clarendon that

there was little that he and Rouen could do to control the
slanderous remarks of the press because it had the support
of the entire government behind it.

He went on to write that:

The chief of these organs here are the Aion and the Elpis;
the Aion the old supporter of Russian policy and proceedings and no\v of the Court; and the Elpis the newly stipended advocate of the same party, at times repeating in
its columns the very language of the Palace, and even of
the Queen. 100
Wyse was correct in maintaining that the press shared the
nationalism of the court and the "Russian" party but it also
reflected the nationalist sentiments of the public which wished
nothing more than the defeat of Turkey and her Western Allies
who were occupying Greek soil.

99 F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 7, 1854.
100

F.O. 32/220, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
August 22, 1854.
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Besides the blow to their independence shattered by
the Powers who helped to create the nation of Greece, the
occupied subjects fell victims to a physical disaster brought
by the occupation forces.

One of the worst cases of cholera

ever to hit Greece was responsible for the lives of thousands
in a very short period.

A French ship carrying soldiers from

Crimea came to the port of Piraeus in early June.

A number of

men carrying the deadly disease were taken off the ship to be
hospitalized in a temporary hospital set up by the occupying
forces.

This was the beginning of a disaster which claimed,

it is estimated, seven thousand lives in Piraeus and thi.rty
101
thousand in Athens.
A panic hit the country as people
began leaving their property and loved ones to escape death.
In Piraeus only sixty families were left after a few days of
the spreading of the disease.

Dragoumes who was fortunate to

live through this catastrophe describes it in the following
manner:
After a short while the streets were converted to deserts,
the working shops shut down, inside the houses all voices
were morbid and the town from one end to the other became
quiet from the infinite lack of people; only the sound of
your own footsteps ascended to your
and it roused
your fright.
Here and there you'd meet a man slow-walking alone with a face of wonder and lividness • • • •
Laws, police, hospitals, doctors, everything and everyone
had been paralyzed by fear and'death. 102
101 Fotiades, The Exile, 227.
102 Dragoumes, Recollections, II, 197-98.
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The disease spread as far as the islands when many people who
carried it tried to escape the horror of Athens and Piraeus
before they died.

103

Due to the cholera the occupying for-

ces asked to be allowed to relocate at Patesia (an area outside Athens which was not contaminated), but their request
was flatly denied by the Prime Minister who threatened to
104
resign if the Anglo-French troops relocated.
Mavrokordatos was only trying to prevent the disease
from spreading any more than it already had, but apparently
his denial of the forces' removal was received in bad faith
by the French Admiral de Tinan.

The Admiral chose to create

a major incident and once again displayed his authority to
the devastated Greek nation.

When the Minister of Justice,

P. Bargoles, recalled the alternate district attorneys of
Patras and Nauplia and proceeded to promote the Justice of
the Peace of Piraeus, Admiral Tinan accused the minister of
being a Russophile and even threatened him personally that
action would be taken to have him removed from office.

In

view of such direct intervention by officials of the Occupying Powers in the affairs of the Greek state, Mavrokordatos
could only vigorously protest to Wyse and Rouen and insist

103 Fotiades, The Exile, 297-98
104 Evagelides, Otho, 572-79, also Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, 672-73-.---
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for an immediate settlement.

Realizing the impact such an

affair could have on the public mind and the European community after the press picked it up, the two representatives
105
settled it immediately.
Direct and indirect intervention in Greek state affairs by the Allied Powers was what
Greece could expect under the circumstances.

It was

~he

price that Greece had to pay for the foolishness of a nationalist-expansionist foreign policy pursued by an irresponsible monarch and a pro-Russian and royalist cabinet.
D.

Restoration of Greek-Turkish Relations
and the Treaty of Kalinja
The occupation of Greece by the two Western Protect-

ing Powers was

illega~

for it violated the treaty of 1832

which guaranteed Greece its independence.

Just as the Brit-

ish blockade of 1850 was illegal because France and Russia
had not been informed of it until after it took place, similarly 1854 Franco-British occupation was illegal because
Russia, the third Protecting Power, did not consent to the
actions of the other two Protecting Powers.
For most Greeks as well as those sympathetic to
Greece it was expected that the occupation like the blockade
of 1850 would be a temporary affair, but more than eight
months had passed since the Franco-British naval forces landed in Piraeus and there was no sign that they would be leav-

lOS Evangelides, Ibid., 579-81.

,
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ing.

In an attempt to justify the continuing Anglo-French

occupation of Greece Wyse wrote the following dispatch to
the Foreign Minister of Great Britain:
The "occupation" '"as designed to secure Turkey from lawless aggression, and to establish good government in
Greece.
The Frontier is tranquil, but good government
has only commenced.
The most important organic laws,
respecting Electoral and Municipal Reforms, the Regulation of the Press, the liberalizing of the tariff, the
reorganization of Education, the reconstruction of the
army, the ensuring the independence and purity of the
bench, the revival of Commerce, the development of Industry, the reestablishment of friendly relations, based
on commercial and extradition treaties, with Turkey, have
all to pass.
The purification of every Department of
Administration from the corru~tion and incapacity in
which the old system had flung them, has to be effected. 106
If the facts supported these claims of the British minister
perhaps the Greek historians would regard the period of the
occupation as one of the greatest in Modern Greece.

But how

can any "occupation" of one nation by another, no matter what
the good intentions of the Occupying Powers are, be benefic!ary to the occupied people when it is a recognized fact by
all those politically conscious that the first guiding principle of all nations is their own national self-interests.
In spite Wyse's theoretical jargon which was only intended,
as was pointed out above, to judtify an occupation of a
helpless country, the issue of immediate concern to both
ministers of the Allied Powers in Greece was the restoration
of Greek-Turkish relations.

The occupying forces would never

106 F.O. 32/227 (No. 7), Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
January 17, 1855.

171
leave Piraeus if relations between Greece and Turkey remained broken.

In an interview which took place at St.

cloud between the Emperor Napoleon III and Mavrokordatos
before the latter became Prime Minister, Napoleon expressed
his determination to have Greece observe neutrality towards
Turkey.

He told Mavrokordatos that the king of Greece and

the government must reestablish relations with the Sublime
Porte otherwise, if the king intended to adopt another conduct, "he (Napoleon) should not only retain the force of
5,000 men now in Greece but if necessary increase it to
10,000 or even 20,000, until it was sufficient to accomplish
107
The restoration of relations with Turkey
this object."
was Mavrokordatos' desired goal who believed that Greek expansion was a dream for the present and a policy only for
the distant future.
Early in August the Prime Minister took the first
steps to open negotiations with the Sultan's government.

He

communicated with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and proposed
to send M. Barozzi, ex-consul at Andrianople, to represent
Greece in Constantinople. 108

During this time Mavrokordatos

also took measures to end brigandage in the Greek-Turkish
107

F.O. 32/218, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 8,

1853.
108 F.O. 32/219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, August 11,
1854.
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frontiers realizing that the presence of this element in Greece
presented a threat to the Ottoman Empire and could affect the
Greek government's attempts to restore relations with Turkey.
Furthermore, the new administration made efforts to restore
109
Ottoman property plundered by the insurgents.
In the first conference which was held in Constantinople
between the representatives of England, France, Greece and Turkey, the Sublime Porte expressed its enthusiasm with the Mavrokordatos government and was pleased with his proposal of a
commercial treaty between Greece and Turkey.

Reshid Pasha,

the Turkish representative at the conference, however, continued to press for "the recognition for the principle of indemnity," which meant that an already economically weak Greece
would have to pay for damaRes it never committed directly
110
since it never declared war on Turkey.
Stratford de
Redcliffe, who was just as anxious as Napoleon and Mavrokordatos to have Greek-Turkish relations normalized again, was
more concerned with the security of the Greek-Turkish frontiers than anything else for he feared that the threat of a

109 F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September
11, 1854, also F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 7, 1854.
110 Mavrokordatos Archive 008,971, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, September 28, 1854, also F.O. 32/221,
Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 27, 1854.
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nationalist revolt could change the character of the Eastern
Ouest ion.

The Greeks on the other hand hoped to gain in com-

mercial and navigational benefits from the Treaty.

So the

problem was to draw up such a compromise settlement which
would satisfy all parties involved.

Stratford wrote to Wyse

on this matter that:
It is essential to have the bases of the commercial treaty
in a more intelligible and definite form.
Turkey is securing to Greece the advantages desirable from commerce
and navigation with the Imperial territories is entitled
to have its tranquility guaranteed on the score of abuses
in protection, and other matte~s of intercommunication
between the two countries so delicately circumstanced
towards each other. 111
Stratford de Redcliffe accused Mavrokordatos of delaying the
conclusion of the Treaty by not conforming to the stated wishes
of the Sublime Porte,.namely, the guarantees of security and
the principle of indemnity.

112

By early December the Greek

Prime Minister was persuaded by Rouen and Wyse to meet the
demands of the Sublime Porte so that the treaty could be worked
113
out.
One of the major objections which the Greek government
had concerning the procedure for the treaty negotiations before
111 F.O. 32/222, Private, Stratford de Redcliffe to Wyse,
Constantinople, November 29, 1854.
112 Barozze informed Mavrokordatos
Redcliffe was a philhellene and "hoped for
our country'' but that he wanted things his
Archive 008,971, Barozze to Mavrokordatos,
September 28, 1854.
113
1854.

that Stratford de
a great future for
way. Mavrokordatos
Constantinople,

F.O. 32/222, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 7,
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the substance of the treaty began to be negotiated was the
demand of the Sublime Porte that Mavrokordatos should send
to Constantinople an Envoy Extraordinary who was to beg pardon on behalf of the king of Greece, for what had happened
in Epirua, Thessaly and Chalcidice.

This seemed an outrag-

eous demand to the Greek Court as well as to many supporters
of Otho who felt that by fulfilling such a demand Greece would
be admitting the king's involvement in the revolution.

It was

not only a humiliating act against the king but also against
the honor of the Greek nation.
Immediately the Greek press attacked the Sublime Porte
and its Allies for making such a demand on an occupied country.
The following article was published in Elpis (Hope) in early
January.
That neither Mr. Mavrokordatos, nor any other minister of
Greece will ever consent to such humiliation, is to us
quite certain. We are only sorry to see that Mr. Mavrokordatos, who has sufficient perspicacity, did not long
ago forsee that which we so long repeated; that as long
as the war shall continue between the Western Powers and
Russia, the reestablishment of our relations is an idle
fancy.
Since the Governments interested, in order to
justify before the public opinion of Europe the measures
taken against Greece, qualified the last struggle of the
Christians in Turkey and the part which Greece took therein, as a Russian Movement; • • • the hatred against Russia,
inspired the Belligerent Powers, as well as those who remain neutral, with the desire of humiliating her, and orig- 114
inated also the idea, that every Greek was a spy of Russia.
Mavrokordatos' position was that of the middle man who was continuously pressured by Rouen and Wyse on the one hand and Otho

114 ELPIS (No. 788), Athens, January 1, 1855.
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on the other to carry out contradictory policies.
At the beginning of his appointment the Prime Minister
seemed to please the king because he checked the power of
Kalergis.

Otho believed that Mavrokordatos would not be the

sort of puppet to Wyse and Rouen that Kalergis was and, furthermore, the king was convinced that the new Prime Minister
would be devoted to the Crown.

The good relationship that

existed between the king and Mavrokordatos in July was replaced by antagonism in September.

The reason for this, pri-

marily, was the fact that the French and British representatives' pressure in Athens kept the new administration as far
from the king's influence as was possible.

In a letter to

Francis Joseph, Otho complained that he had entrusted his
Prime Minister the full cooperation of the Court but as he
put it:
Mavrokordatos was not able though until today to live up
to my hopes, with which we supported him • • • The foreign
intervention in the internal affairs of the country which
is based on the strength of the foreign forces stationed
near the capital, prevent him in his actions.
• I beg
you then, as is the interest of the independence of Greece,
that you take a stand and declare, that it is time to
finally put an end to the occupation. 115
Opposition to Mavrokordatos came not only from the king but
from faithful ministers to the king whose devotion to Otho
exceeded their devotion to their parties.

Riga Palamides,

115 Otho to Francis Josef, Athens, September 1, 1854.
Cited in Skandames, Kingdom £i Otho, 980-81.
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Minister of the Interior, and Christides, Minister of Finance,
were two of the most prominent political figures who turned
against the Prime Minister, thereby, creating a schism within
the administration.

Consequently, the polarization of the

two opposing forces, the Anglo-French on the one side and the
royalists on the other, was becoming greater and the power of
Mavrokordatos was diminishing.
On December 12, Riga Palamides wrote a letter to Fuad
Pasha cautioning him and his government against the intentions
116
of Greek Prime Minister who happened to be a Phanariot.
He warned Fuad Pasha that Mavrokordatos should not be trusted
in so far as the negotiations for the restoration of Greek117
Turkish conflict were concerned.
When the British representative in Athens discovered that Palamides had warned Fuad
Pasha about Mavrokordatos' intentions and that Christides in
collaboration with the Minister of the Interior were waging
war on the Prime Minister he felt that the entire affair was
the scheme of the Crown.

He wrote to Clarendon that:

116

.
Phanariotes came from a section in Constantinople
and many of them worked in the Greek or Turkish government.
They were well off and many took part in the War of Independence.
The Turks viewed them with suspicion.
117 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,043, Secret and Confidential, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, January 3,
1855.
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Mr. Christides' opinions are well known, and his late alliance with Riga Palamides and Gardiakotte Grivas is based
on the hopes of giving them early effect. He would not
venture on such a course, however, without the countenance
of the Court, no more than the Court would show such countenance, unless they witnessed the intimacy of M. Christides with the French Legation, and entertained the presumption, that no control had been exercifrH over his designs, or such control had been in vain.
The Mavrokordatos administration was made up of politicians
affiliated with both "French" and "English" parties and because the occupying forces had one policy in the Near East it
was assumed that these two parties would hold the same.

Even

though this assumption holds true ·to a large extent for the
consensus on the foreign policy of the Mavrokordatos ministry, the same did not hold true for any other measures.

Fur-

thermore, Mavrokordatos was a member of the "English" party
which those who
opposed.

belon~ed

to the "French" had traditionally

But the feuds that were developing among the mem-

bers of the ministry were not due simply to party differences
but to basic differences between support of the Crown which
to many meant support of Greece or support of the Occupying
Forces.

And it was primarily the king who was behind such

a movement, for the obvious reasons, and not as much the
French Legation as Wyse emphasizes.
Palamides and Christides charged that Mavrokordatos
and the Allied Powers were responsible for stalling the treaty

118

F.o.

January 24, 1855.

32/227, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
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with the Sublime Porte and by so doing they were responsible
for the economic loss suffered by the Greek commerce and navigation.

119

Barozze, however, gained the confidence of the

representatives of England, France and Turkey in Constantinople
and he made considerable progress in the negotiations. 120
By early May the Greek Court and the two Western Powers agreed
to a large extent on the terms of the treaty between Greece
and the Ottoman Empire.

Upon the advice of France and England,

Andreas Koundouriotes was appointed Minister to Constantinople
and Riza-Halel Bey, Minister at Athens.

The treaty, which took

almost a year to be worked out, was signed at Kalinja on May
27th 1855, by Koundouriotes and Fuad Pasha.

The title of the

treaty was "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the Kingdom of Greece and the.Ottoman Empire" and some of the key articles in it are listed below:
Article I.

"The subjects of His Majesty the King of Greece

and those of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, can in each of
the two States, exercise reciprocally commerce by land and by
sea, with total freedom and security."

119 F.O! 32/227, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February
14, 1855.
120 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,051, Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, January 27, 1855.
It was fortunate
for Mavrokordatos that the Sublime Porte did not take the
propaganda letter of R. Palamides ~eriously and continued the
negotiations in good faith, see Mavrokordatos Archive 009,043,
Barozze to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, January 20, 1855.

179
Article II.

"The subjects of each party in the contract will

be exempt in the state of the other from all conscription and
from all military service on land or sea, of whatever nature
it may be."
Article IV.

"The merchant ships, of the two High parties con-

tracted, whether they are empty or carrying a cargo of merchandise or other articles of whatever type will navigate in
complete freedom and security, under their own flag in the
seas and waters of either country."
Article VIII.

"The war vessels of each Power which meet ships

belonging to the merchant marine of the other, will allow
these to freely continue their route and even aid them in case
of need."
Article XII.

"The subjects of one and the other Power can

freely buy and trade in any part of the two respective states
merchandise bought from foreign countries without being subject to various dues.

. ."

Article XIX, "It is agreed that no war ship can provide and
arm in the ports and the shores of either of the high contrac121
ted parties."
After Koundouriotes was appointed Minister at Constantinople
Fuad Pasha expressed his governments full confidence in Mavrokordatos, see A.Y.E. 1855, 19/1 (No. 71, Koundouriotes to
Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, April 24, 1855.
121 For the full text in Turkish, Greek and French see

,.
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This treaty which normalized commercial and navigational relations between the Sublime Porte and Greece lasted until 1897
when Greece made another attempt to bring the Megali Idea into
122
reality,
and after the resolution of that conflict it was
modif1ed and it lasted until 1923.

123

France and England, and especially Stratford de Redcliffe, believed that they had achieved a major diplomatic
victory by the negotiation of and success of this treaty and
Redcliffe wrote to the Greek Prime Minister after the treaty
124
was signed to express his satis~action with its results.
Greece was also pleased with the establishment of the treaty.
On June 8th, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate passed
the treaty and issued it henceforth as a law of the nation.

125

A.Y.E. 1855 a.a.k/H.
This treaty is also in British and
Foreign State Papers, LVI, 1381-89, also in G. Moradounghian,
ed., Recueil d'actes internationaux del' empire Ottoman, II·
(Paris, 1897-1903),-437-44.
122 See F. Tatsios, "The Megali Idea and the GreekTurkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on
Greek Irredentism; 1866-1897," Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Columbia, 1973.
123 Donta, Crimean War, 144.
124 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,088, Stratford de
Redcliffe to Mavrokordatos, Constantinople, June 9, 1855.
125 Mavrokordatos Archive 009,087, The Treaty and
the Resolution of the Chambers and Senate are included.
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Wyse felt that the Treaty placed the relations of
Greece "with Turkey, on a far surer and clearer foundation,
than they were before and • • • it will much facilitate, it
is to be hoped, for the future, the maintainance of peace
126
and order between the two countries. "
The people who
benefited most were those in commerce for during the year of
disrupted relations with Turkey they suffered greatly and as
a result the Greek economy also deteriorated considerably.
As Wyse remarked in a note appraising the Treaty:
Its (the Treaty's) immediate ~esults to the commercial
interests of this country are incalculable. Mr. Consul
Wilkinson states it to me, to be his conviction that had
the state of interruption and exclusion, consequent on
the breaking up of diplomatic relations between Greece
and Turkey been allowed to continue, it necessarily would
have been been had not overtures for the present Treaty
been made throu·gh this Legation and the Embassy in Constantinople, there is little doubt, that Greek commerce
would have suffered a disturbance very little different
from general bankruptcy and ruin. 127
In spite of the general approval and enthusiasm concerning
the Treaty there was some opposition by the press under the
control of Riga Palamides, C. Levides, Soutso and Christides,
all well known royalists who were opposed to Mavrokordatos
and the Anglo-French attempts to restore Greek Turkish rela128
tions.
Otho and his followers did not care so much about

126 F.O. 32/230, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 17,
1855.
1Z7 Ibid.
128 F.O. 32/230, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 17,
1855.
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the fact that the economy of Greece benefited from the Treaty
as they could only see that the Treaty was the result of AngloFrench collaboration with Mavrokordatos, and the Sublime Porte
representing the defeat of the court's foreign policy.

r
CHAPTER V
THE PROLONGED OCCUPATION, 1854-1857
A.

Otho's Expansionist Foreign Policy
After the Declaration of Neutrality

One of the questions which scholars of modern Greek
history and the Eastern Ouestion are concerned with is the
long and illegal Franco-British occupation of Greece.
did the Anglo-French naval forces

~tay

Why

in Greece almost a

year after the Treaty of Paris was signed?
purpose behind the prolonged occupation?

What was the
It is clear why

troops had to be sent to Greece in May 1854 but the question of why these troops stayed there for such a long period of time has not been dealt with in detail by historians.
To answer these questions the factors of economic and political control of Greece by the Western Powers as well as a
persistent expansionist, pro-Russian in many respects,
foreign policy of Otho will be examined in this final chapter.

1

1 There is only one work which deals with the role of
Greece in the Crimean War, that of Domna Donta, Crimean War.
This study focuses on the years 1853-1854, from the beginning
of the Menshikov Mission to the beginning of the Mavrokordatos
administration.
It does not cover the entire history of the
occupation and its consequences. Another recent study on the
Greek-Turkish war of 1854 is that of Dimitri Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854. This is a study focusing mostly on the Thessaly
revolt of 1854 and does not go beyond that year. Other works on
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responsi~le

Otho's foreign policy was

for the occupa-

tion of 1854 and its devastating economic, political and sccial
consequences.

Yet some of the most prominent

have vigorously defended that foreign policy.

Gr~ek

historianu

Kyriakides writas

the folloldng:
The policy of Otho was the national policy, indoubtably then
it was the duty of the Greek people to observe this stand,
which it observed; if it was not benefited, if it was harme~,
this is irrelevant; its stand, its past, its history, this
was the policy sketched and this was what King had to fol-·
low having in conscience his national mission. 2
Another historian

eulo~izes

the policy of the Greek Court in

the following manner:
This policy not rightfully, was characterized as exclusivaly
dynastic policy.
It was a policy which the people wanted.
• • • ' As much as it looked Russian on the surface as from
the facts that policy, the responsibility from which the
Crown courageously resumed, was Greek policy. 3
Another Greek historian who favored that policy of the Cou=t
characterized the Oueen as brave and patriotic and sympathized
with the difficult problems facing Otho and Amalia.

According

to Filaretos, the king and Oueen were determined "in the fulfillment of the country's duty."

4

the Othonian period such as Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, Trifonas
Evagelides, Otho, and other works mentioned throughout this
study have not dealt ldth the diplomatic aspects of the period
1854 to 1857 nor have they covered the consequences of the occupation.
Driault's Histoire Diplomatique is the only work which
briefly covers the diplomatic relations of Greece and the Great
Powers beyond 1854 but it fails to tie in the domestic political scene.
2 Kyraikides, Contemporary Greek~, I, 674.
3 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 224-25
4

Philaretos, Foreign Rule, 103-04.
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Undoubtedly nationalist and royalist favoritism has
prevailed in the interpretations of those historians at the
expense of historical objectivity.

But if for the sake of

this so-called "historical objectivity'' such motives as nationalism and royalism are set aside, the policy of the Greek
Court turns out to be very unrealistic and harmful, in the
light of the deplorable condition of the Greek nation and
also the Near Eastern policy of the Western Powers.
Otho and Amalia vainly pursued a dream of expansionism since the Kolettes administration reintroduced the Megali
~

to the Greek people.

The king and queen sought the op-

portunity since the Mousouros Incident to antagonize the Ottoman Empire and to have an open conflict with the Turks in hope
of gaining the Turkish Provinces north of the Greek frontier.
During the Holy Places controversy the Greek Court prepared
the people through its propaganda to be ready to face the
Turkish enemy in war.

And before the Menshikov Mission had

finally been declared a failure Otho had started supporting
the insurrection in the Provinces of Thessaly and Epirus.
The foreign policy of the Megali Idea which began as
a dream for Otho and Amalia during the Kolettes administration was on its way of becoming a reality in 1853, at least
as far as many Greeks were concerned.

It was clearly a de-

ception, however, for the king and·many government officials
to believe that Greece could expand its frontiers when the
Great Powers were all against such a measure.

One wonders,

""
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therefore, if it was wise of Otho and Amalia to risk the destructive consequences of an Algo-French occupation, which lasted from May 1854 to February 1857, for a dream that could
never come true under the circumstances of 1854.

It was a

greater wonder, however, that the royal couple pursued the
dream of the Megali Idea even after Greece was occupied by
the foreign forces.

Indeed, it was true that the Greek Court

never changed the foreign policy which was handed to it by
Kolettes, until the force of the Occupying Powers fell so
great upon Greece as to make certain that the policy of expansionism would not be repeated.
A few days after the king announced the neutrality of
Greece in the Crimean War the British Legation in Athens informed the Foreign Office of secret Court support to the insurgents.

Wyse wrote to Clarendon concerning the king's co-

vert attempts to continue the insurrection.
At Athens cart ldads of powder and other ammunition continued to be conveyed with secrecy, for the purpose of
being formed into cartridges to the different stores.
At the Piraeus, a considerable quantity of powder was
transmitted to the government magazine there by superior
·orders for the purpose, it would seem, of being embarked
covertly. •
On the 25th inst. a body of 300 armed
volunteers were collected together at Argos by the Deputy
of that place, who had received 20,000 drachmas from Athens
for the purpose, and a short time afterwards they started
for the frontier. 5

5

F.o. 32/217, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, May 31, 1854.
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This report of the British

Le~ation

in Athens indica-

ted that the king and a great number of sympathizers of the
insurrection were determined to continue the struggle against
the Turks even after the king's official declaration of Greek
neutrality.

Otho never really made the transition from the

Megali Idea policy to a course which called for internal development and economic growth.

Rouen reported to his govern-

ment after the occupation took place that the king had not
accepted the full implications of his neutrality declaration
and that Otho wished to present his position in the European
6
community as a victim of the Occupying Powers.
Wyse also
hinted the same thing to Clarendon when he wrote that if Otho
had accepted the terms of neutrality he would not have any
objections to the changes of his Russophile advisors who were
all connected with the developments of the insurrection.

7

Such an attitude of the king gave cause to the Allied Powers
to suspect Otho of Russophilism and as long as such suspicions
existed and the Crimean War continued there was no chance that
the occupation of Piraeus would be ended.

6 Grece 68 (No. 90), Rouen to Drouyn de Lhuys, Athens,
June 17, 1854.
7

F.O. 32/217, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
June 12, 1854.
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Only two weeks after the declaration of neutrality
Otho wrote to his father:
I would prefer undoubtedly instead of retreating in the
supremacy of force, to attack Turkey and with bravity
(palikaria) to bring through and to win the goal, which
I designed. • • • I retreat with difficulty when the
cession of a certain thing is attempted with impudence
and with repression. 8
Incidents which revealed

The king meant every word he wrote.

his support to the Megali Idea policy occurred almost as soon
as the Allied forces had landed on Piraeus.
On June 25, a senator and a doctor by the name of
Tasseos left Piraeus with ammunition and money in order to
renew the aggression in Pelio, a village in the Province of
Thessaly.

Tasseos was captured by a French agent, however,

before he reached his destination.

9

According to the intel-

ligence information of the British Legation in Athens:
This attempt has been got up at the instigation of the
"Russian" and Court party here, that it has been aided
by funds and ammunition supplied by them, that among the
chief agents in the matter are not only persons directly
connected with the late administration, but also persons
at this moment in the immediate service of His Majesty
and in constant communication with him, and that a portion of these funds was supplied by the Directors of the
National Bank. 10
After the Tasseos incident it was doscovered that the queen
of Greece was personally involved in a scheme concerning

8 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, June 3, 1854.
Skandames, Kingdom~ Otho, 977.
9 Koutroumbas, Revolution

£i

Cited in

~, 162.

10 F.O. 32 I 219, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 17,
1854.
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another insurrection to take place in Crete.

Apparently,

Amalia had received 140,000 roubles from Russia for the purpose of exciting an uprising in Crete.

Various individuals in

Greece who shared the dream of national expansion with the
court gave another 70,000 drachmas to the Queen.

A group of

three hundred Cretans then assembled outside of Athens ready
to depart for Crete at about the same time that a new minis11
try was forming.
The insurrection never took place in
crete because General Kalergis who was supposedly sent to
Paris in order to bring back arms for the Cretans did not
return to the island with the ammunition.

Even though noth-

ing became of the queen's attempt to start a Cretan insurrection, it did not help the position of Greece at all because
the Allied intelligence found out about the scheme.
The Occupying Powers' concern was not limited to the

.

expansionist plans of Otho and Amalia but extended to the
press propaganda, to the political groups which were proRussian and wanted to see a Greater Greece, and to the various Hetairias (secret organizations) whose goal was to free
all the Greeks from the Ottoman Empire by raising money, arms
and recruiting volunteers.

Both Wyse and Rouen knew that the

insurrection had public support and both representatives felt
that their job was to prevent any further excitement among

11

F.O. 32/219, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, July 22, 1854.
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the public which could lead to renewed Greek-Turkish hostilities.
There were two means through which a great deal of propaganda against the Turks was carried out.

The first was the

press which continuously attacked the Allied Powers for illegally occupying Greece while at the same time it supported the
king and the insurrection.

The second was the local govern-

ment officials who by virtue of their position had an enormous
influence on the public mind.

Most government officials through-

out Greece were appointed before the Mavrokordatos ministry of
1854 and therefore were pro-Russian.

So even though the cen-

tral government had changed, the majority of government officials had remained the same and they continued to propagate
war against Turkey even after May 1854.
The two papers which engaged in editorial attacks
against the occupying Powers and were both sympathetic to
Russia and to Otho were the Aion and Elpis. 12

By the middle

of August, after the cholera had broken out, these two papers
were waging such a verbal war on the Occupying Powers that
Rouen demanded that Mavrokordatos take positive action against
the editors responsible.

Mavrokordatos was not at liberty to

carry out every demand the French and British representatives

12 There were other papers which were against the
Allied Powers. Panhellenium ran an article after the occupation questioning its legality. See Moniteur Universe!, June
19, 1854.

\,I

,,
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had to make for he had the force of the Crown checking his
13
powers constantly.
As a result of the Prime Minister's
failure to act upon the command of the French minister, a
group of forty men were sent from Piraeus to Athens on Septemher 21, by the order of Admiral Tinan to smash the printing
presses of the Aion, close the office of Elpis and place under
arrest the editors of the two newspapers, John Philimon and
14
Wyse maintained and, undoubtedly, so
constantine Levides.
did Rouen that:
The real object (of the press) was to establish such a
state of opinion and feeling in the Provinces and especially in the frontier, as regarded both Russia and Western
Powers, no matter by what means, as should render it practicable the first opportunity to resume the late system of
excitement and aggression, and furnish them with minds and
men as well as funds and ammunition, entirely for the invasion of the Turkish Provinces. 15
There was a certain element of truth in this observation but
it was no justification to destroy the property of the Greek
newspapers and to illegally arrest the two editors.

The vio-

lation of Greek independence first occured in May by the AngloFrench invasion of Greece.

Then private property violations

13

F.O. 32/220, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, September 13, 1854.
14 Kyriakides, Contemporary Greeks, I, 672, Kordatos,
Modern Greece, III, 653, also see F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September 22, 1854.
15 F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September
27, 1854.
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in Greece by foreign troops and finally the violation of the
citizens' freedom guaranteed by the Constitution was executed
all in the name of the national interests of the Occupying
Powers.
The French and the British felt that by the destruction of the opposition press they would win over the public
to their side but as in the case of the 1850 British blockade
this did not happen.

Instead, the people turned Russophile
16
more than ever before
and this only increased Wyse's and
Rauen's irritation.

It seemed that the germ of Russophilism

which began to spread ever since 1850 kept spreading beyond
control and one of the reasons for this, besides the course
of events and the press propaganda, was the influence on the
public mind which the local government authorities exercised.
The government authorities and most people who sympathized with the insurgents believed that the Anglo-French
occupation as well ai the Mavrokordatos ministry, which was
publicly known as the "Ministry of occupation," were only
temporary.

Many Greeks thought that since the blockade of

1850 did not last long by the same token the occupation of
1854 would be terminated quickly.

As Wyse informed his gov-

ernment in early September:
The authorities, mostly placed in their situation by a
pro-Russian Ministry, are still nourished with the false
hope that all present men and measures are temporary,

16 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 554.
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that the incursions on Turkey are only suspended, that the
German Powers will compel!, at least by diplomacy the two
Allied Powers to withdraw their troops from Greece, that
the King thus free from further control, will once more
resume his ancient Counsellors, with whom he has never
ceased to communicate and that the "status quo ante" will
be reestablished triumphantly and without difficulty. 17
This line of thought was also shared by Rouen and both representatives of the Occupying Powers were pressing Mavrokordatos
to adopt strict measures against Rusophilism.

The Prime Mini-

ster could not do so in the open and directly because to fight
Russophilism would mean attacking the Court and the king himself.

He came to the point where he could no longer be torn

by the two forces of the Western Powers on the one side and
the Court on the other, so he threatened to resign if he was
not left alone to run the government his own way. 18
In a personal visit to the Prime Minister by Wyse and
Rouen, the two representatives listed a number of complaints,
all tied to the issue of Russophilism and the government's
failure to repress it.

Mavrokordatos told the two ministers

that:
He was occupied in devising remedy to the evil, (spread
of Russophilism) by a change in the Municipal Law itself,
but until this could be brought to bear, he much feared
he could not accomplish what he felt, as well as we,
(Rouen, Wyse), was every way so desirable.
I admitted
the reasoning of Mr. Mavrokordatos as far as it went, but
I regretted it did not go further. 19
·

17

F.O. 32/220, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, September

7, 1854.
18 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 233.
19 F.o. 32/221, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, November 12, 1854.
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The Prime Minister further indicated "that it was much easier
20
to make or accept these suggestions, then to give them effect."
Besides the issue of Russophilism in the Court, in the press
and in public offices, there was an even more serious matter
which attracted the attention of the Allied Powers in Greece,
namely, brigandage.

This was an old problem which always wor-

ried the Turks for it presented a threat to their Christian
occupied Provinces.

Brigandage was also Palmerston's concern

from 1844 to 1851 and it received criticism from the French
who like the British were determined to defend the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire.

After Otho declared Greek neutrality

in May 1854, the Turkish authorities in the Greek-populated
Provinces of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia took advantage
of their superior position, since they were aided by AngloFrench forces, and began mistreating and even murdering
Christians in the Provinces to avenge the acts of Greek in21
As a result of the Turkish mistreatment of
surgents.
Christians and the intensive hunt for the Greek insurgents
the latter were forced to become brigands in order to sur22
vive.
The problem of Brigandage after the end of the

20 Ibid.
21

Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 176-80.

22 There were 8,000 Epirotes, 6,000 Thessaloi, 2,000
Cretans, Hydraens, Maniates and others, see Ibid., 178.
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Greek insurrection of 1854 was partially the result therefore
of Turkish determination to mistreat and eliminate Greek insurgents in the Provinces.
By November 1854, only a few months after the occupation, brigandage was steadily increasing not only in the Turkish Provinces where the Greek revolts took place, but on the
Greek-Turkish frontiers and throughout the entire country of
Greece making life for the inhabitants as well as the government in Athens increasingly difficult.

The European embassies

informed the Greek government that they regarded brigandage
in Greece as an obstacle to their Near Eastern policy and an
advantage to the Russians. 23

Wyse who was the most severe

critic of the rising brigandage went to the Greek Prime Minister and once again asked for his cooperation to repress this
dangerous phenomenon.

Mavrokordatos could do very little

against the brigands for as Wyse noted in one of his dispatches
to Clarendon, "there appears to be no Law in the Greek Code,
sufficiently effective, to meet such a state of disorder.

..

."

24

Even if there was a law against brigandage Mavro-

kordatos could not wage an open and total campaign to suppress
the brigands because the pro-Russian elements in the country
and many others who sympathized with the Court's Megali Idea
23 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./1), Confidential, Potles to
Trikoupis, Athens, September 22, 1855.
24 F.O. 32/222, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, November
27, 1854.
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policy would be against such a measure.

Furthermore, the

Prime Minister knew very well that Otho and his Court would
greatly disapprove of brigands' repression since the king
himself supported brigandage morally and in many cases materially.
The Greek Court put the blame on Kalergis for the
rise of brigandage even though the Minister of War did more
than his share to cooperate with the Occupying Powers in
suppressing brigandage.

As Wyse's report indicates Kalergis

was eager to suppress brigandage:
When General Kalergis mentioned to His Majesty a few days
since that he was ready to take the most energetic course
which could be desired to put down this growing calamity,
the Queen opposed the difficulty which was to be expected
from the Chambers and the Constitution, and on General
Kalergis proposing an appeal to the country - - "Never,"
was her answer, "as long as the occupation troops of the
Allied Powers remained here." 25
As far as the Western Powers were concerned brigandage was
born and maintained as part of the Greek Court's policy.

I

mentioned above that under the Kolettes administration the
government patronized brigand chieftains who were indeed considered as soldiers who would someday liberate all of the
Greeks from Turkish oppression.

The king viewed brigands in

the same respect since after all it was the contribution of
the Klefts and Armatoloi who helped to liberate the Greeks
in 1821.

In so far as England and France were concerned

25 F.O. 32/228, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 4,
1855.
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Greek brigands were a Christian army when they crossed over
26
to the Ottoman territory
and that presented a threat to
the peaceful coexistence of the two neighboring states and
more importantly brigandage served to the Russian advantage
under the present circumstances. 27
There was apprehension among the Allied Powers that
the ''Russian" party in collaboration with the Greek Camarilla
were planning renewed hostilities with Turkey so this explained their unwillingness to cooperate with Wyse and Rouen
in suppressing brigandage.

When the two representatives dis-

covered that there were funds in the king's name at the Nationa! Bank of Greece which were to be used as the king wished,
their suspicion about the king's intentions were confirmed.
This prompted Wyse to accuse Otho of still following the same
policy currently as he had before the Allied occupation.

He

wrote to Clarendon:
• • • such an attitude on the part of their Majesties and
Court, as shall unmistakably discourage, in those who
boast of their implicit obedience to their wishes, that
continued hostility, sometimes open, sometimes concealed,
against the government and the policy of the Western Powers which thwarts their effects, and proclaims to the
country that the protection granted to Russia Partisanship is not extinct and that the opportunity is not perhaps
distant when it may again be called, under roaal auspices,
and with hope of better issue, into action. 2

27 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./A), No. 129, Note Verbal, Athens,
August 12, 1855.
28 F.o~ 32/229, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 5, 1855.
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The Greek government tried to do its best to convince the
Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay that effective measures
29
had been adopted to deal with the problem of brigandage.
Britain and France were convinced otherwise.

Walewski ex-

pressed his discontent with brigandage in Greece to M. Roque,
Minister at Paris, after he had been informed of a certain
case of brigandage in the village of Micali.

Roque defended

the Greek government as he reassured the French Foreign Minister that the authorities were doing their best to repress the
existing menace. 30

It was useless to defend, however, acts

which were taking place out in the open.

By the spring of

1855 the problem was so severe that the Allies were forced
to guard the roads between Athens and Piraeus in order to
safeguard their own troops. 31
Admittedly some of those engaged in bands of brigandage were out to rob anyone but there was a number of exinsurgents who were condemned by the Greek government for
taking part in the revolution.

According to British intel-

ligence reports certain brigands in Boetia wanted full amnesty

29 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./A), No. 203, Potles to Trikoupes, Athens, October 15, 1855.
(Potles was foreign minister under the Boulgaris administration, see below section C.)
30 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 259, Confidential, Roques
to Potles, Paris, October 14, 1855.
31

Bower & Bolitho,

~

!, 203.
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and they claimed that brigandage was the means they used to
attain their goal. 32 In a letter to Boulgaris, President of
the Council, the Boetia Brigands revealed their former plans
of using brigandage as a means of creating the fall of the
Mavrokordatos ministry so that they would be granted amnesty
when a new ministry would come into power.

They warned the

Boulgaris administration, however, "that if the Ministers
should persist in neglecting them, and not grant the amnesty
in question they would act henceforth as real brigands.
The Western Allies would never have agreed with the
Greek government to grant amnesty to the insurgents and of
course the Sublime Porte would flatly reject any such measure
in dealing with the rebels.

The Turks, however, were anxious

to put an end to this problem and Fuad Pasha met in a conference with the Greek Prime Minister at Constantinople and
discussed a possible procedure for ending brigandage.

34

The Sublime Porte was preoccupied with the war in
Crimea and had larger problems than the settlement of brigandage in Greece.

It could not afford, however, to allow this

32 F.O. 32/233, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, November 20, 1855. In the same report Wyse wrote
that a group of brigands was caught and held for the abduction of the French Captain Bertrand at Piraeus.
33 Ibid.
34 A.Y.E. 1855 (19/1), Np. 35, Confidential, Koundouriotes to Syivergos, Constantinople, October 10, 1855.
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menace to grow at the expense of more uprisings in its Provinces.

A quick settlement of this problem was sought, there-

fore. and in the first months of 1856 the real efforts to end
brigandage began.

On January 8, it was announced in the

Moniteur Grec that the Minister of War. L. Smolenctz had
drawn up several articles calling for the order of the Greek
government to participate actively in the repression of brigandage in mainland Greece as well as in the Provinces.

These

articles were later to be adopted into law since no law existed
against brigandage as was known in Greece. 35
Two months after the Moniteur Grec announced the government's legal repression of brigandage, a treaty between Greece
and the Sublime Porte was signed at Kalinja which called for
36
the two countries' cooperation to suppress brigandage.
By
the conclusion of this treaty it can be argued that technically Greece and Turkey were back on stable and friendly relations which were only·to be disturbed again in the Cretan insurrection of 1866-1869. 37

35 Moniteur Grec, Athens, January 8, 1856, No. 30382.
in F.O. 32/239.
36 The Treaty was ratified 3 June 1856, signed 8 April,
1856. See Noradoughian. Recueil d'actes interna tionaux. II,
90, 93, also see British and Foreign State Papers, LVI, 13891391.
37 See D. Donta, Greece and the Great Powers, 18631875 (Thessalonike, 1966).
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B.

The Fall of the Mavrokordatos Ministry

Ever since the "ministry of occupation" came to power,
a political struggle began between the king and the Mavrokordatos administration.

For the first time after a period of

over twenty years of absolute rule the Bavarian dynasty in
Greece was forced by France and England to share power with
a ministry under their control.
At first Otho believed that Mavrokordatos would be
able to check the abusive influence of the occupying Powers
in Greek internal and foreign affairs, and he also hoped that
the Prime Minister would control the hostile acts of Kalergis
{Minister of War), which the king thought were directed
against him personally.

As was pointed out in the last sec-

tion, the Prime Minister had made it clear to Otho that he
would have liked to rule constitutionally with as little
foreign influence as possible.

To run a "ministry of occupa-

tion" without the influence of the Occupying Powers, and to
administer in a country which was ruled by an absolute monarch
for as long as it had existed was an impossibility.

Mavrokor-

datos was pulled by two opposing forces - - the Monarchy and
the Allied Powers - - constantly until he got to a point where
he was totally ineffective in so far as exercising his own
will in matters of government.

During the first few months

of the "ministry of occupation" Havrokordatos enjoyed the confidence of the king as well as that of Western Europe.

The

declaration of neutrality, the change of ministries and the

202

new administration's attempts to restore relations with the
sublime Porte were all positive signs of good faith on the
part of Greece toward the Allied Powers.

Of course it took

an armed force at Piraeus to win the good faith of Greece, but
the important factor was that Greece won the confidence of
both Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys.

When Greece requested to

resume possession of the three Russian frigates purchased by
the Kriezes administration, but detained in Dalmatia,

38

both

Clarendon and Drouyn de Lhuys consented to the Greek govern39
ment's request.
The Anglo-French Powers were also determined to maintain good relations with Otho and several months after the occupation even the king of Greece was optimistic about the
friendly course of Greek foreign relations.

"The Emperor of

the French," he wrote to Ludwig, "expressed himself very friendly
towards me and Greece, • • • Clarendon wrote confidentially a
while ago to the British ambassador here the following:

'I wish

as Otho will allow us to be his friends, and he will never have
the least cause to regret this.'

You see from this that our

38 A.Y.E. 1855 (99/1), No. 107, Trikoupis to Argyropou-

los, London, June 25, 1854.
39 Greece was also allowed to regain possession arms
and ammunition detained at Malta and Corfu.
See A.Y.E. 1855
(99/1), Clarendon to Trikoupis, Foreign Office, July 5, 1854,
also A.Y.E. 1855 (99/1), No. 145, Trikoupis to Mavrokordatos,
London, September 9, 1854.
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foreign relations have improved."

40

On the surface it

appeared that Greece was finally following a policy parallel to that of France and England but there was indeed a
power struggle between the Greek Court and the Allied Powers
for political domination in Greek internal and foreign affairs.

As the Greek Legation in Paris informed Mavrokordatos,

the main concern of France and England was the consolidation
of Turkey and the reestablishment of equilibrium in Europe.

41

Greece, ever since the crisis of the Holy Places, had sided
with Russia and its foreign policy was an obstacle to the
plans and policy of Western Europe in the Near East.

Even

after the "ministry of occupation" had come in control,
42
Clarendon could call Greece "a misgoverned country."

No

matter how much effort went into trying to convince the Western Powers that Mavrokordatos had good intentions and that
43
he was ready to cooperate willfully with them,
it was difficult to win their total confidence as long as they knew
that the Bavarian dynasty in Greece was pro-Russian and would
never give up their hopes of territorial expansion.

4o

Otho to Ludwig, Athens, February 4, 1855.
Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 986-87.

Cited in

41 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 776, Roque to Mavrokordatos,
Paris, August 2, 1854.
42 Ibid.
43 A.Y.E. 1855 (a.a.k./A), Confidential, Argyropoulos
to Roques, Athens, July 9, 1855.
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Otho wanted to rule by himself and he knew that somehow he had to remove the "ministry of occupation" and replace
it with a Court ministry if he was to start drawing power away
from the hands of Wyse and Rouen.

Alone the king could not

achieve such a political victory.

He had to use diplomatic

means and make use of his influence in the German Courts.

In

September 1854 he wrote to Frances Joseph the following letter
complaining about the intervention of the Occupying Powers in
the state affairs of his kingdom:
The condition of Greece, unfortunately, instead of improving, is continuously deteriorating.
He (Mavrokordatos)
feels it also but is unable to improve it. The foreign
intervention in the internal affairs of the country, which
is based on the strength of the foreign troops near the
capital, prevent him, in his actions. You can understand
with how much difficulty the prolongation of the occupation
is connected. And I resort to your mediation for the removal of the occupation. 44
The Austrian emperor answered that he would be glad to use his
influence in the French Court on behalf of Greece but he felt
that the possibility of renewed hostilities in the Turkish
Provinces by the Greeks was highly likely to reoccur so he
thought that for the time being the occupation served a pur45
pose.
Otho was determine to have the influence of Wyse and
Rouen diminished as much as possible and would not give up

44 Otho to Francis Joseph, Athens, September 1, 1854.
Cited in Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 980-81.
45 Ibid.
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trying to fulfill this goal.

As was mentioned in the previous

section, the "ministry of occupation'' was divided among extremists like Christides and Palamides, who were royalists and
opposed actions Mavrokordatos had taken after the French and
British Legations' consultation in Athens, and Kalergis with
Rouen and Wyse behind him who went out of his way to please
46
the Occupying Forces.
Kalergis was a personal friend of
Napoleon III

47

and, apparently, the Emperor of the French was

very pleased with the work and position of General Kalergis in
the Greek government. 48
The Minister of War took advantage of the fact that he
had powerful friends and became very obnoxious towards the king.
Otho waited for the opportunity to arrive so he could dismiss
Kalergis.

This opportunity came in July 1855.

There was a

scandal involving the Minister of War and the wife of P. Pelygiannis, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1849 during the Kriezes
administration.

This scandal received much publicity in the

anti-Western press and was used by the queen to degrade Kalergis

46 On June
British and French
was converted into
forces.
Fotiades,

lOth Kalergis treated the troops and other
officials to a dinner at the Parthenon which
a restaurant to accomodate the invading
The Exile, 224.

47 See Karolides, History of the Greeks, IV, 530-31.
48 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 164.
49 He would go to the palace to get the king's signature and he would ask that the orders be signed without delay,
Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 656.

49
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and diminish his power hopefully resulting in his downfall.
After the king requested the resignation of the Minister,
Mavrokordatos promised on July 26 that in forty-eight hours
he would have Kalergis' resignation at the palace.

Instead

of a resignation delivered by the Prime Minister, Otho received a visit from Mercier, the French representative who
replaced Forth-Rouen, and Wyse who had come for an explana51
The two ambassadors asked
tion of the king's actions.
Otho not to take any affirmative action until they had time
to contact their governments.

On September 2, Otho was in-

formed that both France and Britain were against the Kalergis
dismissal for they did not know of anyone who could replace
52
him as Minister of War.
The king declared, however, that
all services between the Court and the Ministry of War were
stopped and he would not sign any ordinances drawn by that
ministry as long as Kalergis was in charge.

All this chaos

was devised by the Court to lead only to one thing, the fall
of the ''ministry of occupation" thus Otho's political triumph.
In this respect Otho was successful for he had the help of the
German Courts.
The Mavrokordatos administration would have fallen,
however, even if a scandal involving one of his ministers had

5

° Fotiades,

The Exile, 238-40.

51 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, 658.
52 Petrakakos, History of Greece, 169.
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not occurred.

First, there was factional division in the minis-

try, second, it was an administration set up in an emergency
situation and under foreign force and finally, it represented
the will of two opposing sides, the Crown and the Allied Powers.
Mavrokordatos could not rule between such forces and had become
very weak.

As Wyse observed:

If Mr. Mavrokordatos does not make up his mind to more explicitness, determination and activity, he may as long find
himself placed in a position before the King on the one side
and the public (he implies the Allied Powers) on the other
which will leave him no choice between permanent acquiscence
or a sudden retreat. 53
The Prime Minister could not openly oppose the King's policy
and obey orders given by the foreign invaders, but when the
French and British asked for cooperation this is precisely what
they had in mind.

Both Mercier and Wyse felt that Mavrokordatos

was becoming gradually weak and was unable to make government
decisions.
In September the Greek Prime Minister went to see the
British ambassador to discuss the difficulties of his administration.

At the meeting Mavrokordatos stated that before he

left Paris he was assured by Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord Cowley
that there would be no change in the Greek dynasty or the removal of the king as long as the interests of the Allied Powers
are not damaged by Greece.

Further, he understood his position

as that of a mediator between the king and the Powers.

53

F.O~

32/229, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 5, 1855.
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• • • in that sense he understood his mission, and was
desirous to give effect to it legally and constitutionally.
But he found here little either of Law or Constitution.
He would conceive of two kinds of governments a constitution frankly carried out, or a despotism; but not a despotism under the forms of a constitution. • • • That is the
present state of Greece and with that difficulty he has to
contend. The government as it is now cannot act and cannot go on. 54
Wyse of course placed all the blame for the weakness of the
Mavrokordatos administration on the king but the Allied forces
with their continuous demands on the Prime Minister, as Otho
pointed out above, were also responsible for this phenomenon.
In the final analysis the Court was in many respects
more desirous to end Mavrokordatos than the Allied Powers who
merely regretted his weak position.

The members of the Chamber,

all appointed by the king, waged a war on the Mavrokordatos
administration using as an excuse the Kalergis scandal.

The

press and public servants alike, all directed by the Court,
also turned against the "ministry of occupation."

In a dis-

patch from the British Legation in Athens Wyse summarized what
he considered the main causes of Mavrokordatos' fall from power:
All these circumstances combined leave no doubt of a common
hostility, and concerted movement against M. Mavrokordatos.
But this would be of little moment if M. Mavrokordatos were
another man, or had long since, or would even now adopt
another policy; the conspiracy might easily be defeated if
he did not also continue to conspire himself.
Such, however,
is, unfortunately, not the case. His first step was a mistake. He attempted to unite the character of a minister

54

F.O. 32/231, Most Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, September 4, 185s:--
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chosen deliberately by the king, with that of a minister
selected by the Allied Powers. He has had his eye fixed
on the chances of the future, instead of the necessities
of the present; he had been consulting the stronger side
and more permanent authority, whilst he should have acted
without reference to either.
• • 55
Under such strenuous political circumstances it would have
been difficult for any Prime Minister to retain the necessary
unity and strength of the administration to run the government
efficiently and without encountering the sorts of problems
which were responsible for the fall of the Mavrokordatos ministry.

A much greater force had to intervene to bring about this

fall, however, than merely the wish of the king of Greece.
Francis Joseph, finally, bent to the wishes of his cousin, Otho,
and used his influence to have Britain and France discontinue
56
their support of Mavrokordatos.
Otho had used well the only
weapon left to his disposal, diplomacy, after the Anglo-French
occupation.

He knew that as long as the British and the French

needed the support of Austria and the Prussian neutrality commitment in the war against Russia, he could use his influence
with the Germanic nation to pressure the Allied Powers to remove General Kalergis and of course along with him the entire
"ministry of occupation."

lvyse wrote concerning the near-fall

of the "ministry of occupation":

55 F.O. 32/231, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, September 8, 1855.
56 Kordatcs, Modern Greece, III, 658.
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The first impression produced will be one of triumph in
the Russian and German pro-Russian party here, and abroad;
the assurance already given in the journals that the King,
at the instance of Austria and Bavaria, has been restored
to all his prerogatives and rights, and the Russian and
anti-Western propagandism emanating from the Court, under
the inspiration of the Russian Legation, and extending by
the instrumentality by the German Camarilla and German
Diplomacy, to all parts of the country, and to ~~st and
East, will acquire for the moment fresh force.
It had taken two months for the Germanic Powers (Prussia,
Bavaria and Austria) to persuade Napoleon to withdraw his
58
support from Kalergis but finally they succeeded.
After
the "ministry of occupation'' had fallen from power the French
government still regarded the ousting of General Kalergis by
Otho as "a victory of the Russian party over Western politics.''

59

The emperor failed to view the situation as a struggle for
power between the king of Greece and the continuous interference in Greek domestic affairs by the Western Powers.

Both

the British and the French refused to accept Otho's schemes of
Greek expansionism

i~

isolation.

As far as they were concerned

there was a real connection between any Greek plans for expansion and Russian ambitions.

57

F.O. 32/231, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
September 29, 1855.
58 Fotiades, The Exile, 239-240.
59 A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 259, Confidential, Roques
to Potles, Paris, October 14, 1855.
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On September 27, Mavrokordatos handed in the resignation of the entire ministry to the king for to remain after
the forced resignation of Kalergis would have created antago60
nisms with the French.
So the first victory of the Greek
Camarilla was achieved with the resignation of a ministry
which was forced upon Greece by the British and the French.
For Mavrokordatos, September 27, was to be the last day of
his long political career which was to a great extent damaged
in 1844 as well as 1855 by a petty .Bavarian Prince who believed himself to be more of a Greek nationalist than the
Greeks themselves.

c.

The Boulgaris Administration

The man who was chosen to replace Mavrokordatos was
Demitris Boulgaris.

61

The new Prime Minister was born into

a wealthy family in the island of Hydra and was known among
the political circles in Athens for his despotic character.
His father had worked for the Turkish armada and Boulgaris

60

See Skandames, Kingdom of Otho, 990-91, ·also A.R.
Rangabes, Apomnemoneumata (Memoirs) III, (Athens, 1894), 319.
61 The new ministry was sworn in on October 4, 1855
with Trikoupis as President of the Council and Minister of
Foreign Affairs, however, he did not accept the position and
Boulgaris who was originally chosen for the position of Minister of the Interior became Prime Minister.
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like Kolettes had come under the influence of Turkish customs.

62

One of the reasons that Otho selected him to serve as Prime
Minister was because he had remained faithful to the monarchy
in 1843 and had not participated in the revolution of the Constitutionalists.
Even though Greek historians have not dealt extensively
with the Roulgaris administration and one historian even goes
as far as to ascertain that the Boulgaris government did not
63
face serious foreign difficulties,
it will be seen in this
section that the problems of Greece with the Foreign Powers
increased and tensions were not absent until the establishment
of the Financial Commission of 1857.
The Greek Legation in Paris informed the government in
Athens, that, ''Monsieur Walewski at the news has reiterated
the assurance that any hostile disposition did not exist on
the part of France toward the King or against the new Cabinet.
II
64 The Rritish"were not as pleased as the French ap-

..

.

peared to be about the change of ministries.

Wyse speculated

that:

62 Fotiades, The Exile, 240-41, Also see Kordatos,
Moaern Greece, III, 658-59.
63 Aspreas, Modern Greece, I, 235.
64

A.Y.E. 1855 (18/2), No. 254, Roque to Sylvergos,
Paris, October 11, 1855.
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The object of this ministry, will be to detach the French
from the English Lep,ation, to divide the Ministers, and,
as they hope, the governments, and the means for this will
be the distribution and displacements, without scruple, of
office a malignant and treacherous press, in which, in
France, as well as here, the most unbounded devotion to
France and French Party and French interests will be professed.
England, if not calumniated, will be kept in the
background, and an intimate union attempted to be brought
about between the French partisans so called, and the Russian, in this country to the exclusion always of England,
so as at length to bring her to the isolated position in
which they formally stood.
In a word, it will be the system of M. Coletti on a larger and more vicious scale, and
in more critical circumstances, again succeeding to the
fatal moderation of M. Mavrokordatos, 65
Given this observation of the British ambassador in Athens, it
can be seen why the British government was so apprehensive
about ending the occupation.

Every victory which the Crown

scored the Allied Powers considered not as Greek but a Russian
victory.

Every time British policy and actions were attacked

or intercepted in Greece, the Foreign Office considered it as
a victory of the French or the Russians.

Both England and

France believed that tpe causes of the Greek insurrection
against the Turks in 1854 were the product of Russian propaganda or Greek propaganda inspired by Russia.

They also main-

tained throughout the period of the Crimean War that any act
by the Greeks against the Turks or their Allies was an act
executed on behalf of Russia, or at least to her benefit
against the interests of France and England.
On account of these assumptions entertained by the
Allied Powers and, especially, Great Britain the removal of

65 F.O. 32/231, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, September 29, 1855.
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the foreign troops from Piraeus was a distant goal.

In October

Trikoupis, the representative in London, informed his government that the Western Powers were just as suspicious of Greek
policy in the Near East a year and a half after the declaration of neutrality as they were during the months of the revolution.

"The allies," he wrote to Potles, "do not deny, that

the neutrality is actually maintained, but they regard this
as an act of necessary supervision, and that our Court is al66
ways pro-Russian."
After the "ministry of occupation" took
power in May 1854, Otho had the opportunity to abandon the
policy of irredentism and direct the country to a policy of
pe~ceful

coexistence with Turkey and emphasize internal growth

and economic reform.

Instead he continued to pursue a dream

which Kolettes passed on to him and he prayed that the British
and French would loose in the Crimean War so he could utilize
his plans for expansion.

As the British representative at

Athens observed about the Greek royal plans for expansion:
It is the state of "reverie" in which Her Majesty the
Queen admits herself to be until some success of Russia,
some check of the Allies, some outbreak among the Christian races of the Ottoman Empire may present the opportunity to convert the "reverie" into project, and the
project, if possible, into a "fait accompli." This is
the great end of the existing policy.
It may hold our
hope to Greek vanity or Bavarian ambition, but it is not
a state of confidence in us, nor of peace and good faith
towards their Turkish neighbors. 67

66 A.Y.E. 1855, 18/1, Private and Confidential, Trikoupis to Potles, London, October 21, 1855.
67 F.O. 32/232, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, October 6,
1855.
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Wyse and Mercier began to attack the new administration as
soon as it was formed and on October 1, in an interview at
the Palace both representatives openly charged that the constitution in Greece was continuously violated and the coun68
Otho felt that it was not the place
try was misgoverned.
of Wyse or Mercier to criticize the administration and sovereignty of Greece, and he strongly considered such obnoxious
criticisms as foreign intervention in the Greek internal affairs.

Furthermore, he believed that the Treaty of 1832, which

guaranteed Greece its independence as a State to be ruled by
one monarch, was violated by inconsiderate remarks of the
French and British ministers.
When the ministry presented a draft to the king concerning the question of neutrality Otho requested that the
paragraph referring to the advantages which Greek neutrality
brought to the commercial and political stability of Greece
should be modified. 6"9

The king would not admit to his coun-

try that his foreign policy in 1853-1854, before the occupation, was very costly to the nation, and this only irritated
relations between Greece and Western Europe.

But Otho did

not stop infuriating the Allied Powers with his denial that
he had embraced the Megali Idea foreign policy.

After the

interview with Wyse and Mercier, the king decided to visit
68 Bower & Bolitho, Ot~

f, 206-07.

69 F.O. 32/232, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, November 13, 1855.
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the Russian Church in Athens, an act which was intended to
openly allow the world to know that he never regretted supporting the struggle against the Turks.

The Greek press re-

ported that the king's visit to the Russian Church was not
planned but happened by chance.
believe this story.

The Western Powers did not

The British intelligence in Greece in-

formed the Foreign Office that:
The King not only did not come to the Russian Church as
pretended by chance, but the visit was arranged two days
before, and communications were held between a member of
the Russian Legation and a strong Russian partisan in communication with the Court. •
The Russian clergy here,
the singers, and the Russian Legation were all present,
and the members of the Legation were in their evening dress,
and the Charge d'Affaires of the Legation, M. Persiany,
were the Grand Cordon of the Saviour.
The prayers actually
said were closed I understand with the Docology •
which prayers in the Russian Church are followed, by prayers
for the Imperial family nomination, and in time of war, with
prayers for the success of their arms. At these prayers the
King was present. 70
The king could afford to display his apathy toward the occupying
Powers since he had the support of the Germanic Powers and his
popularity in Greece had risen decisively as a result of the
occupation.

Many among the public viewed Otho as a hero, for

he embraced the Greek national cause, and because of this,
France and England humiliated him and the nation.

As in 1850,

the popularity of the Crown increased again during the occupation, and with the help of the German Courts, Otho was actually
in a much stronger position than he appeared to his contemporaries.

70 F.O. 32/233, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 4,
1855.
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After the first success of eliminating the influence
of the Occupying Powers in Greece by causing the Mavrokordatos
resignation, the king worked on another scheme which the Greek
politicians had used before, namely, the dissolution of the
Franco-British Legation coalition in Greece which antagonized
the Court.

The government press began a press war against

England while it praised Napoleon III.

Wyse interpreted the

king's attempts to undermine British foreign policy in the following manner:
Its real purpose is the propagation of Russian opinions
and the maintainance of the present system of government
under the collar of German sympathy and protection, guided by the Camarilla and its diplomatic supporters here,
and the means to be taken are flattery to France and hostility to England, if not between the Legations, at least
between those who affect the designations of French and
English partisans, and thus creating mistrust between the
ministers, and if they can, between their governments, and
allowing free scope to the King and his supporters for the
exercise of their arbitrary power. 71
Though the Greek Court's scheme was to divide the Franco-British coalition and to undermine British foreign policy in Greece
by presenting the goals of the Foreign Office as contradictory
and damaging to French interests in Greece, the king had always
been much more favorable to France than to Great Britain.
France and Russia had not shown as much interest in Greece
since they became its Protectors as had Great Britain.

Even

during the Kolettes administration when the French Legation

71 F.O. 32/233, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December 4,
1855.
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exercised much influence in the government Great

Britain~

rep-

resented by Lord Edmond Lyons, in Athens, went to extremes in
order to assume the protagonist role in Greek internal affairs.
The result of Britain's struggles to become the dominant Protecting Power in Greece during the 1840's resulted in the blockade of 1850.

Such measures were never adopted by France and

Russia towards Greece although they were equal partners in the
Protectorate.

There was much more contempt, therefore, in the

Greek Court as well as the nation for Great Britain than for
either of the other two Protecting. Powers.
In March 1855 when Otho wrote to his father to complain about the Occupying Powers in Athens, he stressed that
the Emperor Napoleon and his Minister in Greece were much
friendlier towards him and his Court than the British government. 72

In the effort of drawing France away from England

and breaking their coalition Otho had help from Austria.

The

following dispatch clearly indicates that the Greek scheme to
break the Anglo-French coalition was part of a larger scheme
worked out by the Germanic Powers:
• • • Baron Prokesch (Austrian minister in Athens) had informed the King, that he was enabled to assure him directly
from His Majesty, the Emperor Napoleon, (for who he, Mr.
Prokesch, had the greatest admiration) that he entertained
for him, the King, the greatest sympathy; that the time was
approaching when the two governments of France and England
would be very probably obliged to relax or dissolve their

72 Otho to Ludwig, Athens, March 16, 1855.
Skandames, Kingdom ££ Otho, 991-92.
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union; that already France was drawing closer to Austria,
and that Austria on her part becoming much more satisfied
with France and proportionally dissatisfied with England;
that the result of these new relations would be soon felt
in Greece. 73
Mercier, the French Charge d'Affaires in Athens upon hearing
this news flatly denied that the insinuations of Baron Prokesch
were based on facts and praised the Anglo-French alliance. 74
The Austrians did not stop protecting the Bavarian Dynasty in
Greece whether they had the support of the French or not.
Baron Prokesch after conferring with the king and queen announced that Otho had fallen victim to bursts of national
feeling in Greece against Turkey so he could not be blamed
for the events of the uprising of 1854.

Furthermore, Prokesch

communicated these observations to the Austrian government
with the implication that the two Western Powers are unjustified in occupying Greece.

75

The press played an important role in the scheme to
shatter Anglo-French relations for the benefit of the Germanic
Powers and the Bavarian dynasty in Greece.

Elpis (Hope), the

newspaper edited and published by C. Levides, whom in the fall
of 1854, the French troops had arrested, continued to publish

73 F.O. 32/233, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
December 19, 1855.
74 Ibid.
75 F.O •. 32 I 239, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 26,
1856.
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articles with the intention of creating an Anglo-French rivalry
in Greece such as the one which existed during the administration of Kolettes.
King Otho understood his mission in the East, not such as
the convention of London considered it to be, when it
formed a kingdom of a span's length, but such as Western
Diplomacy should have considered it, had it looked upon
the Greek Kingdom, as a political structure and not as a
mite bestowed by Christian charity.
Concerning France the paper took a different attitude.
The French Nation has generous sentiments, and does not
measure politics with the mere yard of its manufactures:
it became great by pursuing a generous policy and not a
policy of "the yard." 76
A number of other papers 77 also tried to do the same sort of
thing as Eplis, and there was little doubt that behind them
were the officers of the Greek Court and the "Russian" party.

78

All the efforts, however, on the part of the king, the
press and the Austrians, to flatter the government of France
and to create some kind of friction between the French and
British Legations in Athens did not help at all the situation
of Greece at the Paris Peace Conference.

The Greek government

wished that it should have a representative at the Paris Peace

76 Elpis, No. 833, December 21, 1855.
7 7 F.O. 32/239, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, February 6,
1856, also F.O. 32/239, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, January 8,
1856.
78

Anexartetos, No. 253, Athens, January 14, 1856,
(a court paper) published an article pointing out the dilemma
facing the Wes~ern Powers in regards to the Eastern Question.
The conclusion arrived in the article was that the Christians
of the Ottoman Empire would eventually win their cause for
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Conference, if not for any other reason, than the termination
of the Franco-British occupation which had already lasted for
79
two years. Alexander Rangabes,
the Minister for Foreign
Affairs from February 1856 to February 1857, had made extraordinary efforts to have his country represented in Paris but
the French and British governments argued that Greece did not
participate in the Crimean War therefore could not be among
the participants at the Conference.

8

°

Count

Alexand~r

Walewski,

the French Foreign Minister, informed the Greek Charge d'Affaires
in Paris that his country would not be represented in the Peace
Conference and that she would not even be consulted concerning
the privileges of the Christian subjects living under the Otto81
man rule.

Turkey is getting weaker and Christians and Muslims cannot coexist equally in the same state. The Crimean War only helped
the Christian subjects of Turkey but weaken the Ottoman State
which was wrongly supported by the Western Powers.
79 When Alexander Rangabes was notified by the Prime
Minister that the king chose him as the new minister for
Foreign Affairs he went to Otho and explained that he could
not accept the position for he and Wyse had "bad relationship."
The king and queen insisted, however, that Rangabes should accept the ministry so the former yielded to the wishes of the
Crown.
See Rangabes, Memoirs, III, 325-29.
80 Laskaris, History £i Greece, 411. Trikoupis reported to the Greek government that Greece was excluded f rom
the Conference before Rangabes became Foreign Minister.
See
A.Y.E. 1856, No. 33, Confidential, Trikoupis to Potles, London,
February 21, 1856.
81 Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 411.
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At the peace negotiations Baron Rrunnow, who along
with Count Orlov represented Russia, brought up the subject
of the Franco-British occupation.

The Allied Powers main-

tained that there was a need to keep the troops in Greece as
the situation of brigandage had not been totally resolved and
there were still incidents on the Greek-Turkish frontier caused
by Greek radical nationalists who still hoped to liberate the
Provinces of Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia from the Ottoman
Empire.

82

Furthermore, the British and French representatives

stated that there was still an excitement for war among the
Greek people and under such conditions they argued the presence
of the Franco-British troops was necessary to insure tranquility
in that country.

The Germanic Powers, Austria, Bavaria and

Prussia, revealed the same concern about the occupation of
Greece as had the Tsar's representatives, but neither the French
nor the British wished to go into any detailed discussion con-

.

cerning the future status of Greece in relation to the Protecting Powers.
The failure of Greece to be admitted to negotiations
was not only due to the fact that Greece was an insignificant
state in the European community, but

~lso

beca~se

there was an

ideological conflict between the irredentist policy of Otho and
the guarantee of Ottoman integrity by the Western Powers at the

82

A.Y.E. 1856 (18/1), No. 70, Trikoupis to Rangabes,
London, April 20, 1856.
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Paris Peace Conference.

83

Furthermore, that Greece was a Pro-

tectorate of France, England and Russia placed her a step below
the other European nations which were recognized as totally
autonomous and independent from the other European Powers.
The Greek Government intended to address a formal "protest to the different Courts of Europe, against the declaration respecting Greece at the Conference at Paris," hut instead it "decided on presenting a Memorial or Note containing
various propositions to the Legations of their Protecting Powers at Athens." 84

Seeing that there was no hope of gaining

any concessions at the Conference, the Greek Government decided to address a note to the Legations of the Occupying Powers
in Athens in order to persuade them to reconsider removing
their forces from Piraeus.

Rangabes stated in the note that

his government had friendly intentions toward the Ottoman
State and the Western Powers and tried to reassure Wyse and
Mercier that there would be no repetition of hostile actions
85
towards Turkey on the part of the Greeks.
Neither representative trusted the words of the Greek Foreign Minister for

83 Markezines, Political History, I, 234-36.
84 F.O. 32/241, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, May 28, 1856.
85
1856

F.O. 32/242, Rangabes to Mercier, Athens, May 21,
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they were convinced that the Greek government was not in the
hands of the Counsul but under the absolute control of the
king.

On this matter Wyse added the following report to the

Foreign Office:
We had deliberately and officially informed him that we
should withdraw from all intervention either as to measures, or men in his administration, but that considering he had absorbed all the governing powers into his
own hands, reduced the Constitution to a shadow, and was
to all intents and effects an absolute monarch, we should
be directed in our future relations towards him, by realities, and not by names, and placing the responsibility on
him solely, and not his ministers or the Nation, for the
future proceedings of his government. 86
The French were similarly convinced that the king's intentions
and policy could not be trusted as they maintained "that there
was always in Greece much sympathy for Russia, much covetousness concealed in the Turkish Provinces." 87

The occupation

would be retained therefore until both Britain and France decided that an administration was running the country which was
trustworthy and

reliab~e

by the Western Powers.

Wyse viewed

with serious suspicion certain changes that had taken place in
the Boulgaris ministry and this was the primary reason for the
rejection by both Protecting Powers to lift the occupation.
"The truth is," Wyse wrote, "the whole object had in view for
some time past, is to constitute a ministry partly, of daring
partisans, partly of insignificant men, or whom the Court in

86 F.o. 32/242, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, June 18, 1856.
87

Driault, Histoire Diplomatique, II, 412-13.
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case of need, can implicitly rely.
accomplished."

88

This has now been nearly

Unless some type of political influence

could be exerted in the government in Athens by the Occupying
Powers they would not consider leaving.
w~re

The Germanic Powers

too weak to challenge the policy and actions of the two

Powers in Greece and Russia had just finished a conflict with
the Western Powers over the Near Eastern Question and the new
Russian Tsar, Alexander II, was not about to antagonize either
89
France or England by opposing their occupation of Greece.
The British and the French, to a certain degree, were
more afraid of Russian influence in Greece than of new attacks
by Greek insurgents against Turkey.

The complaints of the

Western Powers that Greece was misgoverned and that there was
still a fear of renewed hostilities in the Provinces were all
used as justification to maintain their military and naval
forces in Piraeus.

They would remain until a pro-British and

pro-French government was in power in Athens.

Before the

Kolettes administration, Lyons, in a conversation with Prokesch
had unfolded the British way of thinking about her Protectorate

88

F.O. 32/243, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 22, 1856.

89 Russia would only go as far as to commit herself verbally to aid Greece as one of the Protecting Powers.
"Baron
Brunnow assured those present (at the Conference) that Russia
would associate itself in improving the state of affairs in
Greece." Nomikos, International Position of Greece, 286.
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in the Near Fast - - a view that later applied to France as well.
A really independent Greece is an absurdity.
Greece, is
either Russian or English and, since she must not be Russian,
she must be English.
I cannot see that there is any doubt
about that; no man in his senses would doubt it.
England's
role is outlined in these words - - be sure that she will
carry it out and she will smash every obstacle that she
meets in her way.
It is not a Tory or a Whig question; it
is a national question.
The King is not on our side, therefore he is Russian - - but, mark you, we have not made a
90
kingdom out of Greece in order to create a Russian Province.
This attitude did not change in the course of fifteen years that
had lapsed since Lyons had stated his country's position toward
Greece.

When in 1856 Britain and France proposed that Greece

had to undergo reforms and improvements before the troops were
ordered out of the country Russia could very well understand
that such propositions were only intended to control Greek politics and finances.

This is clearly revealed in a dispatch sent

to Clarendon from Wyse:
As Russian Diplomacy seems to be much shocked at the present moment at the language held hy the British and French
Governments in referring to the state of Greece, and the
pressing necessity which exists in the common interests
of the three Powers, and of Europe, to provide means for
its reform and improvement, your Lordship may perhaps not
think it inopportune to recall to the recollection of its
agents, who appear to have conveniently forgotten the fact,
what was the language, (and it is to be pronounced the convictions of the Russian Government as to the state of this
country, the conduct of the Sovereign and the duty imposed
upon the Protecting Powers to such and obtain effective
redress on former occasions, but especially in 1843, previous to the establishment of the Constitution, a period
which they are constantly impressing on us, (As a reason
for the suppression of the Constitution) as one, compared 91
to the present, of progress, order, purity and prosperity.

90 Cited in Bower & Bolitho, Otho

91
1856.

F.o.

f, 106-07.

32/244, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, August 12,
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The threat of Russophilism in Greece by the Court, the eovernment and the people was indeed a much ereater problem for the
two Western Powers than was the threat of a nationalist uprising and not until some type of Franco-British control had been
established in Greece to prevent a Russian influence in that
country would the occupation be removed.
D.

Economic Interests of England and France

in Greece and the Ending of the Occupation
On 3 February 1853, Wyse sent a sixty-eight page dispatch to his government concerning: (A) the corrupt government
of Greece, (B) the injustices practiced on all levels of government against the people, (C) the gross mismanagement of the
finances of the country by the authorities.

The passage below

summarizes the major problems of the Greek government:
One of the crying evils of the Greek system is a machinery
out of all proportion to the population and purpose • •
unhappily in a country like this with no manufacture, little
agriculture, the professions crowded, and government employment the only resource, the task especially under the
patronage of a Camarilla, is comparatively easy.
Ministers are too involved in the inequity themselves, too
unprotected by public or parliamentary opinion, and too
dependent on the caprices of the King or rather of those
who rule him, to think seriously of check or correction of
this abuse. • • • The presentation of a budget is an annual comedy; and Representative government itself rendered
in the eyes of the country (in accomplishment of the long
nourished desire of Court and Camarilla) an object of mistrust and contempt. 92

92 F.O. 32/205, No. 10, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens,
February 3, 1853.
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Another contemporary of Wyse, a French journalist, Edmond About,
visited Greece and made the same observations about the political, economic and social condition of the country as Wyse.
"Every minister," he wrote, "is ready to do anything in order
to retain his post.

They think of nothing else there-

fore but to retain their seat and to benefit as best their influence can be exerted from circumstances."

93

The system of

government was indeed antiquated and there were no efforts
made to improve the economic or political conditions in the
Even some of the more conservative Greek historians

country.

who sympathize with the Crown admit the serious problems in
the economy and the governmental system.

Conditions in Greece

seem even more deplorable when viewed by contemporaries such
as Wyse or About who were exposed to the liberal political
systems of France and England, or when viewed by modern historians or politicians who have been exposed to progressive
movements of socialism and communism. 94
One of the accounts concerning the political, economic
and social conditions of Greece under the Bavarian Dynasty
written by a contemporary, Professor S.I. Tzivanopoulos, shows

93

\
About, Grece,
153.

94 Kordatos, Modern Greece, III, Fotiades, The Exile,
T. Bournas, Historia tes Neoteras Helladas (History-of Modern
Greece) (Athens, 1974r;-G. Zevgos, Syntome Melete tes Neoellinikes Historias (A Short Study of Modern Greek History)
(Athens), N. G•. Svoronos, Episkopesi tes Neoellinikes Historias
(A Survey of Modern Greek History) (Athens, 1976), all look to
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that Greece had indeed made very slow progress since its establishment as an independent nation.

The observations of

Professor Socrates I. Tzivanlpoulos, who wrote under the dynasty of king George I (1863-1913), are very similar to those
of Wyse and About.

He criticized Otho for using the Guaran-

teed Loan of 60 million francs to surround himself and the
Court with luxuries instead of using the money, as it was in95
tended, "for public works, and relieving the distress."
Every aspect of Greek society was suffering from a disadvantage of one kind or another.

The army was an institution

greatly abused by the Bavarian Dynasty and the Greek politicians.
Under the plea of preparing the means for the realization
of the "Grande Id~e" it was gradually increased to about
10,000 men, and swallowed 8,000,000 drachmas out of a budget estimated at 24,000,000.
The organization and discipline did not increase in proportion to the numbers and
expenditure, for this army was freely used not to maintain order, but to work the constitution and the result
was an army of po~iticians. 96
The municipal organization of the country was equally devastating.
We see that ahove 60,000,000 of drachmas of national produce have been wasted in the last 30 years, without any
attempt being made to improve the internal condition of

the Othonian period as an era of absolutism guided by the
principles of corruption and adventurous imperialism.
95 Tzivanopoulos, Condition of Greece, 4.
96

.!.E..!i. '

26 •
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the country. The demarchs neglect all local business;
and the people are powerless to do anything for themselves.
No steps have been taken till now by the demarchs to make
roads, to build a hospital, or establish a school; to open
new markets for the improvement of agriculture, or to extend commercial enterprise.
But the majority of them being obliged to act as subordinates to the Eparchs, and as
agents of the central administration, became petty tyrants
and offered a direct impediment to all material progress
of the country. 97
The businessman, the farmer, the worker, were all neglected by
the Bavarian Dynasty in Greece and the only point of attention
for Otho was the territories of Epirus, Thessaly and Macedonia.
He wanted to expand for his own glory and rejected reform and
development in a country which needed it the most.
Even though it is generally agreed among twentiethcentury historians as it was agreed among contemporaries of
the Othonian era that the Bavarian Dynasty in Greece made
slow progress for the country, there are opposing views on
this matter and one that deserves the attention of the historian is that of Alexander Rizo Rangabes.

The ex-foreign

minister, unlike Professor Tzivanopoulos, takes a different
line of argument and holds that Greece actually started from
point zero in 1832 when it joined the community of European
nations and it made enormous progress in just a thirty year
period under Otho.

lle concludes that the question for Greece

is not internal development at all but territorial expansion.
"It is not," he writes, "it will be agreed her example that

97 Ibid., 30.
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European diplomacy has a right to invoke, when denouncing that
Christians of the East as incapable of self government, in
order to evade the solution of the 'Eastern Question,' and to
98
prolong the impossible existence of Turkey."
The work of
Rangabes cannot be taken too seriously for it was written as
propaganda tool. 99

It does, however, represent the nation-

alist point of view typical of those who embraced the Megali
Idea in the nineteenth as well as the twentieth centuries.
The two works, by Rangabes and Tzivanopoulos, outline the
dichotomy that existed in the Greek public mind; the approach
of Rangabes had its origin and derived its momentum from the
Kolettes-Otho dictatorship, whereas the Tsivanopoulos approach
explains the ''English," and more specifically the Mavrokordatos
plan for the present and future condition of Greece.
This gap in opposing policies in Greece had to be
filled as far as France. and England were concerned if they
were to prevent_Russia from having the dominant role in Greece.
Since it became-impossible to influence the politics in Greece
through the ministry it became necessary to find another means
of control, namely, financial.

98

Rangabes, Greece, 102.

99 The work was first published in France under the
title Ca Turkie .£.!:!. La Grece. Hhen it was published in English
Rangabes was serving as representative of Greece in Washington,
D.C. in 1867.
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Throughout the Crimean War period up to the time of
evacuation in February 1857 the Occupying Powers were constantly pressing Greece to meet its financial obligations
towards them.

In December 1854 the Greek government passed

a law which gave it authorization to raise 5,000,000 drachmas
loan.

Upon receiving this news the Foreign Office objected

on the grounds that Greece had first to pay the interest on
the 60 million francs loan before attempting to raise another
loan.

Wyse had informed Paicos in January 1854, that although

there was no measure of opposition in Article 6 of the Treaty
of 1832 prohibiting the raising of any loan which the Greek
government felt it needed, he was surprised to find out that
a loan was considered to be raised at a time when there was
attempt on the part of Greece to discharge its former financial
obligations towards the Protecting Powers.

He went on to

state that:
• • • when the Kirig and Kingdom of Greece had bound themselves by that Treaty to see that the actual receipts of
the Greek Treasury should ''be devoted first of all to the
payment of the interest and sinking fund for~he-repay
ment of th~ loan and that they should not be employed for
any other purpose until those payments should have been
completely secured for the current year,'' and when not
withstanding no such payments, with one slight exemption,
from deficiency of funds or other causes had been made, I
thought it singular and said so that a new engagement
should be contemplated (this being the position of the
old) or, at all events, without consulting with the Creditors or their representatives here. 100

lOO A.Y.E. 1853, 8/1, Wyse to Paicos, Athens,
January 5, 1854.
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Since Greece was obligated by the Treaty to discharge its
financial obligations to its Protectors first before trying
to raise any other loans she found that the Great Powers
could reject her proposals for new loans if they were not
satisfied with the political establishment in Greece. 101
In 1854 the question of interest to be paid on the 60,000,000
francs loan came up again, primarily for political reasons,
even though the "ministry of occupation" was in control in
Athens.

In September Mavrokordatos informed the three Powers

that the Greek government could not meet the payments on the
interest of the 60 million francs loan.

Persiany, the Rus-

sian Charge d'Affaires in Athens, responded mildly stating
that he would inform his government on the matter.

102

The

reply of the British representative was not nearly as sympa103
thetic as that of Persiany or even Forth-Rouen.
The practical disregard shown by former Ministers of
Finance to these undeniable claims, by not only not
liquidating, but not even attempting to liquidate or
even to nottfy the Protecting Powers, their inability
to liquidate the smallest portion of these demands, was
only equalled by the insolent indifference to official

101 A.Y.E. 1853, 8/1, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, January
5, 1854.
102 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Persiany to Mavrokordatos,
Athens, September 11, 1854.
103 A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Forth-Rouen to Mavrokordatos,
Athens, September 15, 1854.
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duty and public opinion, by which through a puerile artifice, they annually paraded in the budget a certain sum,
professedly destined for such an object, but of which, as
no portion found its way into the Treasuries of the Protecting Powers, it is only charitable to suppose that it
was never levied, or was diverted from its legitimate destination at least other state purposes.
This with the
clumsy annual mystification for the purpose of nominally
swelling the return of receipts to some semblance of equality with Expenditure, • • . naturally produced in the whvle
government a disgraceful negligence of the public resources,
and what was far worse, a fatal disregard to the most sacred public and private engagements. 104
After the long lecture on economics by Wyse, the British government agreed, as had the other two Protecting Powers, "not to
press the Greek government, at the present moment, for payment
of the interest on the loan guaranteed by the Protecting Powers," but that Greece should make genuine efforts for regular
105
payment of the interest.
As long as the "ministry of occupation" was in power the Western Powers would not pressure
Greece as such to meet its financial obligations.

Once Otho

removed that ministry, however, the Occupying Powers could no
longer rely on political influence in Greece, so it became
essential for them to start again asking for the delayed paymenta on the loan and ultimately to set up a system of financial control.
The Boulgaris administration unsuccessfully asked to
be included in the Paris Peace Conference.

Furthermore, the

104
A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Wyse to Mavrokordatos, Athens
October 28, 1854.
105

A.Y.E. 1854, 8/1, Clarendon to Wyse, Foreign
Office, October 9, 1854.
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Allies did not desire to end the occupation.

After Rangabes

failed to gain any representation for his country in the Peace
Conference, he began working towards the goal of removing the
foreign troops from Piraeus.

In an interview with Wyse and

Hercier, the Greek foreign minister openly requested that the
occupying forces be removed from Greece, but both representa106
tives instantly rejected his request.
The reply of Wyse
and Mercier was allowed by Rangabes to be published in the
press in order to excite anti-western sentiment among the
public.

Part of the published reply is as follows:

• that their governments did not see with satisfaction appointed into office men well known as professed
enemies of Turkey; that brigandage continued to distress
the country, and that the Greek government neglected to
carry into operation such changes and reforms as were
calculated to promote the internal welfare of the country;
that the object of the occupation had not been to interfere with the internal government of the Kingdom • •
But as the object of the occupation was to impede, on the
part of Greece, the disturbance of the Ottoman Provinces
on the frontier that the Powers, however, desirous they
may be to remove their troops,still they cannot do so
until sufficient guarantee shall be given by the Greek
government, that Turkey shall remain unmolested on the
part of Greece. 107
This publication naturally aroused great excitement among the
Greeks who had been occupied for a period of over two years
but the reaction of the Western Powers to this article was
also very bitter and immediately Wyse sent a dispatch to

106 F.O. 32/243, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 9,
1856.
107 ELPIS, No. 858, Athens, June 23, 1856.
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Rangabes complaining that secret diplomatic talks were allowed
to be publicized in the press for the sole purpose of exciting
108
the public mind.
Rangabes gained support from the public
by exposing the Occupying Powers for their refusal to lift the
troops from Piraeus, but neither France nor England would be
persuaded by Greek public opinion in their policy towards Greece.
The concept of systematic financial control in Greece,
which was implicit in the Treaty of 1832, appeared an inescapable resort for the Western Powers.

Article 12, paragraph 6

of the Treaty gave the right to the Protecting Powers to collect their money first, before the department of Finance had
fulfilled any other financial obligations.

Wyse who was famil-

iar with this article of the Treaty was the first to suggest
that the three Protecting Powers of Greece should set up a
Financial Commission which would provide them with the interest of the guaranteed loan.
It seems, therefore to me, incontestable that the representatives of the Three Powers, in the exercise of their
strict right, all in discharge of their duty, not only are
authorized under international convention but are required
by the position to which this question has arrived, to inquire, why it is the Treasury is not in a position to meet
this debt, • • • and what remedies are to be applied to
check these causes, and to bring the pecuniary condition
of this kingdom into such order, as will enable it to fulfill (even in part) its obligations. • •
The first step
then starting from these premises, which I venture to submit to your Lordship, is a "Commission of Inquiry" into
"the state of the Greek Finances." 109

108 F.O. 32/243, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, July 9, 1856.
109 F.O. 32/243, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, July 12,
1856.
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Wyse, as well as Britain and France, expressed the desire to
collect their payments on the interest from Greece but also
to improve and reform the financial state of the country.
In June 1856, the British Parliament brought to discussion once again the poor and corrupt financial administration of Greece and attempted to justify the prolonged occupation as a result of Greek unwillingness to cooperate with the
Western Powers and thinking who had not followed the Constitution of 1843.
If the Greek Government had properly managed its financial
affairs th~re would have been ample means to meet all the
charges upon it.
It had failed to do so; the liability
had fallen upon the Powers which guaranteed the loan, and
representations innumerable had been made upon the subject
to the Greek Government, but without effect. 110
Restrictions on Greek financial affairs became more rigid during the Boulgaris administration.

In the autumn of 1856 the

Greek government proposed a set of Laws for the alienation of
the National Lands.

Both Britain and France strongly objec-

ted to the sale of the National Lands and advised Rangabes
that his government had no right to take such action without
first consulting with the Protecting Powers.

The Foreign

Office advised Wyse to send the following message to the Greek
foreign minister:
I have received instructions from Her Majesty's Government
that in as much as the Protecting Powers have a right under
the Treaty of 1832 to claim the whole revenues of Greece

110 Session of June 2, 1856, Hansard, 3rd series, CXII,
852-54.
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arising from every source, while the National Lands have
been mortgaged to the British Landholders with whom the
Greek Government contracted loans in England in 1824, and
1825, and in which no interest has been paid since 1827,
to protest against any sale or Allienation of the National
Lands. 111
The Foreign Minister obviously objected to the interference of
the Protecting Powers in Greek internal affairs.

But Wyse re-

plied on two different occasions that the Greek government took
the proposed measures, concerning the National Lands issue,
before the Chambers to be passed before consulting with the
112
three Powers to which Greece still owed money.
When Rangabes charged that the Chambers passed the bill therefore it
was a matter out of his control, Wyse simply placed all res113
ponsibility with the foreign minister.
The British and
French Legations in Athens were informed that Rangabes actually
favored passage of the bill and this is why Wyse entirely
blamed him for it.

There were, however, political reasons for

the Franco-British opposition to the bill besides the obvious
economic ones which were stated above by the British representative.

These political reasons were described to the Earl of

Clarendon by Wyse as follows:

111 A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, September 25, 1856, also see F.o. 32/245, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens,
September 28, 1856, also F.O. 32/245, Confidential, Wyse to
Clarendon, Athens, October 7, 1856.
112

A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, October 14, 1856.
113 F.O.
32/245, Wyse to Rangabes, Athens, October
27, 1856.
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Mr. Boulgaris has been outvoted in the ministry, by Mr.
Koumoundouros (the ally of General Spiro-Milio, and others
of his party) by Mr. Rizo Rangabe and Mr. Chrystopoulos.
Out of doors, General Spiro-Milios, Mr. Chrestides, and
Mr. Levides give, it is reported, their aid, and laugh at
the idea that our protests can have the least weight in
retardinr these measures, "t-Je have had plenty of these
notes," is their reply, "and what harm have they done?
have they stopped a single proceeding?" llith other observations still more contumelious. They act under the
patronage of the Court and of its partisans, and the proposed Laws are represented as emanating directly from Her
Majesty. 114
The king as well as the ministers of the Boulgaris administration realized that France and Great Britain had lost the political battle which they had fought since the fall of the Mavrokcirdatos administration.

The two Powers which occupied

Greece for three years had failed to formulate a ministry consisting of pro-British and pro-French members, and of course
anti-Othonian members.

Otho succeeded through his use of dip-

lomacy with the Germanic Powers to prevent the French and the
British from securing a Greek administration which would be
loyal to the two Western Protecting Powers.
Since France and England failed to exert their influence in Greece by the means of a pro-Franco-British ministry in Athens the two Powers resorted to the measure of financial pressure.

They were determined to curb the king's

·power whether they exerted their influence through a ministry
o~

their choice or whether they forced the government to meet

its financial obligations towards the Protecting Powers.

114 F.O. 32/245, Confidential, Wyse to Clarendon,
Athens, October 7, 1856.
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In December 1856, the Boulgaris administration having
no other choice when confronted with the demands that Greece
should discharge its financial obligations towards the three
Protecting Powers assured the three Powers that the eventual
resources of the country would be provided for the Guaranteed
115 In spite of this reassurance from Athens that Greece
Loan.
would do its best to clear its financial obligations towards
France, Russia and Great Britain, Walewski and Clarendon were
not satisfied with such promises which the Greek government
had made before but had failed to keep.
pate~

The following dis-

from Clarendon stated the official position of Great

Britain and France:
• it is conformity with this principle that Her Majesty's Government have determined in concert that of
France to propose to the Greek Government that the Representatives at Athens of the three guaranteeing Powers
should form a permanent Commission empowered to receive
and if necessary to call for all the information which
may be required for enabling their respective governments
to judge with regard to the due employment of the Public
Funds. • • •
In·a word of duty of the Commissioners will
be to keep the three governments regularly informed of
what is going on, so that those governments may be enabled to form an opinion of the manner in which the Greek
Government deals with the resources which are pledged for
the payment of its debts and if necessary retract the aspect given by them .to the proposals of the Cabinet of
Athens • • • • if the Greek Government should acquire in
the proposal without reserve, the two ~overnments would
be disposed to look upon it as affording a sufficient
guarantee to admit of their withdrawing their troops from
Greece. 116

115 A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, No. 35, Communication francais
a M. Mercier, Paris, December 6, 1856.
116

.
A.Y.E. 1856, 8/1, Clarendon to Wyse, Foreign
Office, December 12, 1856.
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The above dispatch makes it clear that unless the Greek government agreed to the setting up of the Financial Commission the
forces at Piraeus would not be withdrawn.

Britain and France

wanted to lift the occupation and replace it with a system of
financial control.

The Political victory won by Otho in

September 1855, when he replaced the "ministry of occupation"
with the Boulgaris administration, was about to be countered
with an Anglo-French economic victory in Greece.

This time

the Germanic Powers could not come to Otho's rescue as they
had during the Crimean War, for the simple reason that Austria
was no longer needed by the Allies to over-power the force of
Russia in the Near East.

Russia, the other country from which

Otho could expect help, consented to the setting up of a Financial Commission and the Treaty of 1832 made it legal for the
Protecting Powers to interfere in the domestic finances of
Greece.
The terms und·er which the Commission was to be set up
made it very easy for the Protecting Powers not only to check
the Greek finances but to control and operate them.

This

raised questions in the British Parliament which felt that
the occupying Powers were replacing one means of force, the
occupation, with another, the Financial Commission.

"No

doubt," said the Marquess of Clanvicarde, "we ought to have
some control over the finances of the country, as it was our
debtor, and we ought to take care of our debts; yet if such
an arrangement was carried too far, it would involve us in
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difficulties."

117

To this objection the Earl of Clarendon

responded that Greece had not been responsible to the Protecting Powers in

dischar~ing

its payments and it became neces-

sary therefore to resort to extreme measures.

He defended

the idea of the Commission as one which would solve many economic problems of Greece and would end political rivalry in
that country among the Protecting Powers.
He [the Earl of Clarendon] believed that the Protecting
Powers were about to render essential service to Greece
by the advice and assistance which the Commissioners would
be able to render to her Government, and it was expected
that the Greek Government might in this way have it in
their power to effect certain administrative and financial reforms, • • • He believed the Commission would be
established in a few days and he hoped it would tend eventually to put an end to the contests for influence which
had so often taken place between foreign Powers - - contests which did no service to the Powers engaged and which
only distracted and wounded the public feeling of the coun118
try which was so unfortunate as to be the subject of them.
The people in Greek politics felt that no matter how one viewed
the Commission, its purpose was financial control of Greece by
the Protecting Powers.

Rangabes immediately protested to the

Powers against the establishment of the Commission but only
Prince Alexander Gorchakov, who replaced Nesselrode in May
1856 as Minister of Foreign Affairs, showed any sympathy.
The Russian diplomat maintained that the Emperor Alexander
would not participate in such a Commission with such rigid

117 Sessions of February 12, 1857, Hansard, 3rd series,
CXLIV, 510.
118

Ibid., 511-12.
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measures taken against Greece by the Western Powers.

119

The

Russian government's protest forced France and England to reconsider its harsh schemes of financial control and to adopt
milder measures towards the Protectorate.

When finally es-

tablished, the Financial Commission was to have recommending
and advisory powers only, a proposal which was readily accepted by the Greek government and went into effect in February
120
1857.
On February 19, the troops of England and France began the evacuation process and by the 27th of the same month
121
Greece was finally rethey had all left Greek waters.
lieved of a three year occupation only to become burdened with
the permanent establishment of a Financial r.ommission.

119 Levandis, Greek Foreign Debt, 51.

°

12 F.O. 32/252, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, March 3,
1857. Wyse reported ~n March 3rd that the evacuation was completed as two meetings of the Financial Commission had taken
place. The first meeting was on February 18, the second on
February 25. The representatives were Wyse, de Montherot,
Ogeroff.
121 In the spring of 1857 Wyse returned to England.
"On March 27, 1857, it had been announced that the Queen intended to confer on him a knight-Commandership of the Order
of the Bath, and on his arrival in England he was received
by Her Majesty and by his old friend the Prince Consort, both
of whom congratulated him heartily on his services throughout
the difficult war years." James Johnston Auchmuty, Sir Thomas
Wyse, 1791-1862 (London, 1939).

CONCLUSION
In the years which have passed since the Greek insurrection of 1854 there ·have been numerous attempts to interpret
the role of Greece in the Eastern Question.

The predominate

view among Greek historians concerning the 1854 insurrection
and the role of Greece in the Crimean War can be summarized by
the following passage from a modern account of the insurrection:
The revolution in Epiros-Thessaly and Macedonia to shake off
the Ottoman yoke, which was instigated by Greece by dispatching volunteer corps and which erupted as a result of the Crimean War, was a continuation of the 1821 struggle as a first
endeavor to complete the ideological potential of the nation
and the dispositions of the Great Powers in respect to Hellenism. 1
This conclusion is deduced from a close study of the insurrection in Thessaly in 1854.

It reflects the typical Greek

nation~

alist point of view held during the Crimean War period as well
as today.

The role of Greece in the Eastern Question for the

Greek nationalist was the same in 1821 as in 1854, 1866-1869
2
1897, and 1921.
The struggle for Greece to become an independent nation began in 1821 and ended
in 1921.

for most Greeks

Therefore, the focus of this particular point of view

is directed at only one objective, namely, territorial expan-

1 Koutroumbas, Revolution of 1854, 217.
2

These dates indicate the struggle of the Greeks who
tried to carve out a nation for themselves from the Ottoman
Empire.
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sion.

The insurrection of 1854 and the insurrections which

followed later were all continuations of the War of Independence.
Among the factors which are not considered under this
line of thought adopted by Greek nationalists are the role of
domestic politics in the events of the nation's history, the
influence of international politics in the foreign and domestic policies of the state and finally, the importance of the
various socio-economic factors which exercise a great deal of
control in society.

During the War of Independence there was

no nation of Greece, only Greeks who fought with the aid of
the Great Powers to achieve their independence.

In 1854 there

was a nation of Greece and it was the king who actually organized and supported the insurrection against Turkey, therefore the role of Greece in the Eastern Question was totally
different in 1854 than it was during the War of Independence.
In the process of change and early development, Greece
formed a number of classes, namely, the merchant, the professional, the working class and the peasantry.

Political par-

ties were also developed to such a stage that by 1843 there
was a successful constitutional revolution by those progressively minded in politics.

Finally, the most important factor

in the history of the nineteenth century was the constant
foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the country.
The second phase of the role of Greece in the Eastern Question
has, therefore, these elements which are unique and for this
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reason the occurrences of 1854 cannot be explained by the circumstances of 1821 or 1897 but only by 1854 alone without of
course loosing focus of the country's history since the War
of Independence.
The socio-economic factor in the insurrection must be
viewed historically as it was effected by three important
events in Greece:

First, a Constitutional revolution and its

failure to materialize as a result of the Kolettes triumph in
1844, second, the British blockade of Greece in 1850, and
third, the uprising of the Greeks in the Turkish Provinces and
the Occupation of Piraeus.

The failure of the Constitution

and the triumph of Kolettes resulted in the failure of the
merchant and professional class to exert its influence in
society and win economic and political predominance.

Kolettes,

unlike Mavrokordatos who favored economic development, internal
growth and reform, carved out an expansionist foreign policy
which would only
Greece.

dam~ge

the interests of the qusiness world in

The merchant class had nothing to gain from such a

policy and everything to loose since its trade with Turkey
and the Great Powers would be damaged in case of a Greek-Turkish
conflict.

The administration of Kolettes, therefore, indirectly

antagonized by its policy the middle class of Greece which was
the backbone of the Greek economy.

There was a class schism

created as a result of the triumphant exaltation of the Megali
Idea; the lower classes, especially the peasants support nationalist expansion while the middle class opposes it.

The
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third group of people which formulated the strength of the
expansionist group was the chieftains and brigands and the
wealthy Greeks of Europe who entertained nationalist dreams.
The blockade of 1850 tended to widen the schism between middle class and lower allowing room also for exceptions such as military personnel, brigands, and wealthy adventurers.

For the economy of the country the blockade was

simply disastrous.

The class which suffered the most was the

middle class so this experience was the last thing desired to
reoccur by merchants and businessmen.

Those who were already

burning with nationalism became even more radical as a result
of the blockade and the rise of Russophilism in the early
years of 1850's is a good indication of that phenomenon.
Finally, the events of 1854 completed the schism.
The lower class led by the Court politicians and by brigands
fully accepted the idea of a regenerated Byzantine Empire and
morally as well as materially supported the insurrection.

On

the other hand the middle class as well as the large part of
working class involved in navigation and commerce resented
the insurrection fearing another blockade and perhaps worse
consequences.

The finest hour for the king and those who

supported his cause came in March and April 1854, but it was
followed by the sad disappointment of an occupation in May.
The triumph of the middle class was April 1855 when the Treaty
of Commerce and Navigation was signed at Kalinja.

The economy

suffered greatly as a result of the Megali Idea policy from
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1844 to 1855 and the irony is that the governing class with
its broad mass support was engaged in a foreign policy that
contradicted the economic interests of the nation, that is,
In the world of

those of the merchant and business classes.

nineteenth century Europe which had seen the rise of the middle
class, Greece in its desperate efforts of national expansion
jeopardized the very existence of this class.
Aside from the socio-economic factors which were unique
to the developments of 1854, the importance of political factors were also unique to the role of Greece in the Crimean War
phase of the Eastern Question.

If Mavrokordatos had not been

forced to resign in 1844 and had remained in power, the 185l
revolution could have been avoided.
the beginning of a new domestic and

Kolettes' victory marked
fore~gn

to the insurrection and its consequences.
work of the

Co~stitutional

policy which led
He destroyed the

revolution only to replace it with

arbitrary government and handed down to Otho a foreign policy
which could only lead Greece to disaster.

Parliamentary gov-

ernment did not succeed and internal reform and development
were disregarded by the King.

The British blockade did not

teach Otho a lesson in discipline to the Great Powers and the
occupation of Piraeus only excited his dreams of expansion to
an even greater level.

Pointing out the absurdity of the

Megali Idea policy of the Greek Court Dr. Nomikos writes, "in
1854 under the leadership of Otho, this nation of one million
people living on 47,000 square kilometers rose to measure it-
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self up against the combined might of the Ottoman Empire and
the major European Powers."

3

The character of politics can-

not be disregarded in the direct influence it exercised over
the events of the insurrection of the Christians in the Turkish Provinces.

The absence of such politics during the War

of Independence is one more factor which accounts for the differentiation of first Greek rebellion against the Turks from
the second.
Finally, the role of international politics in Greece
contributed to the uniqueness of the 1854 experience.

During

the Othonian era there was a constant rivalry among the Protecting Powers for political control in Greece.

The Anglo-

French rivalry in 1844 replaced the Anglo-Russian rivalry and
the rivalry between Russian and the combined efforts of France
and England replaced the Franco-British rivalry after 1850.
Kolettes was responsible to a great extent for the Anglo-French
rivalry but in spite ·of this charismatic dictator who enjoyed
antagonizing England, there would have been a rivalry among
the Powers for control of policies in Greece since this country was important to control for strategic and commercial
reasons.

3

Nomikos, "International Position of Greece,'' 290.
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Great Britain proved in the decade before the occupation that no risk was too great for the political domination
of Greece.

In 1850 Palmerston blockaded the country's ports

because he could not get satisfaction from the Greek government for his political demands.

In 1854 both France and Eng-

land occupied the country for it had decided not to accept
their Near Eastern policy.

They retained the occupation for

three long years, a year even after the Paris Peace Treaty
was signed because they wanted to gain political control.
When their efforts failed, they decided the next best thing
to political control was financial control so they set up
the Financial Commission and then removed the occupying forces.
The Germanic Powers and Russia, to a lesser extent,
were the balance of power in Greece during the Crimean War
period and in many respects during the entire period of the
reign of king Otho.

Austria, Prussia and Bavaria were the

protectors of the crown against any possible abuses which
could be inflicted upon it by the Protecting Powers.

In 1850

the Germanic Powers joined the rest of Europe in defending
Greece against Palmerstonian aggressive diplomacy in that
nation.

In 1854 and throughout the Crimean War Austria and

the other two Germanic states gave Otho their full support
when his throne and power was endangered by the Occupying
Powers.
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Russia during the six year period of 1844-1850 had
become, to a large extent, aloof from Greek affairs but in
1850 the Tsar came out very strong in support of the king
against Britain.

During the Holy Places question Russia took

the role of the protector and defender of the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire and flirted with Greece during
the entire affair.

In 1854 Nesselrode announced that his

country approved of the Greek insurrection and in that same
year the Tsar made it known to the world that his struggle
against Turkey was in defence of the Christians of the Near
East.

At the. Conferences in Paris Russia tried to eliminate

Anglo-French influence in Greece and asked what were these
Powers intending to do about the occupation.

Finally, Russia

defended Greece before the Financial Commission was established
by protesting to the harsh measures of the Commission.
The foreign policies of the Powers in Greece, the politics of the court, and the socio-economic factors which existed in 1854 were absent during the War of Independence.

Greece

discovered after the Crimean War that its role in the Eastern
Question had undergone radical transformations so the same
goals which were sought for in 1821 could not be hoped to be
realized thirty years later under the same circumstances as
took place during the War of Independence.

One indication of

the realization process that took place was the abolition of
the "foreign" parties that is "English," "French" and "Russian."
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The end of the Crimean War marked the end of these parties
as Greeks realized that their interests could not be identical with those of any other country than their own.

APPENDIX
British interests in Greece were not strategic and
political only but economic as well.

The British currant

traders of Patras had established an economic stronghold in
Greece and exercised a great deal of influence in the economic policy of the Greek government.

In the early months

of 1853 the British currant traders urged Thomas Wood, British Consul at Patras, to stop a fixed duty on currants introduced by Christides, minister of France.

1

When losses were suffered in the currant trade as a
result of a blight the British Legation in Athens demanded
that the Greek government should be held responsible for reimbursing the British merchants since the merchants paid a
2
fixed duty on a bad crop of export.
By December 1853, the British currant merchants in
Patras and the Ionian Isles demanded a reduction of duty in
England for their products.

Wyse was able to persuade the

new minister of finance, Provelgios, to comply with the
demands of the British Legation concerning the economic benefit of the British merchants.

1 F.O. 32/207,
April 26, 1853.

c.c.

The British representative in

Ignate and Co. toT. Wood, Patras,

2 F.O. 1/207, Wyse to Paicos, Athens, June 30, 1853.
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Athens felt that a reduction of duty on currants would benefit the Greek economy as well as the British merchants of
Greece.

He felt therefore that "if the Greek Government are

to receive concessions, it ought not to refuse at least its
cooperation, to render them available, and reduction of duty
in England ought to suggest and be accompanied by a sweeping
away of all unnecessary and vixatious interference, and a
security for a judicious and steady commercial policy in
Greece for the future."

3

The beneficiary of the lower duty

on currants from Greece would clearly have been the British
merchants of Patras and thus Great Britain.

Greece had little

to benefit since it would be forced to grant more concessions
to the British.
Under the administration of Mavrokordatos fixed duties
went into effect

4

much to the satisfaction of the British Le-

gation and merchants of Patras.

Under the administration of

Boulgaris the ministry of finance thought it profitable to do
away with the fixed duty and reintroduce the "old system of
Protocols."

Upon this news Wyse filed the following report

at the Foreign Office.

"Currants form a very large item in

3 F.O. 32/208, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, December
27, 1853.
4 F.O. 32/222, British and Ionian Merchants to
T. Wood, Patras, October 10, 1854.
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the annual list of her (Greece) exports, and the more or less
extension of the market and production, is to her a matter of
vital moment.

We are the chief consumers, but not dependent

for the article on her.

If we were to recur to force instead

of reason, we have at any time the remedy in our hands."

5

Wyse was successful - - at least - - in persuading the minister of finance not to change the existing law on currant
6
trade.
Obviously the presence of the Anglo-French troops
persuaded the Boulgaris government to comply with British
demands.

5

F.O. 32/240, Wyse to Clarendon, Athens, April 15,

1856.
6 F.O. 32/241, Wood to Wyse, Patras, April 28, 1856.
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